



GERMAN DISRUPTION OF SOVIET
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
IN BARBAROSSA, 1941
RUSSEL H. S. STOLFI
LONNIE 0. RATLEY, III
JOHN F. O'NEILL, JR.
DECEMBER 1983
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Prepared for: Director, Net Assessment







Commodore R. H. Shumaker David A. Schrady
Superintendent Provost
The work reported herein was supported by the Director, Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Unci assi fied
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF. THIS PAGE 'HTirn Data Entered)
t/i|«>
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
I. REPORT NUMBER
NPS-56-84-001
2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subltile)
German Disruption of Soviet Command
Control, and Communications, in Barbarossa, 1941
5. TYPE OF REPORT ft PERIOO COVERED
Special Report on Russo-
German Campaign, 1941
S. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
AUTHORC*) 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERfal
Russel H. S. Stolfi
Lonnie 0. Ratley, III
John F. O'Neill , Jr.
9 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS
II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
Office of the Director of Net Assessment




13. NUMBER OF PAGES
257




16. DISTRIBUTION ST A TEMEN T (oi this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (oi (he ebmtract entered In Block 20, It dltlerent from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS 'Continue on reverse aide II neceeaary and Identity by block number)
1. Command, Control, & Communications (C^)




20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverae aide II neceeeary and Identify by block number)
The authors examine the German plans for Operation Barbarossa and the combat
operations of the first five weeks of war in the East in June-July. The
Germans achieved enormous success in the opening stages of the offensive in-
cluding the shattering of Soviet command, control, and communications (C-3).
The purpose of the study was to determine the means by which the Germans
disrupted Soviet C^ and the resulting possible use of Barbarossa as a model for
the Soviets in disrupting NATO C^ in the opening stages of a Warsaw Pact
offensive in Central Europe today. The study is based on interviews with
DD FORM




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
Unclassi fied
(uCU>MTV CLitll'lOfiON 0» TmiI •tg(im aa r>.
German participants in Barbarossa and documents in the federal German military
archives at Freiburg. The study supports the following generalizations:
(1) The German planners of Barbarossa did not have sufficient intel-
ligence of the Soviet armed forces, their relatively primitive C^ system, and
the communications system of the Soviet states to consider as a vital part of
their planning the deliberate paralysis of the Soviet armed forces.
(2) The Germans were determined, particularly in the central front
opposite their most powerful concentration of forces, to prevent the escape of
the powerful peacetime armies into the hinterland of Russia.
(3) German military operations concentrated, therefore, on extra-
ordinarily swift and deep penetrations by mobile forces designed to encircle
and destroy the largest possible concentrations of Soviet troops causing
irreversible casualties and damage and resulting in the quick seizure of the
transportation, communications, political, and psychological hub of the Soviet
Union — Moscow.
(4) The German military operations designed to encircle physically and
destroy vast Soviet army formations simultaneously shattered Soviet C^.
A lesson of the study would seem to be that a massive, surprise offensive
at the beginning of a war should lead quickly to the destruction (direct
casualties and damage) and di stintegration (paralysis of command and
disruption of control) of the strategic defender. In a Warsaw pact offensive
at the beginning of a war in Central Europe, the Soviets could achieve a
decisive" victory with or without special emphasis on deliberate disruption of
NATO C^ simpl-y through the violence and speed of the attack against the
opposing forces in the field. It is unsettling to note further, however, that
the Soviets in applying a potential version of Barbarossa in the future would
probably deliberately target the massive and well known NATO C^ hardware
systems and personnel in West Germany with corresponding paralyzing effects
added to the destruction of the NATO forces lying in the paths of the major
attacks.
DD Form 1473 Unclassified
1 Jan .3




Impressive by any standard with approximately 20,000 tanks,
15,000 combat aircraft, and huge reserves of tough peasant
riflemen, who were politically indoctrinated by a metic-
ulously organized political party, the Red Armed Forces
stood in 1941 as the most formidable anvil which had ever
been struck, by an attacker. Shown here, a smoking KV-I




Impressive by any standard with mission oriented leadership
( Auftragstaktik ) and decisive historical style characterized
by the strategic concept of the great battle of decision
(Entscheidungsschlacht) , the German Armed Forces achieved
near-fatal results against the Soviets in the first 24- days
of Barbarossa. Shown above is an example of German tactical
flexibility: a Luftwaffe-served 88mm antiaircraft gun used
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NOTE TO THE READER
Throughout the text the U.S. equivalent of German military-
ranks have been used to avoid confusion. The German Generaloberst
of the Second World War, for example, is translated as the U.S. rank
of General, with both terms used to indicate four star general of-
ficer rank. A literal translation of Generaloberst would be Colonel
General, however, the term was not used by the U.S. Armed Forces in the
Second World War and is not used today. If one translates the ranks
in terms of star equivalents, a German General der Panzertruppe would
be an American Lieutenant General, a General leutnant an American Major
General, and, finally, a Generalmajor would be an American Brigadier
General. One exception to the concept of equivalents in the study
has been in the case of the German Generalfeldmarschall , a rank which
would be equivalent to an American General of the Army or Air Force.
The German rank Generalfeldmarschall appears in this study several
times and the authors felt that the term General of the Army would
be awkward. The term Field Marshal, therefore, has been used in




RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
In the past several years, evidence has come to light which sup-
ports a view that the Soviet Armed Forces, particularly in cases where
they have the luxury of a timely buildup of strength prior to a major
offensive, will deliberately and systematically disrupt the command,
control, and communications (C 3 ) of their military opponents. The
Soviets strongly emphasize the stunning of an opponent at the beginning
of offensive operations, and, beyond the immediate question of the
style and intensity of the disruption of C , additional questions arise
concerning the reasons for such emphasis and the historical antecedents
or model for Soviet counter C 3 operations. The Soviets have tended to
rely heavily on the experiences of the great patriotic war, particular!
when analyzing the challenges of modern ground warfare, and one must
suspect that a heavy influence from the Second World War lingers en.
It is not too much to expect, for example, that the pragmatic Soviets,
whose C 3 collapsed in the opening stages of the German surprise attack
of 1941 (code name Barbarossa) , would study the German operations as
a lesson for Soviet offensives taking place under broadly similar
strategical circumstances.
The present paper examines the German plans for Earbarossa and the
first five weeks of operations in the East. The research team which
put together the paper addressed itself to the following questions
and points:
First (Basically) , the Question: Did the Germans have a distin-
guishable, formal doctrine of attack against Soviet C 3 in Bar-
barossa? (In effect, the question describes the thesis being
tested by the research team, namely, that the Germans op-
erated under a distinguishable, formal doctrine of attack
against enemy command, control, and communications)
.
Second , the Points:
1. Identification of the Soviet C-* targets which the
Germans planned to attack within the framework of Barbarossa.
2. Identification of changes in the targeting which
occurred in the early weeks of the operation.
3. Uncovering of the actual C^ targets attacked in
the early weeks of Barbarossa.
4. Assessment of the success of the German attacks
in disrupting Soveit C .
5. Explanation of the reasons for any shifts that may
have occurred in German targeting of Soviet C .
6. Ascertainment of the balance between German attacks
on C-* targets and other targets.
The research team was most interested in getting fresh insights
from German staff planners in Barbarossa and actual participants in
the early weeks of the operation on the German methods of attack, and,
3
most specifically of course, operations against Soviet C . The study
is based predominately on interviews with German officer veterans of
Barbarossa who were systematically chosen according to service and
experience to comment on Barbarossa. The research team used the good
offices of Brigadegeneral a. D . Paul-Werner Hozzel, German Air Force,
and Oberstleutnant Albrecht von Mellenthin, German Army, in the months
of October-December 1979 to locate and contact the officer veterans of
Barbarossa who would be willing to comment on the planning and opening
stages of the operation. General Hozzel was provided with an advanced
set of questions which was intended to be distributed to the Barbarossa
veterans in advance of the interviews. The questions would serve the
purpose to prepare the veterans for the interview and warn them fairly
about the information being sought. General Hozzel edited and im-
proved the questions which were then reproduced in smooth typed format
placed in notebooks and mailed in advance to most of the German office
interviewed.
The questionnarie consisted of nine pages including an introduc-
tory letter, a sheet for background information on the Barbarossa ve-
teran, and seven pages of questions which were blocked out so that sue
cinct answers to every question could be completed on the forms them-
selves. The questions proper were divided into those which concerned:
(1) planning for Barbarossa, and (2) combat operations during the
opening stages of the operation. The research team did not intend the
the forms be completely filled out by the Barbarossa veterans and com-
prise a part of the written study but rather that they be used in a
businesslike manner to assist the Germans in thinking about the campai
and the researchers in systemically working through the subject. The
questionnarie is illustrated in Appendix A, and shows the emphasis in
the study on information about German attacks directly against Soviet
C 3 .
When the research team arrived in Germany early in January 1980,
it first made contact with General Hozzel and Lt Col v. Mellenthin in
order to establish the final schedule of interviews. With tact and
patience over the previous months, Hozzel and Mellenthin had managed
to arrange meetings with most of the officers shown in Figure 1 . The
interviews with Col Rudel and Capt v. Luttichau were set up by the
research team alone and in the latter case involved a visit to
Washington D.C. where the Barbarossa veteran is presently an historiar
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Fiqurce 1 shows that the thirteen German officers who were inter-
viewed held command and staff positions in both the Army and Lufwaffe
during the planning and execution of Barbarossa. As was originally in-
tended in the project, many of the views, interpretations, and conclu-
sions in the study are based on the interviews with those thirteen of-
ficers who held widely varied assignments in Barbarossa. The research
team additionally visited the Military Historical Research Institute
and the Military Archives of the Federal Republic at Freiburg (Breisgai
and the Photographic Archives in Koblenz. At the Military Archives
the team spent the equivalent of three man-weeks systematically search-
•a
ing for evidence of attacks against Soviet C . The team examined plans
orders, diaries, and reports of German headquarters and combat forma-
tion which executed Barbarossa. The team also examined documents at
the Hoover Institute (Stanford, CA) , Air Force History Center (Maxwell
AFB, AL) , Army History Center (Carlisle Barracks, PA), and U.S. Army,
Office, Director of Military History (Washington, DC), in an attempt
to balance the fresh, specific material provided by the oral interview:
The following observations on the sample of Barbarossa veterans
interviewed are important to estimate the accuracy and credibility of
the report on the German disruption of Soviet C^. In the report, the
thesis which was tested, essentially that the German operated under
a clear, formal doctrine of attack against Soviet C^ in Barbarossa,
was rejected by every officer interviewed and was unsupported by the
primary documents examined. The officers interviewed consistently pre
sented a picture of German attacks intended primarily to smash the
enemy through casualties to personnel and damage to equipment. The
same officers represented a statistical sample with the following
strengths and weaknesses from the viewpoint of presenting a compre-
hensive picture of Barbarossa:
Sample of German Barbarossa Veterans
Weaknesses Strenaths
1. Small Sample Size.
2. Restricted Distribution of
Rank (and Age), e.g., Lt, Capt,
Maj in Barbarossa.
3. Restricted Range of Commands
Held, e.g., Plat, Company,
Battalion.
1. Effective Distribution Among
Services, e.g., Army, Luftwaffe.
2. Effective Distribution of Staff
Positions, e.g., hi/lo staffs
varying from G-3 (opns) Army Group
to G-4 Division.
With more time and money, the research team could have interviewed
a larger sample of Barbarossa veterans but not a sample which would have
been much more significant statistically. The restricted range of ranks
and commands held in the sample can no longer, in contrast, be overcome
by any research team with any amount of time and money. A German divi-
sion commander in Barbarossa, for example, aged a reasonable 50 years
would now be 89 years old and a rare find. Notwithstanding the excel-
lent reasons for the narrow range of age, rank and command of the in-
terviewers, the sample remains restricted to officers who experienced
command in Barbarossa at junior ranks and in front line combat. The
sample, in contrast, was adequately distributed among Army and Luft-
waffe officers for purposes of picturing missions and targets attacked.
The officers who held staff positions in the planning for Barbarossa
and/or combat also represented a wide range of positions which tended
to reduce the effects of the narrow distribution of age and rank and
the limited range of command. Generalmajor Peter von der Groeben with
rank of major in Barbarossa experienced planning at the exceptionally
high level of assistant G-3 (operation) in Army Group Center
and Generalmajor Rudolf Loytved-Hardegg with rank of major served as
G-2 for Air Fleet with responsibility for Luftwaffe targeting for the
entire Soviet front for the first waves of the attack. The positions
held by Generals v.d. Groeben and Loytved-Hardegg and their heavy re-
sponsbilities under the Gentian general staff system partly counter-
balance the narrow band of ranks held by the interviewees overall.
The report represents largely German views of the planning and
opening stages of the campaign in the sense of both the personal im-
pressions of German officers and the writings in the war diaries
and similar primary documents. These sources paint a picture of the
campaign in which the Germans concentrated their efforts on the des-
truction of the opposing Soviet ground formations through deep pene-
trations of Soviet space and the accompanying pressure of the trailing
German infantry armies. The picture which becomes clear is one where
the German formations moved rapidly across the .Soviet transportation
network to prevent the Soviets from withdrawing into the hinterland
and incidental to that movement fractured the Soviet system of command
and control as it existed in the summer of 1941. The Germans additiona
ly did achieve in the first few hours of Barbarossa some effects agains
Soviet communications through attacks organized among anti-Soviet
minorities which took place close to the frontier. Based on several
comments by readers of the first draft of the report, the research tearr
decided also to include in the final version a brief systematic chapter
on Soviet C as it existed in 1941.
As it became apparent in the study that the basic thesis being
tested, which had seemed to be so natural and viable, was in fact un.-
supported by either interview or document, a unique juncture was reache
during the research in Germany. The research team was faced with the
decision of whether to inform the sponsor of the lack of German emphasis
on the paralysis of Soviet C 3 and somewhat dramatically terminate the
research effort, or to press on and clarify how, in fact, the Germans
had disrupted Soviet C 3 so effectively. Because the research team had
begun to see a body of consistent evidence coming into focus which por-
trayed what had happened in Barbarossa, it decided to press on to il-
luminate the disruption of Soviet C 3 and to extract the more general
lessons and warnings of Barbarossa for potential similar operations
in the future. The team reasoned that a high intensity, conventional
war in Central Europe would begin with an all-out offensive by the
Warsaw Pact similar in many ways to Barbarossa (1941). From the view-
point of a study oriented like its present one, the potential European
operation in the future might even be referred to as Barbarossa II.
The potential similarities which allow such an analogy to be made are:
(1) the potential closeness in historical time of Barbarossa (1941)
and a future War in Central Europe, (2) similarities in military
technology, (3) similarities in weather and terrain, (4) similarities
in the human parameters, i.e., Soviet Russians opposing (West) Germans
,
and (5) the similar strategical circumstances of an all-out attack
at the beginning of a war with the special importance of surprise,
initiative, and concentration of effort for the attacker.
The research team continued to piece together a picture which
showed the enormous advantages held by the side in a conflict which
achieves surprise and seizes the initiative at the beginning of a war.
The picture was an important one to be rnaae available to decision
makers in NATO and was available in effective detail. The German
success in the opening states of Barbarossa was also attributable to
several principles under which the Germans operated, some of which
have application to the defense of the West today. The principles
represented a tactical lingua franca among the German officers inter-
viewed, who presented them consistently as the general reasons for the
German success. The words which describe the principles which the
Germans applied in Barbarossa were the following:
1. Entscheidungsschlacht , or alternately Vernichtungs -
schlacht . The principle of a single great battle of decision, or
alternately battle of annihilation.
2. Auftragstaktik . Within the framework of every bat-
tle, mission oriented tactics.
3. Schwerpunkt . Within the framework of every battle
or mission a point of main effort.
Mission oriented tactics on the part of the Germans at every
level of combat gave them special advantages over the Soviets in
Barbarossa and during the remainder of the war. The assignment of
main points of effort at all levels of combat also gave the Germans
special efficiencies in dealing with the numerically superior Soviets.
The conscious general application of Auftragstaktik and Schwerpunkten
in Barbarossa gave the Germans special decisiveness in smashing through
the Soviet forces within the framework of a great battle of annihila-
tion. In Barbarossa, the Germans emphasized destruction first. Para-
lysis followed as a result of the inflicting of casualties and damage
and the overrunning of the opposing transportation network.
It is important to point out, however, that the Soviets had a
primitive communications system which presented few opportunities for
specialized attack and damage. The Barbarossa veterans also observed
that their units had virtually no knowledge initially about the loca-
tion of Soviet headquarters at any level. The observations are sup-
ported by the documented Soviet xenophobia and paranoia of the era
10
which prevented the Soviets from revealing military information of
virtually any kind to the Germans. Not only were the Soviet reticent
about providing information on military dispositions, but they also
depended on relatively primitive communications hardware up to divis-
ion level characterized by almost complete dependence on messengers,
wire and telephones, and even light signaling devices and flags. The
forests of radio antennas associated with Western formations at the
division level and the numerous command-style motor vehicles were not
present with Soviet infantry divisions. Soviet tank and mechanized
divisions had small numbers of radios and a few specialized command
vehicles. The field command posts of Soviet divisions were therefore
exceedingly difficult to locate let alone paralyze by selective, pur-
poseful attack. Higher level headquarters were located often in ordin-
ary buildings in the cities, towns, and villages of the operational
area and equally difficult to pinpoint. German documents note that
Soviet transportation and communications targets in the cities were
attacked based on tourist or government Stadtplane (city ground-plans)
supplemented by aerial photography. The necessity for the Germans
to use ordinary tourist city plans to target communications facilities
in the larger cities was a bit ignominious and tends to bring into
focus the lack of information about the Soviet Union and resulting




CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS IN 1941
Command, Control, and Communications in 1941 was simpler than it
3is today, and Soviet C was more primitive than that of the Western
3powers. The Soviet Union employed C materiel similar to that of
other nations, but the USSR's own peculiar national objectives,
3
society, and internal bureaucratic organizations influenced its C
system and made it different from other national systems in 1941.
Aside from the influencing factors just mentioned, there were others
which are particularly important to this study. The technological
inferiority of Soviet C hardware, compared with German and American
equipment of the same era, restricted the performance and versatility
of Soviet command and control. The unique highly centralized politi-
cal system of the Soviet Union and bureaucratic stiffness of the
political and military participants in the political system also com-
3bined to limit the versatility and responsiveness of Soviet C . The
geographical size of the Soviet Union increased the requirements of
the Soviet C system and magnified its vulnerability to counter-C
activities.
The Soviet officer corps was still suffering the after-effects
of the purges of the 1930s and was unprepared for the threat devel-
oping in the west. A leadership void had been created in the Red Army
by the purges and had not been filled by 1941, since there were simply
not enough qualified officers to occupy the positions available. A
lingering element of ear still pervaded the Red Army in 1941, and
Interview , Kamil Usfensky, Cambridge, Mass. 1980
i-Z.
officers and non-commissioned officers were reluctant to exercise
their own initiative for fear of making mistakes, i.e., it was safer
simply to follow orders exactly. Such a situation severely detracted
from effective command and control in the Red Army.
The modernization of military thought, equipment, and organiza-
tion, begun by Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskii in the 1930s was reversed
following his death in the purges. In December 1940, after careful
study of the German campaigns in Poland and the West, however, the Army
initiated a program to reorganize and modernize its armored forces,
but to effect such a reorganization the Red Army would require more
time than the Germans allowed. Caught in the midst of reorganization
and modernization when Operation Barbarossa began on 22 June 19 41,
the Soviets paid a heavy price when overrun by the Germans. Stalin
compounded the problems plaguing the military in 1941 by his ominous
mistrust of the officer corps. As Operation Barbarossa began, Stalin
•
. . . 1
was single-handedly making decisions on important military matters,
frequently countermanding orders issued by Military District Commanders
to rectify locally perceived deficiencies in readiness. Stalin
additionally threatened executions for incompetence or disloyalty and
in fact carried the threats out following the initial setbacks in
Operation Barbarossa. The problems enumerated above were a catastrophic
liability for the Red Army at the moment the German forces unleashed
Operation Barbarossa.
The officer corps of the Red Army was in an uncomfortable position
at best, but what about the common soldier who would carry out the orders
of the Army's leaders? The Soviet soldier was a simple, uncomplicated
History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union
1941-1945 (Moscow, 1961), p. 11.
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individual, largely recruited from a rural, peasant background.
Independent thought and action were conspicuously absent from his
military make-up, but he displayed superior determination and adapt-
ability. Soldiers in the Red Army had few necessities and many enjoye
a better existence in the army during the Great Patriotic War than in
their peasant villages. The closeness to nature, characteristic of
peasant life, enabled the Soviet soldier of such background to choose
almost unconsciously the appropriate and correct military course of
action when his existence was threatened. From his experience on the
Russian front, Generalleutnant Sintzenrich, formerly Commander of the
German 132d Infantry Division, made the following cogent observation:
"All these traits are rooted deeply in the Russian soldier;
military training could teach them to a man matured in
a higher civilization only laboriously and with difficulty."
"In all operations and movements within a unit, he is,
however, greatly dependent on the leadership of those above
him. Independent thinking, except in situations invol-
ving his adaptability to natural surroundings,..., is not
in his nature. "2
Although there were cases of entire Red Army units surrendering or
deserting during the first five months of Operation Barbarossa, there
were also reports of units fighting to the last man with fanatical
determination
.
One must also examine the character of the Russian land to
appreciate the problems of command, control, and communications as
Generalleutnant a.D. Sintzenich, 132d Infantry Division-
Geomilitary Description of the Western Ukraine-the Russian Soldier
(Unpublished Foreign Military Studies Typescript #D-103 Historical





they existed in 1941. The generalization that Russia was a large,
remote, underdeveloped country is not sufficient to grasp its im-
mensity and appreciate the number of waterways, from intermittent
streams to great rivers, which traverse Russia in every direction.
Such a host of waterways required a multitude of bridges whose real
importance became more apparent in time of war. Considering the size
of Russia, the underdeveloped condition of the Soviet motor vehicle
industry in 1941, and the extremely primitive road system, the Russian
railroad presented the predominant means with which to accomplish
the strategic maneuvers required in that vast country against a mobile
opponent like the German Army.
Soviet national communications in 1941 consisted of a shallow
set of communications systems which largely converged on the Russian
capital, Moscow. Captain Charles von Luttichau, an intelligence and
later signal officer with the German Army on the Eastern Front,
succinctly described the Soviet communications system as "very
2primitive but adequate for its purpose." Operation Barbarossa, how-
ever, served Soviet purposes very poorly. The official Soviet History
of the Great Patriotic War , with remarkable candor, described Soviet
communications on the first day of Operation Barbarossa as improperly
3
organized. The Soviets had designed their communications according
to a preconceived concept of the type of conflict that would develop
on the western frontier. This concept seems to be one in which the
Capt von Luttichau has also completed extensive research into
the early part of the war between Germany and Russia and has authored
the Barbarossa volume in the U. S. Army series on the Eastern Front.
2 Interview, Charles von Luttichau, Washington, 1980.




Soviets felt they would have sufficient forces to check an attack
conducted at the slow pace of military operations they had exper-
ienced in the past and to seize the offensive themselves. Operation
Barbarossa, with its opening swift, deep breakthroughs was inconsis-
tent with this notion and the Soviets began to disintegrate within
the opening hours of the attack.
The Soviet communications system although primitive was extensive
and it is useful to distinguish among the individual communication sys
terns, for example, those of the Military Party, etc. and the various
communication means, for example, telephones, radios, etc. employed
in the national communications network of the Soviet Union. The five
principal communications systems which served the Soviet Union during
part or all of Operation Barbarossa were the following:
1. The Military Communications System.
2. The Communist Party Communications System.
3. The Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) Communications
System.
4. The Commissariat of Interior Communications System.
5. The Local Government Officials Communications System.
These five systems ranged from the Military System, which could be
precisely defined by the hardware it employed, to the Local Officials
System, which could be loosely defined by the users it serviced. The
various means of communicating employed over the five systems are
given in Figure I. Figure II graphically portrays the means of com-
munications used in the military system and arranges them according
to the level of command at which they were generally employed. Figurt
II shows that a transition existed from those means employed at the
tactical level. The telephone was the primary means of communication
employed by all the various communications systems. The Post Office
Commissariat managed state telephone communications in Soviet Russia
16
and the location of telephone exchanges in the basement of postal
buildings reveals a certain degree of hardening of these communication
facilities. Concerning radio communications, it can be said that
they were less important than telephone communications. High-frequency
radio transmissions, however, were important means of communications
at strategic levels over the extremely long distances involved in the
Soviet Union. No single communications system can be cited as superior
to all the others, and it is important to note that all five were
available to the national leaders who used the system which best
2
served their requirements at any given time.
Little information is available on the various communications
systems comprising the National Communication Network in the Soviet
Union in 1941 with the exception of the Military System. The Communist
Party in the Soviet Union operated its own communications system in
1941, utilizing telephonic communications on the Party's own telephone
lines. Although few specifics are known, it can be stated that the
People's Commissariat for State Security with its state intelligence
organization (NKGB) , operated its own system of communications within
4the USSR and utilized radio transmission to communicate with its spy
networks in foreign countries. The Commissariat of the Interior,
which controlled the border guards in the west, also operated its own
Interview, Charles von Luttichau and Detmar Finke, Washington,
1980.





communications system for direct contact between the border and the
Ministry in Moscow. Except for the exchange of information which
occurred at the Ministry level, the communications system of the
Commissariat of the Interior interfaced with the Defense Commissariat
Communications System only at the Military District level. The
Local Officials Communications System was the least complete of all
the communications systems and probably relied on conversations con-
ducted on the state telephone network, messages sent on the telegraph
system, and conversations face-to-face.
The Military Communication System (see Figure 2 ) was designed
to operate under the rigors of war, and was more complex than the
other four systems previously discussed. The civilian telephone land-
lines and cables operated by the People's Commisariat for Communica-
tions, however, provided the basis around which the Military Communi-
2
cation System functioned. Even the armored units connected into the
civilian cables as the following statement indicates:
"The signals of the 22nd Tank Division, for example,
were operated through the local post office, where the
formation plugged into the civilian telephone network
and telegraph service (22 Tk. Div. record, 7.61941:
captured document) . "3
Personal face-to-face and messenger communications were extremely
important in the military and were probably the primary means of
Interview , von Luttichau.
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communication at the company, and perhaps even battalion, level.
Couriers and liaison officers replaced messengers in the personal
communications role at the regimental level and higher. Radios were
employed only above the division level except in armor units where
radios were common at all levels. It is likely that radio com-
munication was the primary means of communication in armor units with
personal face-to-face, messenger, and telephonic communications assum-
ing secondary importance, although little direct evidence can be
*
presented to support such a view. In the Soviet Military Communi-
cations System in 1941, communications were not effectively coordin-
ated between the infantry and its supporting arms, for example, air
and artillery. The Soviet artillery forces, however, had excellent
internal communications.
Due to a paucity of wireless sets and limited experience with
wireless communication before the Great Patriotic War, many Red Army
personnel were not familiar with radio communications and preferred
2
to rely on the more familiar telephone. Radio operators who were
formally trained, however, were extremely well trained and assigned
to corps level commands and above. Radio operators below the corps
level where radios were used only in armor units (see Figure 3 ) were
. . 3typically poorly trained on the job and limited in technical ability.
Interview
, von Luttichau.





*According to Richard Ogorkiewicz , Armoured Forces (New York,
1970), p. 99,,a Russian armored, or Tank Division consisted of two tank
regiments, one motorized infantry regiment and an artillery regiment
while a motorized division included two motored infantry regiments,
one tank regiment and an artillery regiment.
21
Only in the Leningrad Military District had the system of radio nets
reached an effective degree of development by 22 June 1941 to make a
significant contribution to the defense of the Soviet Union in the
opening stages of Barbarossa. The communications section of a typicc
staff was known as the node of communications. An army level node of
*
communications, for example, was headed by the Army Signals Officer
and usually included the communications equipment and operators, cryp-
tographic personnel, representatives from the operations and intel-
2ligence staff sections, and political and state security personnel.
Special High Command Radio Communications Units, operating under the
direction of the Signals Administration, existed to maintain contact
3between the General Staff in Moscow and the Fronts.
No separate air signal service existed in the Red Air Force in
1941. The Army Signal Service supported both the Air Force and the
Army with wire and radio communications, and in the case of the Air
Force, with a weather reporting system. Flying units, area air com-
mands, air divisions, and air bases had Army communication personnel
included as organic units. Wireless telegraphy and radio were the
primary means of communications in the air forces, but a variety of
Erickson, Stalingrad
, p. 72.




*The Army level node of communications communicated with the
Front and Corps nodes of communications. When Corps were eliminated
on 10 July 1941, the Army communicated directly with the divisions.
22
other means such as wire, marking panels, visual and light signals,
and flares and rockets were also utilized. Separate radio networks
existed for ground-to-air, air-to-ground, ground-to-ground, air
traffic control, and weather service communications. Although a
variety of radio nets existed to support the Air Force, the signal
communications services were poorly organized and the air signal net-
2
work was not suited to the flexible conduct of air warfare. Specific
wave-lengths were not assigned to units in the Air Force, but rather
a complete wave-band of frequencies was allotted to a Front (army
group) area. The frequencies and sometimes also the call signs were
changed arbitrarily twice in one day. Only a few Soviet aircraft
were equipped with radios in 1941. Commanders of attacking flights of
aircraft were able to communicate with radio from air-to-ground but
were forced to more primitive, visual communications between aircraft
in flight.
Radios were in short supply in the Soviet Air Force and were of
the same low quality as those used by the ground forces. Only a few
radio beacons existed in 1941 in Russia, and very few of them were used
4by the military. Aircraft instruments, such as radio direction-finding
equipment, were crude and even the influx of superior American equip-
ment failed to improve the situation because of a critical shortage
Generalleutnant a.D. Walter Schwabedissen, The Russian
Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders (New York, 1960), p. 31.
2 Ibid







of personnel able to operate the superior equipment. Harold Faber
in Luftwaffe, a History otters a unique, descriptive account of
Soviet airfield operations before the German attack.
"Control towers were unheard of in Soviet ground
organizations and radio and electrical apparatus were
usually nonexistent. When units took off it was
reminiscent of the old flying squadrons of World War I,
which operated from primitive fields and communicated
by a wave of the hand or a tip of the wings. Even
normal field telephone equipment was absent from most
Soviet airfields."
Soviet communications equipment in 1941 was technically inferior
to German and American equipment of that time. Lt Col Kamill Usfensk?
an intelligence officer in the Red Army on the Eastern Front, con-
sidered the American field telephones provided the Soviets through
the Lend-Lease Program to be "twice as good" as Russian phones then
in use. The German communications equipment encountered by the
Soviets during the. course of Operation Barbarossa was so superior to
similar Russian equipment that the Soviets employed captured German
2
radios and telephones whenever they were available. The Soviets wer
habitually short of radio sets, operators, and repairmen. On 22 June
1941, in fact, the 3rd Army under Lieutenant-General Kuznetsov, hold-
ing the right flank of the Western Military District at its junction
with the Baltic Military District, had no radios in service to higher
headquarters during the German attack because of Soviet maintenance
problems.
"'"Harold Faber, Luftwaffe , a History (New York, 1978) , p. 233.





Varying degrees of sophistication existed in the cryptography
employed by the Soviet forces in Operation Barbarossa. The well-trained
radio operators of corps level and higher could handle complicated
ciphers with assistance from cryptographic specialists. The tactical
units were restricted to elementary ciphers and simple call signs due
2
to the limited training of the communications operators. German
army group codebreakers were unable to crack the high level codes em-
ployed between Stavka and the Theater Commands but codes used below
corps level, often the Caesar's Codes actually developed during the
3time of Caesar, proved relatively easy for the Germans to decipher.
In addition to formal ciphers, the Soviets used simple, easily de-
4
ciphered, word-substitution codes in their tactical transmissions.
ro facilitate their use, the codewords were usually written around the
oorder of the unit operations map, which resulted in the capture of
the codes whenever a map was captured during Operation Barbarossa. The
alementary system of codewords employed by the Soviets was easily
compromised, and the use of this primitive codeword system caused a
iangerous false sense of security wherever the codewords were employed.
2The Soviet Command and Control (C ) System, which conceptually
can be considered as a subset of the overall Soviet Command, Control,
1General der Nachrichtentruppen Albert Praun, German Radio
Intelligence (Unpublished Foreign Military Studies Typescript #P-038
Historical Division USEUCOM, 1950), p. 94.
2 . , . ,Interview
, Nekrich
3 Interview , von Luttichau
4 ...See Generaloberst Hellmuth Reinhardt, Small Unit Tactics
(Unpublished Foreign Military Studies Typescript #P-06Gd Historical




































The 6-Pk was a pack-type
transmitter-receiver used
by the Red Army during
Operation Barbarossa. This
radio was poorly constructed
and poorly designed for main-
tenance (although the opera-
ting controls were reasonably
accessible) . The 6-PK trans-
mitter-receiver was encased
in a flimsy wood case covered
with canvas on the outside.















































The Soviet 5-AK-1M transmitter receiver was a relatively
compact, vehicular mounted radio used by the Red Army
during Operation Barbarossa. The 5-AX-1M transmitter-
receiver weighed approximately 286 pounds and required
over 36 feet of antenna to operate..
: .......; . . : ' : K
rCAH
Nameplates for transmitter (left) and
receiver (right) of 5-AK-1M.
Illustration 2. Transmitter-Receiver 5-AK-1M
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and Communication System, was unique to the Soviets and influenced
heavily by the personnel served and controlled by it as well as the
preceived Soviet notion of a slow moving war on the western frontier.
2The C system was effective under peacetime conditions but largely
untested under the combat conditions for which it was designed. Littl
thought, if any, had been given to the types of situations which
developed during Operation Barbarossa. In time of war, it is often
2 2difficult to separate the national C system from the military C sys-
tem, and actions taken by the Soviet Union during Operational Barbaros
effectively merged these two systems so that a discussion of Soviet
2
C in general must include both.
A national strategic leadership body did not exist in the Soviet
Union on 22 June 1941, a detail supported by the fact that there was
no supreme command, supreme command headquarters facility, nor clearly
discernable supreme commander. As Marshal of the Soviet Union, V. D.
Sokolovskii recounts:
"...We had not worked out the problems of strategic
leadership of the Armed Forces by the beginning of the
war. As a result, leadership in the command of the
armed forces was quite inadequate during the initial
period of the war. "2
As Commissar of Defense, Marshal Timonshenko was the supreme commander
but through political authority and sheer intimidation, Stalin was
. . 3personally making all of the important military decisions, and
4




2Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy
, p. 252






facility, uniquely dedicated or designated, from which the supreme
commander could effectively exercise command and control. Accounts of
activity in the Defense Ministry during the initial hours of Operation
Barbarossa leave the impression that Marshal Timoshenko, and his
assistant, General Zhukov, responded to the German attack from the
desks in their offices. No procedures existed for the use of
command facilities available at either the Moscow Military District
or the Air Defense Command Headquarters in Moscow. The lack of such
procedures is further testimony of the inadequacy of Soviet Strategic
C
2
on 22 June 1941.
The command structure was quickly modified on 23 June 1941 when
the Central Committee of the Communist Party formed the Headquarters
of the Supreme Command (Stavka) under the Defense Commissar, Marshal
Timoshenko. One week later, on 30 June, the Central Committee, Supreme
Soviet, and Soviet of the People's Commissars of the USSR created the
2State Defense Committee (GKO) with complete state and military power.
The GKO members were soon sitting as part of the Stavka and by 10 July
the State Defense Committee had created three high commands (or theater
level commands) to assist the Stavka exercise direct command of the
troops. The high commands functioned in the field directly under the
Stavka in Moscow and coordinated several fronts for the accomplishment
3
of general strategic missions in specific geographical areas. As
See Erickson, Stalingrad
, pp. 101-135 for an exceptionally
detailed account of the initial hours of Operationa Barbarossa.







As Marshall Sokolovskii points out,
"This decision of the State Defense Committee changed the
Stavka of the High Command into the Stavka of the Supreme
High Command under the direction of the Chairman of the
State Committee of Defense. . .and in August it was placed
under the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces of the Soviet Union (Joseph Stalin)...
During the entire Great Patriotic War, the Stavka was the
highest agency of strategic command for the Armed Forces.
It was collegial agency. All the most important decisions
were made after the Stavka discussed them with the front
commands, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the
Armed Forces, the service commanders, as well as with
other individuals concerned. "l
Following the reorganizations just described, the Stavka comprised se'
lected members of the Politburo, the Chief of the General Headquarter
2
and individual higher command personnel. By August 1941, Joseph
Stalin's consolidation of power was complete and he had refined centre
ization to a new degree as Chairman of the State Defense Committee,
Defense Commissar (replacing Timoshenko who had been assigned to a
theater command), and Supreme Commander.
Changes were also made in the organization of the military as
Operation Barbarossa progressed. As stated previously, portions of the
military organization were in the process of reorganization on 22 Jun«
1S41 to bring the Red Army up to date with the more modern concepts
of varfare employed by the Germans. The incomplete reorganization of
Soviet tank forces resulted in large, unwieldy formations, difficult





4 Interview, von Luttichau.
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Figure 4















































1. Formed 30 June 1941 with complete state and militar;
powers to provide the leadership organ by which
national decisions could be made and coordinated.
2. Headquarters of the Supreme Command (Stavka) formed
23 June 1941 under the Defense Commissar, placed
under GKO on 10 July. The Stavka provided the
General Headquarters lacking on 22 June with which
Moscow could direct the military.
3. Formed 10 July 1941 to facilitate control of the
fighting units by Stavka.
4. Military Districts transformed into Fronts during
the first ten days of Operation Barbarossa.
















































1. On 10 August Joseph Stalin as Supreme Commander
approved a GKO recommendation which changed the
Stavka from simply the General Headquarters into
the Stavka of the Supreme Command.
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Figure 6
Russo-German Frontier Military Districts
(22 June 1941)
Leningrad Military District: 14th, 7th, 23d Soviet Armies
sector: from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland
Baltic (Special) Military District: 8th, 11th Soviet Armies
sector: 300 kilometers of frontier with East Prussia
Western (Special) Military District: 3rd, 10th, 4th Soviet
Armies
sector: 470 kilometers of frontier, Belorussia
Kiev (Special) Military District: 5th, 6th, 26th, 12th
Soviet Armies
sector: 865 kilometers of frontier, Ukraine (from Vlodava
to Lipkany)
Odessa Military District: 9th Soviet Army (administrative
only)
sector: from Lipkang to Odessa (defense of the Crimea
assigned to independent rifle corps)
Note: According to Erickson, Stalingrad
,
p. 71
the Special Military Districts were operational
groupings capable of operations for a limited time
without mobilization of additional reserves unlike
the other Military Districts which were largely
administrative organizations to facilitate reserve
mobilization.
Information for this figure was derived from
Erickson, Stalingrad, pp. 68-69,
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command Dn 22 June, was eliminated by 10 July because initial combat
losses aggrevated the already existing shortage of trained officers.
Figure 4 illustrates the chain of command on 22 June 1941, and Figur
4 and 5 together highlight the changes that occurred during the
first seven weeks of Operation Barbarossa in the national and military
command structures. The military districts indicated in Figure 6
were peacetime administrative organizations for the mobilization of re-
serves and transitioned into fronts or essentially army groups in time
of war. The military districts along the western frontier on the eve
cf the German attack are shown in Figure 6. As mentioned earlier,
three high commands (theaters) were formed on 10 July to facilitate
command of the troops by the Stavka and were designated by their geo-
graphical area of responsibility as the LTorthwest, West and Southwest
Commands
.
The Soviet system of command was clumsy and inflexible during
the early days of Operation Barbarossa^ when unexpected situations pre
eluded quick response. The great distances between strategic fronts
and the physical constraints of the Russian transportation system
limited the Soviet options for defense by making rapid redeployment
and large-scale movement difficult.-^ The Soviet military and politica
leadership at the strategic level lacked a realistic view of the actua
situation since it had underestimated the German potential while
Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy
, p. 489.
2Generalmajor Wilhelm Peterson, Campaign Against Etussig C
ment of Second Army Engineers ) (Foreign Military Studies r_"":ezcr
#D-018 Historical Division USEUCOM, 1947), p. 8."
3Erickson, Stalingrad, p. 85.
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over-estimating the Soviet potential. The influences just cited
combined to interfere with innovative, flexible responses to German
offensive maneuvers and caused the selection of preconceived responses
or responses patterned in strict accord with established doctrine.
At the tactical level, officers and NCO's were reluctant to exercise
initiative partly because they feared punishment for failures. In
situations where initiative was displayed, the highly centralized
Soviet command structure facilitated higher authority review and
punishment for actions perceived as inappropriate. The ordinary sol-
dier simply followed the example set by his superiors and displayed
the same lack of initiative. Many commanders who had been quickly
advanced after the purges lacked the experience required for their
positions. For some of these commanders, the war as it developed
in the first days of Operation Barbarossa was simply beyond their
comprehension. ^ The lower command echelons in the Red Army char-
acteristically suffered from poor leadership since the best leaders
had risen to higher commands. ^ German observers commented on com-
mand in the Soviet Air Force as awkward, old-fashioned, stereotyped
and hampered by political control. ^ Although the communist party
Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy
, p. 249.
2 Reinhardt, Small Unit Tactics , Appendix I, p. 11




* Interview , von Luttichau.
* Schwabedissen , The Russian Air Force, p. 12.
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activities in the Army may have exerted detrimental influences
similar to those experienced in the Air Force, in at least one re-
spect the party strengthened military command by adding robustness
to the command structure, since the political officer was always
available to replace the commander should he be removed unexpectedly
by enemy action during combat.
Orders issued by the Soviets during the Great Patriotic War we:
generally clear and, at least on the tactical level, simple. Due
to the general lack of information from the front during the initial
weeks of Operation Barbarossa, orders issued from Moscow were con-
fusing^ and unrealistic until the Soviets gained an understanding
of the true state of affairs. ^ As Supreme Commander, Joseph Stalin
issued the most important orders to his front commanders by summoni]
them to the Stavka or sending Stavka representatives to the fronts.
Whether Stalin personally issued the orders himself or simply causet
them to be issued in his presence is unclear, but the important poii
is that critical strategic orders were issued in person, and not by
other means such as couriers or electronic transmissions .6 Reports
from the fronts to Moscow were likewise presented in person^ and
Interview , von Luttichau and Finke.
2 Interview , von Luttichau.









during the first few days of the war, before the leaders in Moscow
clearly understood the Soviet position, the Stavka sent representatives
to the fronts to determine the true situation and to assist the front
commanders to respond to the enemy advances.
Centralization was a key element in the Soviet Command and Control
System and was a positive force in mobilizing the country and the mili-
tary once the Soviets recovered from the initial devastating setbacks
of Operation Barbarossa. During June and July 1941, however, the highly
9 1
centralized Soviet C* System adversely affected the Soviet response.
As an example of the detrimental influence of the highly centralized
Soviet C^ System, consider that after the first two days of war, Stalin
became inaccessible when he locked himself in his quarters for the
2
next several days. At precisely the time the Soviet Union required
its most inspired leadership and when the very existence of the Soviet
Union was most seriously challenged, the key figure in the- centralized
Soviet C^ System was not available. During the first few days of the
attack, the overly centralized command system also required commanders
in the field to await orders from Moscow which arrived late, if at
all, and were divorced from reality.-* Field commanders were in a
better position to make their own decisions if for no other reason
than the precious time that could be saved by eliminating additional




See Nekrich, 22 June 1941
, p. 22 for an account of a telephone
conversation on 22 June' between Marshal Timoshenko, Defense Commissar,
and General Boldin, Deputy Commander of the Western Special Military
District.
37
Stavka by-passed the fronts whenever the situation required and com-
municated directly with the various armies, although the fronts were
always informed of the orders issued or information transmitted.
Considering that each front had evolved from a military district whic
had been basically an administrative grouping of armies, it is not sur
prising that the front was occasionally by-passed for operational
expediency.
The Soviet leadership had prepared mobilization and defense plan
but they were either incomplete or based on the erroneous concept
of a leisurely war in the west previously discussed. Plans for the
2
economic mobilization of the war industries were ineffective and in-
complete and special, crisis management techniques were required to
supplement them. The 1941 defense plan for the west was predicted
on the ability of the border units and frontier military districts
to provide sufficient time for the mobilization of the main forces ir
the event of surprise attack. 4 The adequacy of the 1941 defense
plan certainly appears questionable today and so does the level of
readiness of the units designated to implement the plan. Marshal of
the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, a corps commander in the 18th
Army during Operation Barbarossa, has written the following:
Sckolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy
, p. 493




Nekrich, 22 June 1941, p. 68.
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"requests from some district troop commanders for authority
to bring their troops to combat readiness and move them
closer to the frontier were personally turned down by J.V.
Stalin. The troops continued to be trained in peacetime
fashion: the artillery of infantry divisions was in artil-
lery camps and ranges, antiaircraft weapons on antiaircraft
ranges, and sapper units in engineer camps, and the 'naked'
infantry regiments of divisions were located separately in
their camps."
The point is that despite massive outlays of men and equipment along
the frontier, readiness levels required by the 1941 defense plan were
not high enough to ensure thesuccess of that plan against a surprise
attack. The Soviet Union was continually improving its border de-
fenses, and, on their own initiative, individual commanders were
taking measures to improve their unit readiness. When- these individ-
ual actions were discovered in Moscow they were frequently counter-
manded. Colonel-General Kuznetsov, Commander of the Baltic Special
Military District, instituted on his own initiative, for example, a
partial blackout of the naval bases and airfields in his district to
reduce his vulnerability to possibly enemy intelligence activity.
Colonel-General Voronov, Commander of the Anti-Air Defense Command
(PVO) , learned of this precaution and recommended it to the General
Staff for adoption elesewhere. Moscow, however, based on the nonag-
gression pact with Germany countermanded Kuznetsov 's order.
Red Army Commanders exercised C 3 in the field from severely
austere facilities as the following account of an army headquarters
on 22 June 1941 shows. 10th Army Headquarters- which at 2100 on the 22nd
See Nekrich, 22 June 1941
, p. 198.
2 See Erickson, Stalingrad, p. 83.
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was located six miles southwest of Bialystok, consisted of only two
tents, wooden tables and stools., one telephone truck, and a radio tru«
This headquarters was the 10th Army's advance command post (CP) which
at the army level consisted of from ten to fifteen men and included
the following: the node of communications; cryptographic, operations,
and intelligence personnel; political and state security personnel,
liaison officers; and the commander. Farther back from the forward
edge of the battle area (FSBA) was the first echelon of the CP , com-
prising the main staff effort under the chief of staff. Still farthei
behind the FEBA was the rear element of the CP which handled logisti-
cal matters. Command posts in cities and villages were often locatec
in school buidlings since they were generally the newest brick facili
ties with sufficient interior space to accommodate a staff operation.
Factories and administration buildings on collective farms were also
suitable locations for CP's, in the absence of schools, but private
dwellings were unsatisfactory due to the prevalent problem of pest
infestation in Russian homes.
Each headquarters, down to and including company level on the
border, was issued sealed letters containing special orders for speci-
fic emergencies.'* It is apparently these same sealed letters to whicr




2 Interview , Nekrich.
3Interview , von Luttichau.
4 Interview, Nekrich.
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ontaining mobilization plans and cover plans, between 0430 and 0500
on 22 June. These letters, or packets, contained orders to be opened
by the commander under very specific circumstances, although it is un-
clear from accounts whether the letters were to be opened only upon
direction of higher authority or upon the initiative of the individual
commander.
Soviet maps used during Operation Barbarossa were adequate for
intended purposes but were quite primitive by comparison with German
maps of the same time. 2 There was apparently no system which allowed
continuous use of maps by the Soviets, except for those portions of
the map previously unused, since marks placed on the maps by the users
were indelible. Soviet efforts to remove marks from maps resulted in
the removal of the printed features and rendered the used portions of
maps unserviceable. Unlike their German opponents, the Soviets had
no mobile map production facilities to service the armed forces but
relied on maps printed in the rear area, probably Moscow, which had
to be delivered to the various units.
Intelligence information was critical to the Soviet system of Com-
mand and Control during Operation Barbarossa, and the surprise nature
of that operation made the early warning phase of the intelligence
function even more important than it had been previously. The Soviet
Union had an excellent network of spies in foreign countries, especially
See Erickson, Stalingrad
, pp. 119 and 121.
2The research team examined several Russian maps captured by the
Germans and compared them with German maps of the same area used in
Operation Barbarossa to arrive at the conclusions noted.
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Germany and Japan, relaying very accurate, timely information to Moscc
Although the United States and Great Britain both warned the Soviets
of German intentions regarding Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet ieadei
attached low esteem to these warnings since the Soviets considered th€
as efforts to undermine the relationship established by the Soviet Unj
and Germany through such agreements as the 1939 Nonaggression Pact.
German soldiers defecting to the Soviet Union only hours before the at
tack relayed very accurate details of the impending attack,-'- but the
Soviet leadership and Stalin in particular, discounted the possibility
of a surprise attack of the dimensions of Operation Barbarossa and cor
sidered the reports as attempts by the Germans to provoke Soviet actic
The individuals who provided intelligence information to Stalin, such
as the Military Intelligence ( GRU ) Chief, Marshal Golikov, while not
intentionally misinforming Stalin, evidently were well aware of Stalir
frame of mind before their meetings and presented intelligence in the
5
manner least irritating to their leader. Presentation of intelligenc
in such a fashion to Stalin, who had a firm preconceived notion of the
type of war which might develop with Germany, reduced the value of the
intelligence.
Several aspects of the Soviet intelligence system existing on
22 June were inadequate and deserve special mention to provide a. better
See Erickson, Stalingrad
, p. 105. One deserter, Alfred Liskow,
crossing the lines at 2100 on 21 June 1941, reportedly stated the at-
tack would commence at 0400 and that German guns were in firing posi-
tions. In response to a report from a deserter, Stalin, possible re-
ferring to Liskow, ordered him to be shot for his disinformation.
2 Interview, Nekrich.
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fgeneral appreciation of Soviet C^ capabilities and limitations during
Operation Barbarossa. Although the Soviet Air Force possessed opera-
tional reconnaissance aircaraft, very few were located along the fron-
tier. Fighter and attack planes designed for other specialized mis-
sions were employed instead in a reconnaissance role. When air recon-
naissance did produce valuable intelligence, the Soviet Air Force
;
system of processing the information and initiating a response was so
slow that usually little effect was derived from air reconnaissance.
The air raid warning system was so inefficiently organized, even by
Soviet standards, that fighter planes launched in response to warnings
from the system usually arrived too late to provide adequate overhead
cover for the Soviet forces. The air defense forces (PVO) control
system performed unsatisfactorily and only a reorganization of the
forces and complete new air defense system could provide adequate air
defense in 1941. The general usefullness of high level Soviet in-
telligence during Operation Barbarossa, is illustrated by the complaint
of General Tikhamirov, chief of the operations section of the North-
west Front, that the intelligence distributed to his front from Moscow
in early July 1941 regarding the German forces in his area of responsi-
bility was too general and inaccurate to be of value.
Immediately preceding and during the initial attack of Operation
Barbarossa, the Soviet border provided a particularly important early
warning capability. The 1939 Non-aggression Pact had apparently di-
minished the urgency for a quick, thorough completion of the facilities
Faber, Luftwaffe
, pp. 228 and 231.
2
The Great Patriotic War
, p. 50.
3Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy
, p. 265
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were incomplete at the time of the German attack. The new Soviet
border, resulting from the division of Poland, extended for almost 12C
miles from the Baltic Sea at the border of East Prussia and Lithuania,
through Poland, along the eastern borders of Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, and Bulgaria to the Black Sea. Approxiamately 700 of these
1200 miles bordered German occupied territory. The border itself and
the border units in the forward portion of the frontier region were
the responsibility of the Interior. Immediately behind the border, nc
fewer than ten armies of the Defense Commissariat were located in the
frontier military districts listed in Figure V and added depth to the
border defense by deployment up to 30 0, and in some cases 6 00 kilo-
meters behind the border. These forces were not positioned in accor-
dance with any systematic plan of defense and their supply points
were close to the border itself and frequently located a considerable
distance from the units and equipment they served. Although the Red
Army was very large and conducted active training in the border mili-
tary districts during June 1941, it was none-the-less in a peacetime
posture with artillery pieces located separately from stored ammuni-
tion and tank units located separately from their ammunition and fuel
The road network, which was so critical to the Soviet plan to reinforc(
the border, was incomplete on 22 June 1941. 3
Basil Collier, The Second World War: A Military History (New
York, 1967)
, p. 201.
2 Sokolovskn, Soviet Military Strategy
, p. 370.
3 Interview, von Luttichau.
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The sophisticated electronic sensors of today are quite different
from the elemental sensors employed on the Soviet borders in 1941.
There was no radar available on the border: instead, elementary sen-
sors such as police dogs and humans were use.-'- Patrolling was em-
ployed on the Soviet side of the border but apparently very few patrols
crossed the border, although local civilian inhabitants visiting on
the German side were undoubtedly questioned concerning their observa-
tions of German activity. The border itself was a barrier consisting
of a barbed wire apron with a variety of primitive alarm signals. Be-
hind the initial apron of wire was a strip of cleared, raked earth
probably less than fifty yards in width to highlight footprints.
Listening posts were located at regular intervals and wooden three-
man guard towers about twenty-five yards high were erected approxima-
tely every 500 yards with telephonic and visual communications between
the towers. Patrols with guard dogs covered the ground between the
1 Ibid .
2 Interview , Nekrich.
3Apparently the width of this strip varied with the location of
the border. For an excellent description of the border, along the
Bug River in Poland, facing Army Group Center see Generalleutnant Curt
Cano, German Preparations for the Attack on Russia (Unpublished Foreign
Military Studies Typescript #D-247 Historical Division USEUCOM, 1947)
.
See Generalleutnant Hans Bergen, Part Played by the 187th Infantry
Regiment in the 87th Infantry Division Attack at the Beginning of the
Russian Campaign on 22 June 1941 ( Unpublished Foreign Military Studies
Typescript #D-074 Historical Division USEUCOM, 1947) , for an account
of the border in East Prussia.




towers.^ Excellent field fortifications extended six to eight kilo-
meters beyond the barrier^ with the defensive facilities manned by
squads or companies. ^ Some new bunkers and artillery positions in
this belt of defensive positions were still under construction and pr<
bably unmanned during June 1941. ^ Behind the border was a security
belt of approximately twenty miles from which inhabitants of certain
areas were removed while in other areas they were allowed to remain bi
forbidden to shelter strangers.
As the battle raged eastward, the border was no longer a signifi
cant intelligence source and the military relied on such intelligence
gathering means as ground patrolling, air reconnaissance, and radio
direction finding. The military probably also received information
from less conventional sources such as civilian refugees and military
stragglers fleeing from behind enemy lines. There are accounts of re
fugees acutually seeking German units, ostensibly for food, but in
7
reality to gather intelligence. The government in Moscow, while
Bergen, 187th Infantry Regiment
, p. 6.
2 Interview , von Luttichau.
3Cano, German Preparations
, p. 4.
4Bergen, 187the Infantry Regiment
, p. 6.
5Leverkeuhn, German Military Intelligence
, p. 15 6.
General der Nachtrichtentruppen Albert Praun, Signal Communica -
tions in the East (Unpublished Foreign Military Study Typescript #P-1!




receiving intelligence from the military, continued to receive infor-
mation from other nations and agents in other countries, and undoubted-
ly received valuable information from local civilian officials who sud-
denly found themselves behind the advancing German Armies and sometimes
continued to use the civilian telephone network eastward.
The Soviet transportation system in 1941, consisiting essentially
of the railroad and road network, was adequate for the needs of the
Soviet Union as a moderately settled, developing nation. It was in-
adequate to serve large, modern military forces and was considered
the weakest factor in support the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet
Union was traversed by innumerable waterways of varying dimensions,
but, during the opening stages of Barbarossa few water transportation
systems were considered immediately important for operations. An im-
pressive number of bridges was necessary, of course, to maintain the
ground transportation system across the many rivers and streams. Since
the Germans depended heavily on mobile spearheads and the Soviets had
to maneuver large forces to parry the German thrusts, the bridges as-
sumed paramount importance as to ensure the accomplishment of military
movements via road and rail. Appendix B is an analysis of the Soviet
Transportation System in 1941 by Generalleutnant Max Bork, a transporta-
tion expert with the German Army, and is the best account available of
the Soviet Transportation System in relation to Operation Barbarossa.
Although the railroad was the most reliable transportation system
Abberger, Roads and Railroads in Russia , p. 2
2 Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force, p. 50.
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in the Soviet Union and provided the most practical means of accom-
plishing the massive, rapid, strategic maneuvers required of the Sovi
in resonse to the German attack, the Soviet railroads were not as den
ly developed as those in other European countries. In 1938, the late
year prior to 1941 for which statistics are commonly available, the
Soviet Union had only 0.65 miles of rail per 100 square miles as a
whole with 1.80 miles per 100 square miles in European Russia, com-
pared with the German railroad average of 20 miles per 100 square mil
There were only 3.30 miles of track per 10,000 inhabitants in Russia,
around the industrial areas of the Donets Basin, Moscow, and Leningra
where the railroads were concentrated most heavily while all of Germa.
had 5.80 miles of track per 10,000 inhabitants. Signalling and safet;
devices were primitive compared witn railroads in other countries and
Russian track beds were constructed of sand and gravel instead of
crushed-rock ballast used elsewhere due to a scarcity of rock. The
standard railroad gauge in Europe was four feet, eight and one-half
inches, but the Russian railroad gauge was five feet which allowed
more' loading space per car. There were no double-track railroad
bridges in Russia; instead single-track spans separated by 50 to 100
yards had been constructed. Some of these bridges were temporary spa:
constructed during World War I, which would have been considered un-
safe anywhere but in Russia.
The Soviet railroad assumes even greater importance when compare
with the shallow system of roads in Russia in 1941. The road network
satisfied the relatively weak demands of peacetime traffic but failed
to meet the requirements of modern warfare. The Red Army used some
motor vehicles for transportation but much of its road transport
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requirements were satisfied by horse-drawn means. Paved roads except
in the larger cities were largely unknown in the Soviet Union. Con-
crete and asphalt were not used to construct rural roads. Cobblestones
and graded crushed rock were used on a few main roads outside the cities
but only in sections. Except in urban areas, paved roads were ex-
tremely rare and only four all-weather, hard-surfaced roads have been
identified in western Russia during Barbarossa. The main roads were
broad, hard-rolled and quite satisfactory, although dusty, in dry
weather. They became bottomless after rain and snow at which time ve-
hicles would widen the roads by driving around untraf ficable areas.
In many German corps areas and sometimes entire army areas, there was
not a single hard-surfaced road. In the entire area of Army Group
North, for example, there were only two all-weather roads capable of
sustaining heavy traffic while all the other roads were weather depen-
dent. 3 in the opinion of Generalleutnant Bork, there was only one
road in European Russia constructed in accordance with western European
standards which received proper, consistent maintenance the -Minsk-
Mo scow Highway .
*
Soviet Command, Control, and Communications, in general, was ade-
quate for the primitive, peacetime requirements of the Soviet Union
1
Sentzenich, 132d Infantry Division
,
p. 2.
2Abbarger, Roads and Railroads in Russia
,
p. 3.
3Generalmaior Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, German Army Group
Operations on the Eastern Front 1941-4 3 (Unpublished Foreign Military
Studies Typescript #P-114a Historical Division USEUCOM, 1954), p. 9.
4 Bork, Russian Railroads and Highway s, p. 6.
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in 1941 before the German attack. The military C J System was designe
for the leisurely operations envisioned by the Soviets prior to Barba
rossa. The Soviet C System, like the Russian transportation system,
was not constructed to cope with an all-out, surprise attack executed
by more than 150 German divisions and spearheaded by highly mobile




"More than any other event, military victory
opens the way to the achievement of the
Political and Economic Goals of War."
Erich von Manstein
The Soviets continue to be disturbed today by German
Operation Barbarossa and the disintegrating effects which it had
on the Soviet armed forces and the political state at the
beginning of the Russo-German Campaign in June and July 1941.
The total picture of the campaign, which extends from June 1941 -
May 1945, a period of 48 months, tends to obscure the relative
importance of the opening offensive. The Soviets emphasize, for
example, their achievements in planning and executing the
Stalingrad counterof fensive much later in the war. The Soviets
also make it clear that the turning point in the campaign came
with their uniquely Russian, defensive victory at Kursk in July
1943. Others in the West have been attracted by the vast, final
act at Berlin in April 1945, and see that final offensive as a
culmination of two and one half years of similar massive Soviet
offensives. None of the actions noted above -- Stalingrad,
Kursk, Berlin -- equal in importance the scope, effects, and
gains of Barbarossa. The Soviets required four years of
externally assisted efforts to overcome German gains associated
largely with Barbarossa. From a slightly different perspective,
the War in the East can be interpreted as consisting of two
phases -- German Operation Barbarossa and the Soviet recovery
from it.
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The Barbarossa military operations were complex and can be
considered as the historical events in the period from 22 June
1941 to the collapse of German offensive operations on 5, 6
December 1941 in the northwest suburbs of Moscow. Within that
period, i.e., 22 June - 5,6 December 1941, which sets the full
operational dimensions of Barbarossa, a clearly defined opening
stage exists with Army Group Center in the area of the German
effort in White Russia. Under the Command of Field Marshal Fedor
von Bock, the army group seized the area around Smolensk during
the period 22 June-24 July 41. The terrain comprises a land
bridge between marshy and heavily forested regions to the north
and south and the Germans determined it to be the crucial area in
which they would pause and reorganize for the final attack
against Moscow. * The unprecedented damage inflicted on an
opposing military force by Army Group Center retained for the
Germans the initiative in the war. On 24 July 41, the Germans
(1) stood 100 kilometers east of Smolensk, (2) unopposed by
anything which could be called a coherent defensive front, and
(3) capable within a period of no more than approximately 10 days
of rest and resupply^ of attacking successfully against a stunned
opponent on the central front. Army Groups North and South had
also driven back and pinned down their opponents, freeing the
larger forces in Army Group Center for a final thrust
!• Intervie ", Major General Peter von der Groeben, German
Army (Ret.), Grabow, W. Germany, 25 January 80. Former assistant
to the la (operations), Army Group Center.
2. See, for example, Panzer A. O.K. 2., Anlagen, Band Nr . 40
,
K.T.B. Nr.l , von 23.6.1941 bis 31.2.1942, Bundesar chi v , Freiburg,
RH 21-21 v. 171, XXIV Pz.K., Personnel and Materiel Standing of
27.7.41.
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which would end the war in the East.
The German armies in Russia required at this time the
assignment of a strategical objective, which would complete the
disintegration of the Soviet armed forces and, through the
physical location of the objective, prevent the continuation of
the war even by a fanatical and well organized political enemy.
Instead of the timely assignment of an objective conceived to be
decisive for knocking the Soviet Union out of the war, the center
group of armies stood immobile in the face of weeks of
vacillation on the part of Adolf Hitler and then received the
incredible order to attack southward into the Ukraine. It is a
monument to the destruction wrought by Army Group Center in June
- July 1941, that, after four weeks of recovery allowed the
Soviets, the German armies drove southward on 26 August 1941 into
the great victory of the Kiev cauldron in mid-September 1941.1
It is further testimony to the success of the opening stages of
Barbarossa, that the Germans regrouped themselves after Kiev
hundreds of miles to the north and launched a great offensive
toward Moscow on 2 October 1941 at Vyasma and Bryansk. 2 j n that
region where the Soviets had now been allowed almost 10 weeks of
largely unhindered recovery, the Germans achieved another
victory. It is a final monument to the effects of June - July
1. The Germans took approximately 665,000 Russian prisoners
in the Kiev battle, a figure roughly seven times greater than the
number of Germans captured in the Stalingrad pocket by the
Soviets.
2. The Germans took approximately 663,000 Russian prisoners
in the Viasma-Bryansk battle, a figure also roughly seven times
greater than the number of Germans captured in the Stalingrad
pocket by the Soviets.
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1941, that Army Group Center was capable of launching the autumn
offensive of 14 November 1941 toward Moscow and succeeded in
placing German combat soldiers in Khimki, a northwest suburb of
Moscow.
The historical question which begs to be answered at this
point is what would have been the result in the war in the East
if the Germans had launched the attack at Vyasma and Bryansk
shortly after their arrival in the vicinity around 24 July 1941.
The answer to the question is beyond the scope of the present
study. The fact that the Germans stood near Vyasma and Bryansk
on 24 July 1941 in positions virtually identical to those from
which they launched the great offensive toward Moscow on 2
October 1941, 70 days later, however, supports the following
thesis which is central to this study. The Germans on
approximately 24 July 1941 stood in positions from which they
could have reached terrain far to the east of Moscow with
concomitant destruction of the defending Soviet armies and
occupation of the political, communications, and transportation
center of Soviet Russia. The German achievement in June - July
1941, and the moderate projection of territorial gains in the
event of a timely continuation of the offensive toward Moscow,
reinforce a view of the opening stages of Barbarossa as the model
of combat within which the Soviets would avoid being on the
defensive and attempt instead to execute a Barbarossa in reverse.
Soviet writings and Soviet peacetime military maneuvers, for
example, the Dneiper exercises of the mid-1960s, and the
maneuvers in the region of the Western Dvina River in the 1970s,
paint an uncomplicated picture of Soviet forces reacting during
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peacetime to an anticipated attack from the West with an
offensive of their own. The unique usefulness of Barbarossa in
contrast with Allied offensive operations in Europe during the
Second World War lies in the fact that it was a major of fens i ve
at the beg inning of a war. The pattern in which the Germans
prepared for Barbarossa, for example, the deceptions as to
intentions, the execution of the Auf mar sch (concentration) of
three million troops on an international border for an attack,
the guiding principles under which the German armies operated in
the opening stages of the attack, and the disruption of the
relaxed Soviet peacetime command, control, and communication
system, offer immense potential rewards for study by the Soviets.
The research team examined the German disruption of Soviet
Command, Control, and, Communications (C-^) during the opening
stages of Barbarossa. The team reasoned that a systematic
exposition of the disruption would provide a firmer historical
basis for Western planners to understand the present Soviet
emphasis on disrupting an opponent in the opening stages of an
offensive by attacks on his C
. The task demanded the ex-
amination of the historical event, i.e., Barbarossa, and required
in turn, at least the discussion if not the establishment of a
reasonable historical analogy between Barbarossa and a potential,
future historical event, i.e., Barbarossa II, a future Soviet
military offensive in Central Europe. In order to gauge the
effectiveness of the historical analogy, one can establish
certain of the more important general factors, which operated in
Barbarossa (1941), and balance them against similar general
factors, which would operate in a potential Barbarossa II.
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Figures 7 and 8 show several considerations which can be
considered as general factors in Barbarossa-type offensives. The
statements in Figure 1 are moderately couched, historically
supportable statements which characterize the planning and
execution of Barbarossa. The statements in Figure 8 include
statements which are forecasts on the subject of a potential
future concentration and attack by Soviet forces in Central
Europe.
The Figures set forth identical factors to be considered in
the same sequence and show striking differences and similarities
between Barbarossa (1941) and a potential future Barbarossa II.
The peacetime diplomatic situation and the qualitative military
balance are immensely different, and the differences favor the
NATO defenders in both cases. In the one case, the more tense
diplomatic situation in Europe today and the highly alert posture
of the NATO military forces reduce the chance of surprise and
weaken the advantages associated with it. In the other case, the
defending NATO military forces have a moderate qualitative
superiority in terms of weapons and the hardware of C^, which
would probably tend to reduce casualties to manageable
proportions when taken in conjunction with the economies of force
possible with a less exposed defender. The similarities between
Barbarossa (1941) and Barbarossa II (Future) are equally
striking, however, if one makes the forecast that the Soviet
Armed Forces will be able to concentrate secretly and effect
significant levels of strategic surprise and accompanying
initiative and concentration of effort. It can probably be said
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I. Barbarossa (1941) Planning and Concentration, (July
1940 - June 1941).
A. National Socialist Germany in Overtly Correct and
Friendly Relations with Marxist Socialist Russia.
B. Germans Plan Barbarossa as an Offensive to Begin a
War Within the Framework of Overtly Correct and Friendly
Peacetime Foreign Relations.
C. German Military Plans Pivot on Assumption of High
Quality German Armed Force Attacking Low Quality Soviet Armed
Force at the Beginning of a War.
D. German Armed Forces Maintain Large Measure of High
Level Political Military Secrecy, i.e., Strategic Secrecy.
E. German Army Maintains Large Measure of Tactical
Secrecy.
F. Luftwaffe Maintains Large Measure of Tactical
Secrecy.
II. Barbarosa (1941) Attack (22 June 1941) .
A. German Army Achieves Larqe Measure of Tactical
Surprise.
B. Luftwaffe Achieves Complete Tactical Surprise.
III. Barbarossa (1941) Initial Stages (22 J une - 2_4 July
1941) .
A. German Army Seizes and Maintains the Initiative and
Concentrates its Effort Along Planned Axis of Advance.
B. Luftwaffe Seizes and Maintains the Initiative and
Concentrates its Effort on First Mission of Air Supremacy and
Main Mission of Tactical Air Support.
Figure 7. The General Factors
Operating In Bar barossa (1941)
.
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I. Barbarossa II (Future) Planning and Concentration .
A. (Fact) North Atlantic Alliance in Correct but
Guarded, Tense, and Unfriendly Peacetime Relations with Soviet
Dominated Warsaw Pact.
B. (Assumption) Soviets Plan a Preemptive Offensive to
Begin a War Within the Framework of Tense, Unfriendly Relations,
and Soviet perceived Threat of Impending Attack by NATO.
C. (Fact) If a Soviet Offensive is launched in Europe,
High Quality Soviet Forces Will Attack Higher Quality NATO
Forces
.
D. (Forecast) Notwithstanding the Tense, Unfriendly
Political Situation in Europe and the Alert Military Stance of
the NATO Forces, the Soviets Will Be Able to Maintain Secrecy in
Preparing an Attack.
E. (Forecast) The Soviet Army Will Have Relatively
Greater Problems in Maintaining Secrecy in the Concentration
for an Attack than the Soviet Air Force.
F. (Forecast) The Soviet Air Force Units Supporting
the Openinq Offensive Will be Able to Concentrate for an Attack
with Relatively Greater Secrecy than the Army.
II. Barbarossa II (Future) Attack .
A. (Forecast) The Soviet Army Will Achieve a
Significant Element of Tactical Surprise.
B. (Forecast) The Soviet Air Force Will Achieve a
Significant Element of Tactical Surprise.
III. Barbarossa II (Future) Initial Stages .
A. (Forecast) The Soviet Army Will Seize and Maintain
the Initiative and Concentrate its Effort along Planned Axes of
Attack.
B. (Forecast) The Soviet Air Force Will Seize and
Maintain the Initiative and Concentrate its Effort on Supporting
the Planned Scheme of maneuver on the Ground.
Figure 8. The General Factors
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overall, that the situation in Barbarossa II (Future) will be
considerably more favorable to the defender than the situation in
the planning and execution of the earlier epic. The lessons and
warning of the opening stages of Barbarossa (1941), which will be
examined in detail in the following chapters, would seem to be
the gloomy ones, however, that the advantages of surprise,
initiative, and concentration of effort, taken in concert with
the initial numerical superiority of the Soviets, may outweigh
the moderate NATO advantage in technology and certain economies
of force associated with the defense. The anticipated NATO
superiority in C^ equipment and the implied superiority in
command may also be cancelled by successful Soviet attacks
against NATO C^ installation based on the element of surprise.
Soviet military and political-military literature since the
Second World War has emphasized several themes which the Soviets
evidently feel are of special importance to the survival of
Soviet Russia. Possibly the two foremost themes are those of (1)
weapons technology, both nuclear and conventional, and (2) the
lessons of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviets make consistent,
terse, but decisive references to the opening stages of
Barbarossa as comprising "terrible" 1 happenings which no Soviet
government can allow to be repeated in any future confrontation
with technologically advanced states. The evidence is strong
that the Soviets have studied and are continuing to study
Barbarossa and its aftermath in the light of advancing
conventional and nuclear technology. The evidence is
1. See, History of the Great Patr i otic War of th e Soviet
U nion, 1941-1945
,
Vol. II (Moscow, 1961), pp. 11.
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overwhelming that the Soviets will not place themselves in the
position of repelling a Barbarossa type offensive but rather have
ensured through long term political conditioning of the Soviet
population and the development of offensive strategy and tactics
that they will exploit the advantages seized by the Germans in
launching Barbarossa. The great question which remains is:
what, in fact, were the advantages seized by the Germans in
launching Barbarossa? Evidence exists to support views that
while the Soviets accurately appreciate the havoc wrought during
the opening stages of Barbarossa, they still fail to understand
the reasons for the German success in a wide range of
perspectives varying from the historical necessities of Germany's
political-geographical position through the immediate necessities
of machine gun tactics in a ten-man infantry squad.
The Germans planned the Russian campaign and executed the
vast Auf m arsch (concentration) in the period July 1940 - June
1941. The planning, concentration, and execution bear the unique
stamp of German offensive operations. The stamp can be said to
comprise the idea in war of a great battle of decision, or
Entscheidungsschlacht , and flexible, independent decision making
on the part of subordinate commanders in order to assure the
success of the Entscheidungsschlacht . The Germans in severe
contrast to the Russians had been forced historically to
implement offensive military solutions to the problem of
political survival. Barbarossa runs accordingly in a pattern of
1. See, for example, the prescient comments in General
Ludendor f f ,M^ War Memor ies , 19 14-19 18 , Vol. II (London,
Hutchinson, no date^ p. 574.
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great military offensives including Koniggratz (1866), Sedan
(1870), France (1914), Poland (1939), and France (1940). Almost
as if the event were preordained, the Soviets received the impact
in a consistent defensive pattern which runs from Poltava (1709) ,
Moscow (1812), Sevastopol (1854-1855), Port Arthur (1904-1905),
and Gorlice-Tarnow (1915). The German pattern of war, with its
decisive offensive action at the beginning of all of the major
conflicts in recent German history, was severely tested in
Barbarossa. No other state in modern times has had the
confidence, expertise, and strategical necessity to launch such
an attack. Probably the most serious objection to the study of
"arbarossa as a model for present Soviet strategy and tactics is
<-he disparity in confidence and expertise between the German and
Soviet military leadership in 1941, rather than the differences
in technology between 1941 and 1980. An additional difficulty in
using Barbarossa as a guide to future happenings is that the
roles of the opponents are reversed, i.e., Soviet attackers with
high quality leadership are assumed to attack NATO/West German
forces which possess higher quality leadership. An historical
analogy between Barbarossa and a contemplated future Soviet
offensive at the opening of a war against the West, must be
considered in the light of the factors noted above.
German planning for Barbarossa went through many iterations
from the time of the beginning of planning by the Chief of Staff
of the Army on 3 July 40 to the morning of the Attack. For
purposes of this study, the complex picture at the higher levels
of command, e.g., High Commands of the Armed Forces (0_KW) , Army
(OKH ) , and Luftwaffe (OKL) . can be summarized as follows. On the
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one hand Adolf Hitler and certain immediate assistants, as
directed by him in OKW , developed a course of action which
emphasized the importance of the wings of the advance into the
Soviet Union. Hitler added to the inherent diffusion of effort
an economic argument about the necessary seizure of the grain and
industrial resources of the Ukraine at the expense of immediate
military victory. On the other hand, with solid professional
military competence, the planners of QKH emphasized the necessity
to defeat the opposing military force and seize "objectives",
i.e., political - military terrain, which would ensure the
military collapse of Soviet Russia. Army ideas and will power
triumphed in the planning of Barbarossa. The Germans, as a
result, concentrated 17 of the total of 32 motorized divisions
employed in the opening days of the offensive, with Army Group
Center north of the Pripyat Marshes in an attack directly toward
Moscow. Only nine German motorized divisions attacked into the
plains of the Ukraine and six into the forest, lakes, and swamp
of the Baltic area. The Sch w erpunkt , i.e., point of main
effort, in Barbarossa lay with Army Group Center. Only a
disastrous turn of events on the flanks or extraordinary
reemphasis on their importance could prevent the Germans from
seizing Moscow with the concomitant probability of the
annihilation of the defending armies and collapse of the Soviet
Union.
The QKH played out high level war games in several increments
in November - December 1940. The war games were manual ones
which involved a few high level commanders and staff officers,
with maps, map tables, and orders of battle and deployments of
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the opposing armies. The Germans set great store in such games
and those of November - December 1940 influenced the Germans to
reorganize Army Group South because of the resistance which it met
in the games and the resulting losses and setbacks.-'- Lower level
war games and map exercises were carried out by the newly
designated army groups in February 1941 and map exercises were
conducted by the field army and corps headquarters in April and
May 1941. Division commanders were not aware that a war with the
Soviet Union was planned until a few days before the commencement
of operations on 22, June 1941. Similar emphasis on security and
the achieving of surprise developed among the Luftwaffe planners.
In the areas of Air Fleet 1 (Army Group North) and Air Fleet 2
(Army Group Center), none of the hundreds of air crews and
individual pilots who took to the air just before first light to
attack the Soviet Air Force opened their sealed envelopes
containinq tarqet information more than eight hours prior to the
launching of the attack. 2 By various means the German High
Command systematically reduced knowledge of the impending
operation among personnel of the Armed Forces, e.g., Erich von
Manstein notes that as commanding general of LVI Panzer Corps,
one of only ten panzer corps in the East, he was not made aware
of the impending campaign until May 1941.
1. See Walter Gorlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad (New York),
pp. 110-112.
2« In tervie w , Major General Rudolph Loytved-Hardegg
,
Luftwaffe (Ret.), Nuremberg, W. Germany, 18 January 1980.
3. See, Erich von Manstein, Lost Vict or ies (Chicago,
1958), p. 175. Only 12 mobile corps existed in the German Army at
this time. The additional corps were XXXX Panzer Corps in OKH















































































































Illustration 6 GERMAN COMMAND: Shown here at left, with his command
car carrying the pennant of the 2nd Panzer Group, is
General (German Generaloberst ) Heinz Guderian, standing
on an unpaved road and keeping at least two staff
officers busy with instructions. German command style
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The German government continued to operate under the Russo-
German Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939, and maintained
formal, correct diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The
nonaggression pact was an extremely advantageous agreement for
the Soviets both politically and economically. Under the
agreement, i.e., with the sanction of the Germans, the Soviet
government had swiftly and boldly occupied by armed force half of
Poland, part of Finland, all of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
and Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina in 1939-1940. Heavy
transfers of Soviet grain and German industrial products had
taken place between the two states as well as the return of a
substantial number of ethnic Germans who had formerly been
forbidden to emigrate. Both states remained moderately tense
over the issue of appropriate degrees of influence in Rumania and
the question of the ultimate intentions of each. The correct
behaviour of the Germans within the framework of the explicit
nonaggression pact of 1939 constituted, however, an immensely
successful political deception for purposes of launching a
military campaign against the Soviets. The German political
military situation in the West, where active air and naval fronts
existed, and in the Mediterranean where major air, naval, and
ground fronts existed, also tended to support a view that the
Germans would not develop a new front in the East.
The German High Command had, in fact, issued the general
directive for the campaign en 18 December 1940, and detailed
planning at the level of Army Group through Corps proceeded from
January - June 1941. The first basic question for purposes of
this study is the degree to which the Germans planned to disrupt
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Soviet command, control, and communications. Consideration of
the basic question demands the definition of command, control,
and communications (C 3 ), which, on the one hand, is flexible
enough to be generally acceptable, and, on the other, firm enough
to allow systematic, structured analysis. An historical subtlety
also appears which warns that the Germans in 1940-1941,
notwithstanding the creation of a graceful, generally acceptable
definition of C 3 today, may not, in fact, have made such a
distinction.
Various descriptions of C 3 exist today based on the thoughts
and experiences of various responsible military officers,
scientists, and analysts. The following description of C 3 / which
will be used for the sake of having a reference point for
consideration, is based on four separate present-day authorities
and certain flexible extensions embraced by the study: 1
Command, Control, and Communications _(C 3]_
Command is the exercise of authority in the performance of
missions by a commander and his staff. Command is exercised
throuqh a Control system which comprises the Comm unications
facilities, equipment, and personnel essential for directing
assigned forces. Tr ansportation comprises the facilities and
eauipment used by the assigned forces to move in accordance with
direction received from the commander through his control system.
The commander directs his assigned forces within the framework of
a clearly discernible historical style. The style and asso-
ciated quality of command sets limits on the performance of the
entire system. Those qualitative limits exist in addition to the
technical ones imposed hy the technical qualities of the
communication facilities.
1. See, for example, the definitions of (1) Joint Chiefs of
Staff, (2) Dr. Thomas Rona, Boeing Corporation, (3) Dr. Robert
Conley, Chief Scientist, C 3 Programs, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, and (4) Dr. Richard Stark, Aerospace
Corporation.
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Use of such a definition results in a picture of Soviet
Command, Control and communications which is probably more
realistic and effective than one which neglects the
transportation used by assigned forces to achieve the moves
directed by the command and control system. The broader
definition tends to dilute the picture of extraordinary emphasis
placed on technically sophisticated control hardware in the West
today. Command and Control systems exist, however, to direct
the movements of assigned forces along existing transportation
networks and it is probably most effective to consider those
networks integrally with Command and Control. The integrated
viewpoint is used in this study and results in the following




Commanders Communications Road, Rail, Air,
General Staffs Hardware and Water Networks
Special Staffs Facilities Used by Assigned
Forces
»
3It is doubtful that the Germans hypothesized about Soviet C
in terms of a definition such as that noted above, especially as
concerns command and control. It is practically certain that the
Germans considered the Soviet Union to be a continuous,
homogeneous target in which commanders, staffs, control
personnel, communications hardware transportation, terrain, and
the Soviet field armies and air fleets were ranged together.
Within the total picture which presented itself to German
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military planners, it is practically certain that the Germans
developed a plan of operations which concentrated on the
destruction of as much as possible of the Soviet armed forces as
close as possible to the western boundaries of the Soviet Union.
It can be argued that a particularly effective way of achieving
such destruction would be by deft, surgical thrusts at the
Soviet commanders and their control hardware to stun the motor
system of the Soviet armed forces, i.e., command and control of
the armed forces. It can also be argued that attacks
concentrated against the Soviet transportation system would
effect a paralysis of movement among the forces assigned to
Soviet commanders, which would have effects virtually identical
to those associated with a stunned command, i.e., paralysis of
movement of the assigned forces, or, at the least, uncoordinated,
costly attacks and misdirected movement. Neither stunning of
enemy Command and Control nor disruption of an enemy
transportation system, however, directly effects the destruction
of armed forces, especially those operating relatively intact in
their own homeland at the beginning of a war.
The twelve German participants in Barbarossa who were
interviewed in this study, stated that the Germans did not single
out Soviet C^ for attack either in the planning or execution of
the campaign. The Barbarossa veterans agreed that Soviet C^ was
important, but pointed out from the viewpoints of both staff and
1. See, for example, part one of The Fuehrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, Directive No. 21 , Operation on
Barbarossa
, 18 December 1940, as reproduced in Heinz Guderian,
Panzer Leader (New York, 1956), p. 513.
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command experience, that the locations of Soviet higher
headquarters and lower level command posts were largely unkown.
There are some exceptions to their generalizations. In the first
few days of the campaign, the Luftwaffe attacked several targets
described as "suspected billets of higher level staffs" and
photographs exist of a damaged villa-like structure which is a
identified as "T
i
moshenko' s headquarters".^ The civilian
telephone and telegraph systems in the Soviet Union served as one
of the most important means of communication for the Soviet
armed forces, and the Luftwaffe recorded attacks on "telephone
exchanges" in several of the larger cities in the path of the
attacking German ground armies, e.g., Bialystok, Minsk, and Kiev.
In the opening days of Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe was forced also
to concentrate its meager resources almost entirely against the
Soviet Air Force* As concerns attacks against the Soviet
Russian transportation system, the Luftwaffe was faced with a
complex, subtle picture which demanded that the bridges, roads,
and rail lines in the path of the advancing German Panzer groups
be left untouched while similar facilities along which the
Soviets could withdraw come under continuous, effective attack,
e.g., the main road from west to east through Bialystok
described by the German infantry soldiers who passed over it as
the "road of horrors." 1 The German plans and operations aimed
directly at the destruction of the Soviet armed forces. The
1. See Gene ral leu t nan
t
Hermann Plocher, The German Air Air
Force Versus Russia, 1941 , USAF Historical Studies: No. 153 (New
York, Arno Press, 1965) p. 41. See page 209 of this study for
the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, West Germany, photograph identified as
"Timoshenko's headquarters".
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superiority of German staff planning and the violence of the
German advance ensured the disruption of Soviet C 3 and the
transportation system simultaneously with the physical
destruction of the armed forces because of the necessary
interrelationships among Soviet C 3
, the transportation system,
and the armed forces.
In its attacks against Soviet air installations and
aircraft, the Luftwaffe rendered the Red Air Force incapable of
interfering with the advance of the German ground armies within
the first 18 hours of the attack. One could almost say that the
C 3 system of the Red Air Force became extraneous in the face of
the massive destruction of the air force aircraft, airfields,
and personnel. The German field armies succeeded in their
attacks in advances so rapid in the Soviet Western Military
District (Minsk), that the Soviet C 3 system in that area, which
lies on the direct route to Moscow, became extraneous in the face
of the encirclement of approximately 400,000 troops and 3,332
tanks within the first five days of the campaign. The Germans
intended to destroy physically (1) the Red Air Force across the
entire front, and (2) the Red Army especially in the Western Mi-
litary District. One must observe, however, that the violence of
1. Interview , Major General Eberhard Waaermann, German Army
(Ret.), Rheinbach, West Germany, 18 January 1980. Wagermann was
a light infantry cannon platoon leader with a second echelon
infantry division which marched over the road shortly after the
air and ground attacks on the Soviet columns along it. Wagermann
and the combat hardened German troops with him referred to the
scene as the "road of horrors." Wagermann had already lost a leg
in the Polish campaign but was able to participate in Barbarossa
by riding a "small horse" and thus effectively keep up with the
pace of combat associated with the infantry division.
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the attacks, and the movement of the German field armies, suc-
ceeded in inducing the following trauma which constituted severe
disruption of Soviet C
, but necessarily within the context of
direct, physical destruction of the Red Air Force and the armies
of the central front:
German Soviet
Attack Results C 3 Trauma
(1) Casualties to Red Command (1) Stun, Paralyze Command
(2) Destruction Red C 3 Hardware (2) Disrupt Control
(3) Displace Red HQs & CPs (3) Disrupt Control
(4) Air Atk Vs. Transport System (4) Paralyze Movement of
Assigned Forces
(5) Physical Overrunning of (5) Paralyze Movement,
Transportation System Encircle, Kill, Capture
Assigned Forces
(6) Physical Destruction of (6) Prevent Execution of
Red AF C 3 Orders
At the highest governmental levels in Moscow, the Soviets
experienced catastrophic C 3 difficulties. For significant periods
of time the national decision makers operated without current
intelligence because of disrupted communications links.
Communications, particularly telephonic communications, between
the Stavka in Moscow and the Fronts and Armies seems to have
operated consistently, but communications from the Fronts and
Armies to subordinate commands were frequently shattered by
German advances which displaced or destroyed the subordinate
units. * in either case, the end result was one in which the
1. The Western Military District on 22 June is a
particularly good example of this situation. On 22 June and for
several days thereafter it had lost all but occasional
communications of any type with its three subordinate armies, the
3d, 4th, and 10th. See Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad , Chapter
3, "The Sunday Blow."
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Soviet leadership in Moscow was unaware of the situation at the
front and could not make intelligent, well-informed decisions.
The Stavka often lacked the communications means to disseminate
key directives quickly and to control the forces involved in
counterattacks as in the case of Soviet Directive Number 1. In
some cases the forces designated for counterattacks had already
been destroyed.
One may logically deduce that the disruption inflicted upon
the military communications system was also inflicted upon on the
communications of the NKVD, Party, and government officials. It
is difficult to determine the amount of disruption in the latter
systems, but it seems reasonable to assume that when the other
systems depended on the same communications facilities as the
military system, the disruption was roughly the same in the other
systems. When the other communications systems utilized
facilities separate from the military communications facilities
the other systems very likely survived longer that the military
system because the civilian facilities were less obvious to the
advancing German troops who were concentrating on military
targets. As some authorities contend, it is very possible that
Stalin was frequently better informed of battle developments than
front commanders due to the separate Party Communications
Systems. ^ It is hard to determine exactly how much better
informed Stalin really may have been because of the frequent








losses of communications at lower command levels and the problem
of determining the value of a commodity when compared with
something of no value
The initial response of the national leadership of the
Soviet Union to the extensive failure of Russian communications
was the 23 June appointment of Marshal I. T. Peresypkin, already
the manager of the Chief Directorate of Communication of the Red
Army, to the People's Commissariat of Communications. ^ Marshal
Peresypkin employed several communications battalions to ensure
communications between Moscow and the Fronts. His new assignment
also permitted utilization of the state communications to support
the fronts and allowed military communications to augment the
state as required. After only one day of battle, Soviet leaders
were also painfully aware of the qross inadeauacies of the
governmental and military command structure, particularly its
inability to cope with the scope and tempo of the German
inwsion. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party
immediately began to formulate a politico-military command
structure capable of responding militarily and economically to
the German attack. During Barbarossa this command structure
constantly adapted to the German threat and included the addition
and deletion of several echelons of authority and decision making
bodies
.
The paralyzing influences cast upon Soviet C^ by the German
Wehrmacht during the initial days of Operation Barbarossa were
not transitory although they did diminish in intensity as the




battle moved eastward and Soviet lines of communications
shortened. The Germans aggressively maintained . their offensive
pressure to achieve their primary objective of eliminating Soviet
combat forces and in so doing proliferated new C disruptions and
perpetuated existing disorders. Reeling from several quick,
stunning defeats, the Soviets attempted to recover from the
surprise of the German attack and stem the advancing German tide
in one coordinated move contained in Directive #3. Given the
confusing state of affairs existing in Russia during June, a
maneuver of such grand proportions could have overstressed the
Soviet-^ System even without the disruption produced by the
Germans.
A multitude of chance counter-C^ occurrences was also
inevitable in an armed conflict of the proportions of Operation
Barbarossa. The planning and execution of the great
encirclements of Barbarossa were remarkably successful and those
encirclements produced immense disorder in Soviet C-* even though
their basic purpose was to destroy the Soviet combat forces.
Operations supporting the great encirclements, for example, air
strikes and commando activities, were also very successful and
produced additional disorder in Soviet C^. What is difficult,
perhaps even impossible to describe, are the counter-C^ effects
of those targets of opportunity fired upon, seized, or destroyed
by German forces in the field. As only one example of this
phenomenon, consider the advance of the 620th Mountain Engineer
1. Interview , Nekrich, Boston, Jan. 80
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Regiment after it crossed the Upper Dvina and seized the village
of Berilawlj in July 1941. After a brief exchange of rifle fire,
elements of the battalion seized a nearby collective farm at
0530. As part of the attack process, the troops immediately
disconnected the telephone at the farm, as they had in the
village. The German soldiers carried out this act rather
casually but nevertheless in an almost habitual manner. 1 This
particular incident involved only two telephones. But how many
phones were destroyed, wires cut, or messengers intercepted by
German soldiers, performing routine duties, who had no idea of
their contribution to the disruption of Soviet command, control,
and communications?
The German attacks against the Red Air Force and the Red
Army were so effective in disrupting the Soviet C^ system that
the two Soviet participants in Barbarossa who were interviewed in
the course of the study stated that they felt the Germans had a
systematic doctrine of attack against Soviet C^.2 Not one Q f t ^ e
twelve Germans interviewed and no document or book examined in
the study hints of a systematic German doctrine of attack against
Soviet C^. Every one of the Germans interviewed and every
pertinent document and book examined supports a view of the
disintegration of Soviet C^ in front of German Army Group Center
and its severe disruption opposite Army Groups North and South.
One is forced to conclude that the German formula for attack
1. E. Schmidt, Small Unit Tactics
,
(unpublished, 1952), in
files of U. S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History.
2. Aleksandr Nekrich and Kamill Usfensky, both interviewed
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, January, 1980.
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against the Red Air Force and Red Army was so effective that si-
multaneously with the destruction of the field forces, it
stunned, paralyzed and disruped Soviet c\ such a conclusion
raises several significant questions, the answers to which are
important to the military survival of the West in the event of a
war opened by a Soviet conventional attack against West Germany.
First: do the Soviets agree with the generalization that
vast Soviet field forces were destroyed and the associated
commands lost control of their assigned forces? The answer to
such a question is probably yes. The great debate which raged
in the Soviet Union between 1945-1953 over the lessons of the
great patriotic war pitted the concept of the advantages of
surprise versus those of the great natural strengths of the
fatherland and associated inevitability of victory. The more
purely military actors in the debate emphasized the advantages
of the element of surprise which had been exploited by the
Germans. Josef Stalin personally led the opposing element which
emphasized long-term factors which eventually contributed to
victory in the Dainful four-year aftermath of Barbarossa.
References can be found in Soviet literature which has appeared
since the debate indicating that the carnage wrought by the
Germans in the opening weeks was immense and unacceptable, thus
driving the Soviets by implication to seize the advantages
offered by a Barbarossa-type opening move at the beginning of a
war. The study also supports a view that, in fact, the Soviets
lost the flower of their peacetime army 1 and the Soviet High
1. Note the conclusions in Alan Clark, Barbarossa
,
(New
York, 1964), pp. 84, 85, 148, 149.
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Command itself lost control of events on the road from Bialystok
to Moscow.
Second: what was the measure of the German victory and what
were the reasons for it? The question is the most important for
purposes of the study because the answer to it can provide
specific historical insight into the practical necessities of
Soviet strategy and tactics. The answer to the question raises
difficulties, however, which must be carefully addressed.
The Soviets, for example, even if they have detected certain
German methods of operation, which gave the Germans special
advantages within the framework of Barbarossa, may not be able
or willing to duplicate such methods of operation. On the other
hand, if one concedes that the Soviets have carefully studied
the Second World War in Russia, a parallel, first hand study of
the part predominated in by the Germans has substantial chances
of agreeing on similar historical lessons. The Germans in fact
seized certain strategical advantages and operated with a
characteristic strategic and tactical style which can be
outlined as follows:
Advantages Seized: Advantages Held: German
Barbarossa-Type Operation Military Historical Style
(1) Strategic Surprise (1) Entscheidungsschlacht Concept
(2) Tactical Surprise. (2) Auf tragstaktik Concept.
(3) Concentration of Effort. (3) Schwerpunkt Concept.
(4) Initiative. (4) Extreme Emphasis on Training.
(5) Operational Experience. (5) Superiority in Small Unit
Tactics.
1. Auftragstaktik refers to mission style operational
orders
.
Schwerpunkt translates as point of main effort.
Entscheidunasschlacht translates as battle of decision
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The advantages seized or held by the Germans at the
beginning of Barbarossa comprise a formidable list which the
Soviets have attempted to simulate as closely as their own
historical style will allow for the situation in Europe. The
Soviets have probably reinforced the list with advantages based
on their own unique perception of effectiveness in combat and
advantages systematically culled from advances in technology.
The present Soviet concept of a preemptive counterstr ike within
a framework of political and military tension leading to war in
Europe, is based on the perceived advantage of surprise or, at
least, the seizure of the initiative at the beginning of a war.
Such a concept stems directly from the Soviet perception of the
disastrous results achieved against Soviet Russia in 1941, which
were based on successful German achievement of surprise and
seizure of the initiative. The Soviets today, however, are faced
with a less favorable political situation for the achievement of
military surprise because of the tense and unfriendly political
relations between the Atlantic Community and the East European
states from 1945 - present. The Soviets can probably achieve,
nevertheless, a substantial if not complete surprise attack
against the West through a phased, carefully concealed, patient
concentration of mobile forces against West Germany.
The expertise with which the Germans exploited the surprise
achieved in the concentration of troops up to 0305-0315 22 June
1941, represents perhaps more than half of the picture of German
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success in Barbarossa. German historical style demanded either
an Entscheidungsschlacht (battle of decision) or in the case of a
vast theater of operations, a linked, continuous series of
decisive battles leading to a military victory in the campaign.
The necessity for such a battle with its emphasis on the
annihilation, i.e., killing or capturing of the opposing military
force, is the leading reason for the absence of a specific German
doctrine of attack against the C 3 of th<=» Russians, French, Poles,
etc. The qeneral concept of the annihilation of an opposing
military force comfortably encompassed a modus operandi in which
enemy C° was shattered as a necessary by-product of the general
advance. Manstein notes, for example, the following results of
the Panzer drive of LVI Panzer Corps through Lithuania from 22-26
June 1941: "A tank drive such as 56 Panzer Corps made to Dvinsk
inevitably generates confusion and panic in the communication
zone; it ruptures the enemy's chain of command and makes it
virtually impossible for the enemy to coordinate his counter-
measures. " 2
The fact that the Germans embraced the concept of a great
decisive battle, applied that concept to Operation Barbarossa,
and successfully achieved surprise in the opening stages of the
campaign still did not assure them of victory in the war in the
East. The Germanscame close to outright military victory in July
1. The Germans attacked with artillery fire and/or movement
of infantry and tanks across the Soviet border at 0305 in Army
Group North and 0315 further south in Army Groups Center and
South.
2. Manstein, Lost Victor ies
, p. 186.
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1941 and the Soviets required four additional years of combat and
the loss of approximately twenty-five . million lives to
share with the United States, British, and the Free French
governments a victory over the Germans. The reasons for the
German success in June - July 1941, lie also in advantages held
by the Germans in terms of the spirit and style in which they
conducted military operations. Through study of the war, the
Soviets have probably come to understand the German advantages in
varying degree, but it is doubtful that they have developed the
capabilities to attain the same condition. The German advantages
lay in the achievement of the Auf trag concept of operational
leadership and the Sch w erpunkt elaboration of the concept of
concentration of effort, in combination with a new idea of
flexibily organized combat groups. The Germans seasoned their
effective historical style with a basic superiority in training
and in small unit tactics.
Auf trags takt
i
k describes a concept which comprised the
issuing of mission type orders covering the longest periods of
time possible in anv given situation. Under the concept, German
military leaders gave brief orders which elaborated on missions
to be accomplished but left the methods of accomplishment to
subordinate commanders. Within the Auf tra£ concept of
operations, commanders emphasized the point of main effort, or
Sch w erpunkt , of the command, especially on the offensive. The
concepts enumerated provide convincing reasons why the Germans in
Barbarossa had no specific doctrine of targeting Soviet C but
nevertheless stunned the Soviet command, disrupted control, and
paralyzed movement along the transportation system. With the
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concept of the Ents cheidungs s chlach t, the Germans focused on
quick military victory through a battle of annihilation. Within
such a concept, specific, elaborate destruction of Soviet C^ was
extraneous. The general violence of the attack with the deep,
paralyzing thrusts of the Panzer formations, the achievement of
air supremacy by the Luftwaffe, and the superiority of German
artillery and machine gun tactics, swept everything before it.
Within the concept of Auftragstaktik , German commanders did not
elaborate on the details of how to annihilate the enemy in the
decisive battle. The concept demanded the maximum, independent
performance from each subordinate commander, who could scarcely
be given the mission of annihilating an enemy in a particular
area and then be directed to employ a significant part of his
force to attack C^ targets. The Schwer£unkt concept, in
contrast, demanded simply that once a subordinate commander
decided how to maneuver his formations to annihilate an enemy, he
would without exception designate the point of main effort, e.g.,
"Sch w erpunkt right," "Schwerpunkt left," "Schwerpunkt with
Infantry Regiment 86," etc.
The German historical condition and the military style
associated with it, accounts for the triad of (1) the decisive
battle, (2) mission type orders, and (3) points of main effort in
the German planning and execution of major offensives at the
beqinning of a war. The triad represents a significant bit of
intellectualizing about the way the Germans operated and the
reasons for their virtuosity in the conduct of military
operations. The Germans, however, did not annihilate an enemy
with intellectual concepts, although it can be argued fairly that
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such concepts are closely bound to the violence and action which
they suggest. They did annihilate Soviet forces with the fire of
machine guns, howitzers, and tank cannon, the release of bombs,
etc.. The German tactical units conducted the annihilating fires
and related manuevers with uniformly greater efficiency than the
Soviets. The resulting German success was based on exceptional
training, sophisticated small unit tactics, and extraordinary
flexibility in the formation of combat groups. Training and
small unit tactics in the German Army held probably a more
important position than in any other army. Such a statement is
supported by (1) the extraordinary German Tactical Training
programs of the winter months during the First World War, which
led to the famed infiltration attacks of 1918, (2) the specific
delineation of the machine gun as the primary offensive weapon of
the army, and (3) the training in the interwar Re ichsheer in
which officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers were
instructed in the duties of personnel one, and, in some cases two
ranks higher than their own position. The Germans used firing
tables with their heavy machine guns, e.g., in the German case, a
light air-cooled gun on a tripod, in order to shoot indirect
fire missions in support of the infantry, and one of the more
important infantry attacks of the Second World War, the German
parachute counterattack back into Cassino from Monastery Hill in
March 1943, which stabilized the German position for a further
two months of combat in Italy, was supported exclusively by a
concentration of direct and indirect machine gun fire. The
equipping of the German heavy machine gun with a telescopic
sight, the lavish equipping of machine gun squad leaders with
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binoculars, and the special attention given to the design of the
light machine gun, are additional factors which point to
extraordinary German emphasis on small unit tactics.
The appearance of the Soviet T-34 tank with its heavy,
sloped armor, advanced 60° v-12 (Model V-2) diesel engine, and
moderately high velocity (662 m/sec) , large 76.2mm tank cannon,
and several other highly respectable pieces of ordnance has
tended to obscure the superiority of several German weapons. The
Germans in the interwar period designed the MG-34, which was
probably the most advanced and effective machine gun in the world
in the Second World War. 1 The MG-34, which existed in light,
heavy, and tank armament versions, equipped virtually all of the
German divisions operating on the eastern front in June - July
1941. With its moderate weight (approximately 24 pounds
unloaded), exceptionally high cyclic rate of fire (800-900 rounds
per minute), self-leveling bipod, and plastic components, the MG-
34 gave the German infantry and motorized infantry squads a
superior weapon of decision for dealing with the Soviet rifle
squads of 1941. Armed with reliable but excessively heavy,
clumsy, wheel-mounted air and water cooled machine guns with
lower rates of fire, the Soviet infantry was dominated by the
German infantry squads.
1. The MG-34 began to be replaced in 1942 with an improved,
less expensive version designated MG-42. The judgment on
effectiveness is made within the context of the MG-34 and follow-
on MG-42 family of weapons and supported by similar judgments in
W.J.K. Davies, German Ar_my_ Handbook (N.Y., 1977), pp.137, 139;
A.J.R. Cormack, German Small Ajrms (N.Y., 1979), p. 85; and A. J.
Barker, German I~nf a n t r y Weapons oj: World War 2 (N.Y., 1969),
p. 47.
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The superior German squad machine guns and related superior
small unit tactics exemplify the other half of the reasons for
German success in Barbarossa in contrast to the more cerebral
factors of strategic suprise, Auf tragstaktik f and the assignment
of Schwerpunkten . The potential for violence with German machine
guns comes into clearer focus when one realizes that within
approximately 48 hours of H-hour on B-day, the Germans had moved
approximately 45,000 infantry squads into the Soviet Union each
built around an MG-34. The German potential for violence must
also include the body of approximately 1,500 Panzer III and
Panzer IV type tanks which were clearly superior to the great
mass of approximately 18,000 Soviet T-26, BT-5, and BT-7
vehicles. The German Panzer III and IV tanks were in turn
inferior to th«=> Soviet T-34A and T-34B tanks in gun armament and
armor thickness but had more effective command control equipment
and superior optics and fire control apparatuses. The Germans
also "established air superiority and even more", perhaps
something which could be described as air supremacy, or "total
rule" in the air. 1 By the third day of the campaign, the
Luftwaffe began to intervene on the ground with attacks by level,
dive, and fighter bombers which disrupted the Soviet
transportation system and inflicted significant casualties and
damage on troop formations. The Germans focused the combination
of strategical initiative and tactical efficiency on the
destruction of the opposing Soviet military forces.
Simultaneously and as a function of the violence of the attack,
1. Interview , Hardegg, Nuremberg, Jan 1980
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the Germans inflicted immense casualties and damage on "the major
enemy groupings" and demolished their C .
1. General of the Army S.P. Ivanov, The Initial Period of_
the War (Moscow, 1974), p. 299. Ivanov makes the point FFTaT th~e
" c h i eT~c o n t e n t of the initial offensive operations of the Nazi





"It is of decisive importance for the breakthrough to push
forward as far as possible without regard to danger from the
flanks, with, maximum use of the mobility afforded by our tank
engines, without rest or rest days, and with movement at night,
limited only by the distance which fuel supplies will allow."
(Army Group Center, Panzer Group 2, XXXXVII Panzer
Corps, Order Number 1 for the attack against the Soviet
Union, dated 13 June 1941) 1
It was still dark but the weather was near perfect with warm
termperatures and only a few clouds in the night sky. Unlike the
scene a year earlier and 800 miles further west, where an
airborne assault had dictated the time for an attack, the German
Army mandated the onset of civil twilight as the time for the
beginning of the new operation. 2 The new operation was big by
any standard. It was to be the biggest offensive in military
history. The time was about 0300, and Barbarossa was soon to
unfold.
German assault troops lay in the summer grass, behind rail-
way embankments, in ditches along the unpaved roads, in forests,
and along the banks of rivers stretching from the Baltic Sea to
central Roumania. More than 45,000 infantry squads lay there,
1. XXXXVII Panzer Korps, Anlagen Nr. 1-100 , Kr iegstagebuch
Nr. 2, 20.5-27.6.1941, Bundesarchiv, Freiburg, 13468/1.
2. The Luftwaffe preferred to attack after first light and
before the Army in order to catch the Red Air Force on the ground
and unwarned by the opening of operations by the Army. The Army
demanded that the attack go in at first light even though the
Luftwaffe would need upwards of 35 minutes after that time to
reach the first targets, i.e., the Soviets would have 35 minutes
to take off and escape the consequence of strategic and tactical
surprise. The Army won the struggle but in turn ran into
difficulties in setting the exact time for the attack.
91
not smoking, not talking, in almost total darkness. The
potential for violence was great: 360,000 loaded rifles, 45,000
belted or drummed light machine guns, and 45,000 magazine-heavy
machine pistols. Almost 3,200 tank crews manned silent, darkened
vehicles whose engines in minutes would announce the advance of
three quarters of a million tank horsepower into the Soviet occu-
pied parts of Lithuania, Poland, and Roumania. More than 900
combat aircrews worked their way into tactical formation over
their bases and began the run to the Soviet frontier in the
final minutes before civil twilight from airfields averaging
about 100 km back from the borders. The hammer was raised.
What about the anvil?
Except for several areas in the sector opposite German Army
Group North, where some Soviet units had gone into defensive
positions near the border at approximately the time of the
attack, the Red Army lay sleeping. The Soviet troops slept in
primitive wooden barracks, open summer bivouacs, or in civilian
quarters on leave passes with friends in the villages and cities
of the recently expanded, western Soviet Union. They slept in a
somber landscape that stretches through the great forests of
Lithuania and White Russia, the swampland of the Pripyat
Marshes, the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, the grassy
plains and deep ravines of the Ukraine down to a southern sea.
The men of more than 40,000 Soviet rifle squads in an immense
peacetime army lay sleeping in the relaxed disarray of an early
Sunday morning. More than 10,000 Soviet tank crews slept near a
huge number of armored vehicles spread liberally among the Soviet
infantry divisions and concentrated in greater numbers in nine
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mechanized corps in the western Soviet Union. Approximately
7,000 air crews manning the same number of military aircraft lay
in billets in and around dozens of formal air bases and a
greater number of small tactical air strips. The Soviets had
also approximately 7,000 additional tanks and 5,000 additional
aircraft capable of being fed into the conflict in the event
that it lasted for more than several weeks and the crews could
be mobilized and linked with the machines. Production of more
modern tanks and aircraft was also just beginning to accelerate
in the middle of 1941, and a huge pool of military manpower was
available to expand the Red Army and Air Force far above the
peacetime figure of approximately 2,500,000 personnel. Never
had such a formidable anvil been struck by so relatively small a
hammer. The Germans needed something special indeed to
compensate for the gross numerical deficiencies in the attacking
force and several qualitative deficiencies which would soon be
revealed.
Probably the single most important strategic advantage that
the Germans would attempt to seize at first light on Sunday 22
June 1941, was surprise. Surprise was the strategic commodity
which would enable the Germans to seize the initiative and
concentrate their field armies on achieving a clear cut military
victory within chosen space and time. Surprise could compensate
for a general deficiency in numbers and several specific
1* Intervie w , Maj. Gen. Rudolf Loytved-Hardegg , Air Force
(Ret.), Nuremberg, W. Germany, 18 Jan. 80. Loytved-Hardegg
stated that as intelligence officer for Luftflotte 1, but with
planning responsibility to locate the Soviet military airfields
in the entire western Soviet Union, he and his assistants
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deficiencies in the technical qualities of German material.^
Strategic surprise comprised many factors at the beginning of
Barbarossa and bestowed several potentially decisive advantages
on the Germans. Some of The factors constituting surprise and
the potential advantages to the Germans were the following ones:
Factor of Strategic Surprise German Advantage
(1) Uncertainty of War (1) Soviet Peacetime Opns
Mode
(2) German Time of Attack (2) Soviets Surprised Tac-
tically
(3) German Point of Main Effort (3)Soviet Strategic De-
ployment Defective
(4) German Scheme of Maneuver (4) Soviet Loss of the
Initiative
(5) German Mobility (5) Soviet Strategy of
Holding on Frontier
(6) German Firepower (6)Soviet MG and Artil-
lery Weaknesses
If the Germans could keep the question of war substantially
uncertain, the Soviets would probably maintain their airfields
operating with densely packed peacetime parking areas and provide
the Germans with the opportunity to eliminate the Red Air Force
from the war. The Soviets would also keep all the frontier
bridges intact with the resulting opportunity for the German
field armies or other special forces to seize them undamaged. If
the Germans could deceive the Soviets as to the question of the
opening of a war, it follows almost as an axiom that they could
.1. The Germans possessed a mild numerical advantage on the
opening day of the campaign which would rapidly change to a dis-
advantage as the Soviets mobilized reserves and entirely new
units. The Germans had two critical materiel deficiencies: (1)
the most numerous German antitank gun in the Barbarossa forces
was the 37mm L-45 cannon which proved incapable of damaging the
Soviet T-34 and KV series tanks, and, (2) the Panzerka mpfw agen
III main battle tank armed with the 50mm, L-42 cannon, which also
was largely incapable of inflicting damage on the heavier, more
modern tanks of the Soviet tank inventory.
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also select a main axis of advance which would (a) render the
entire Soviet deployment of forces defective, and (b) subject the
Soviets to defeat in the war as a result of the initial
strategical misdirection of the defensive effort. If the
Germans could next put together within the area of main effort a
scheme of maneuver with the pace and destructive capabilities to
keep the Soviets off balance, i.e., not allow them to rearrange
and reinforce their defectively deployed armies, the Germans
could press forward to the seizure of strategical terrain in the
Soviet Union the loss of which would result in the collapse of
the Soviet war effort. A key element, finally, contributing to
the success or failure of the Soviet defense would be the Soviet
calculation of the mobility and firepower of the German divisions
executing the schemes of maneuver. If, for example, the Soviets
underestimated German mobility, i.e., were surprised by the
rapidity of German movement, their defensive strategy and
associated tactical movements in reaction to the German
initiatives would likely range from inadequate to self-
defeating .
The Germans would start the war with immense advantages if
they could achieve strategic surprise, and they took severe pre-
cautions to limit knowledge of the impending offensive and dis-
guise the necessary buildup of forces. Did the Germans, however,
achieve surprise in the opening stages of Barbarossa? And,
accepting a premise that surprise was a driving consideration in
the opening of Barbarossa, a basic question for purposes of the
study would be: what doctrine or special emphasis did the Germans
bring to bear in the planning and execution of Barbarossa to
97
disrupt Soviet Command, Control, and Communications? The ques-
tion of German disruption of Soviet C 3 in the opening stages of
Barbarossa must be set, in other words, within the framework of
the German attempt to achieve strategic surprise.
The question of whether or not the German field armies and
air fleets achieved surprise has been addressed by most
commentators on Barbarossa but with ambiguous and indecisive
interpretation. The ambiguity is attributable to the different
levels at which surprise has been considered At the strategic
level, commentators have a tendency to agree that Stalin, and,
by implication, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and the high command of the Army, had
information months before June 1941, which could be interpreted
to indicate German plans and preparations for an attack. Such
agreement tends to support a view that the Soviet political and
military high commands were not surprised, i.e., confounded,
overwhelmed, dumbfounded, bewildered, by the German attack. Yet
the point remains that much of the information received by the
higher level political figures was not of authenticity great
enough to risk a hostile move against National Socialist
Germany, and the fact persists that the high command failed to
institute any plan to raise the state of alert of the great Red
force deployed near the western boundaries of the state. At the
strategic level of consideration, the Soviet political military
leadership in 1941 remained unconvinced of the German intentions
to launch an all out attack and was surprised by the time and
point of main effort of the offensive and the violence and
rapidity of the ensuing German action.
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Among the tactical formations of the Red Army, the picture
as concerns surprise is a mixed one. The Soviet tactical forma-
tions, e.g., divisions, corps, and armies, were constrained by
the political policy of non-provocation and correctness vis-a-
vis the Germans, to adopt a relaxed, peacetime alert status.
Both the field armies and the special border forces of the
Commissariat of the Interior were forbidden to violate the
border in order to collect information to verify German
intentions. To compound the Soviet problem, the Germans
effected the final concentration of their forces on the border
approximately 15-72 hours before the attack. Before that time,
the Germans held the border lightly, echeloned their combat
divisions in great depth behind it, and maintained radio
silence.^ For the final concentration on the border the Germans
moved at night and concealed themselves during the daytime in
the forests of Poland and East Prussia. Even if the Red Army
units and the border guards near the Reich frontier had been
more alert tactically and less concerned about border provo-
cation, they would have observed little activity near the border
up until 19 June 1941. Even after that date, the Germans moved
forward under severely enforced conditions of march secrecy, and
the Red Army would have had difficulty in deducing at the
tactical level that a major offensive was imminent.
1. In a considerable technical achievement, the Germans
maintained absolute radio silence among the Barbarossa forces,
and when they launched the attack between 0305 and 0315, 22 June
1941, the Germans activated almost simultaneously hundreds of
command, logistical, intelligence, etc. radio nets among the 2000
battalions, regiments, divisions, corps, and armies massed for
the offensive.
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In spite of German precautions in the concentration for the
attack and Soviet emphasis on an inoffensive military alert
posture on the western borders, the Red Army was not caught
everywhere by surprise. Opposite several divisions in Army
Group North, the Germans noted that the Russians were in their
field fortifications ready to fight when the attack began.
Opposite Army Groups Center and South, in contrast, the Russians
were taken almost completely by surprise at the tactical level,
but heavy fighting developed quickly opposite Army Group South.
In the south, the Soviets had deployed particularly strong forces
in anticipation of a potential future German attack motivated by
the desire to seize the agricultural and mineral resources of the
Ukraine. The German Sch w erpu nk t in the campaign lay farther
north in the area of Army GroupCenter, and the Germans realized
a greater measure of tactical surprise there The tactical
surprise, which the Germans attained across most of the front
within the broader context of strategical surprise, was
important but lasted for only a brief moment. Literally as the
minutes ticked by in the opening fire missions of Barbarossa,
tactical surprise and the advantages associated with it melted
away, i.e., the Red Army formations knew they were under attack
and began to fight back with increasing effect. The more
enduring factor which the Germans seized and held as tactical
surprise faded on the border was the initiative in point and
time of attack. The Germans gained at least one special
advantage from tactical surprise at the opening of the campaign
and that was the seizure of dozens of bridges along the
watercourses which lay along the frontier between the Reich and
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the Soviet Union. Possession of the bridges gave the Germans the
capability to drive ahead with the extraordinary mobility which
characterized the opening stages of Barbarossa.
The Red Air Force, because of the vulnerability of its
highly visible aircraft and air facilities, suffered almost
irreversible damage from the German exploitation of tactical
surprise. The Red Army, in contrast, was relatively
insensitive to tactical surprise. From the strategic viewpoint
of the initial arrangement or deployment of its forces, however,
the Red Armv was, almost immediately in near-mortal danger from
the German attack. The deployment of the Red Army along the
Reich border was inefficient from both defensive and offensive
viewpoints. If one assumes that the Soviets were in a defensive
deployment, the massing of forces forward in "the Bialystok and
Lemberg salients represents incredible naivety about the
strength of a modern military offensive and a gross under-
estimation of German mobility and firepower. The deployment also
supports a view that the Soviets were completely surprised for
all practical purposes by the time of attack, point of main
effort, and the scheme of maneuver of the German field armies.
If one assumes that the Soviets were in an offensive deployment,
or some stage of transition toward an offensive concentration,
the massing of forces near Bialystok and Lemberg was an
effective arrangement for an attack. The arrangement would have
represented, however, a drastic misapprehension on the part of
the Soviets about the pending German attack. The Soviets could
scarcely be considered to have convincing evidence in their
possession which supported the existence of an incoming German
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offensive while continuing to plan their own offensive at a
relatively unhurried pace. The Soviets were, in fact, in the
throes of reorganizing their tank formations into balanced,
combined arms divisions similar to the German Panzer divisions,
reequipping the tank formation with T-34 medium and KV series
heavy tanks, and modernizing the Red Air Force.
The Germans achieved both strategic and tactical surprise in
the opening of Barbarossa although both types or levels of
surprise must be considered as interdependent. Strategic
surprise was the more important of the two factors with tactical
surprise at the beginning of Barbarossa depending almost
completely on the Soviet strategical assumption of the
continuation of peace. Under the heading of strategical
surprise, the Germans also exploited the defective initial
deployment and qualitative inferiority of the Red Army into a
stunning series of military victories. The Red Army deployment
of the field armies up against the Reich border in the Bialystok
salient resulted in a heavy concentration of Red Army divisions
forward where they could be encircled by the more mobile German
Panzer and motorized infantry divisions and pinned down and
destroyed by the hard marching infantry divisions. Soviet
military strategy was circumscribed by an initial deployment of
forces too far forward and further weakened by establishment of
the main defensive effort south in the Ukraine. The Soviets
embraced a military strategy of stubborn resistance all along
the border and attempted to hold on to as much terrain as
possible. The strategy, which was driven significantly by
consideration of political prestige and credibility in a state
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sensitive to a nationalities problem and the traditional
preeminence of the Great Russians, was a near-fatal one when fit
together with the German strategy of sweeping encirclements
around Bialystok, Minsk, and Smolensk.
The question of what doctrine or special emphasis the
Germans brought to bear in the planning and execution of
Barbarossa on the subject of Soviet C 3 lies within the German
attempt (1) to achieve surprise, and (2) to fight within that
framework, the great, historically driven P r us so-German
Entscheidungsschlacht . Any German attack on Soviet C would have
the purpose to contribute to the success of the great battle of
decision, and the question of what results the Germans sought in
such a battle would seem to be the correct one to ask to
ascertain the significance of counter C operations in
Barbarossa. To discover the deqree to which the German Army
specifically targeted Soviet C 3 and the disruption that they
actually achieved in the opening stages of the campaign, the
authors interviewed in Germany eight Army officers who had
participated in the planning and/or execution of Barbarossa. The
officers were distributed among command and staff billets as
follows with striking difference among the levels at which they
observed the campaign unfold:
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Army Officer Participants in Barbarossa
(1) Gen. (Ret.) J. -A. Graf Kielraansegg (G-3, 6.PZ.D.)
(2) Maj.Gen. Alexander Fr ever t-Niedermein (Squadron
Ldr, AA26, 86. 1. D.)
(3) Maj.Gen. (Ret.) Peter von der Groeben fAsst G-3,
Army Group Center)
(4) Maj.Gen. (Ret.) Detlev von Plato (G-4, l.Pz.D.)
(5) Maj.Gen. (Ret.) Guenter Pape (CO, I.Bn, S.R. 394,
3.PZ.D.)
(6) Maj.Gen. (Ret.) Dr. Eberhard Wagermann (Light Inf.
Gun Plat. Cmdr., 23. 1. D.)
(7) Mr. Noack (Armored Inf. Company CO, 7.Pz.D.)
(8) Mr. Charles von Luttichau (Army intelligence)
The participants were asked a similar set of questions about
terrain objectives for maneuver and targets for fire in
Barbarossa and it became clear at both the higher levels of
consideration, e.g., Headquarters, Army Group Center, and
tactical levels, e.g., light infantry gun platoon, that the
Germans interviewed saw the combat in Soviet Russia as an
exercise in the phys ical destruction of the opposinq Red Army
divisions. The participants were asked specifically whether or
not the Germans in the planning or execution had a conscious,
specific doctrine of attack against Soviet C 3 in the opening
stages of Barbarossa. The Army and Luftwaffe officers alike
answered unanimously that no such doctrine existed. Major
General Guenter Pape answered with great decisiveness that it was
unrealistic, i.e., constituted an unreal intellectual
abstraction, to break out C 3 from the continuum of
relationships, units, and combat in which it existed. Major
General Peter von der Groeben stated that the planning
1. Dr. Klink, presently scientific director at the
Militaer-Geschichtlichen Forschungsamt , Freiburg-im-Breisgau, W.
Germany, was interviewed relative to his experiences in
Barbarossa in a Waffen SS division.
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accomplished and orders issued at Army Group Center involved no
references to Soviet C • Major General Detlev von Plato as G-4
of the 6th Panzer Division stated that "at the level of the
division, we never had intelligence satisfactory enough to
attack Soviet C 3 .» General J. A. Graf Kielmansegg added that
"the main point was to get at the enemy force and make it unable
to fight." He elaborated that the idea of unable to fight could
be equated with killed and captured Soviet troops and bent and
burning Soviet equipment. He added finally that the overrunning
•I
of the enemy formation itself destroyed C as a part of the
smashing of the enemy force. When approached on the same subject
of C 3 but obliquely in terms of the question: what targets did
you designate for attack within the sector of the 6th Panzer
Division, he answered testily, "the main 'target 1 is to destroy
the enemy."
The same officers agreed, however, that Soviet command posts
and headquarters were extremely important and when located were
targeted by artillery and attacked where possible by mobile
ground formations. Major General Frevert-Niedermein, who served
as leader of the Rei ter (horse) squadron, 26th Reconnaissance
Battalion, 86th Infantry Division, noted that the forward
element of the division "tried to disrupt the organization of
the enemy" and that "the general orders for the cavalry were
always to find, attack, and disrupt enemy headquarters."
Frevert-Niedermein and most of the other Army officers
interviewed stated that Soviet headquarters were difficult to
pinpoint. The Army and Air Force Staff officers who
participated in planning noted that German intelligence was
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simply unable to uncover anything more than a few higher level
headquarters. The commanders who executed the attack stated
similarly that Soviet command posts and headquarters were much
smaller and more primitive than the German and extremely
difficult to locate. Major General Frevert-Niedermein noted, for
example, that the command post of the relatively large Soviet
infantry division, of June 1941, would be a small complex of a
few people, one or two motor vehicles, no radios, minimal
tentage, and depend heavily on low quality military telephone
equipment and local civilian telephone and telegraph networks
for communication. Such a primitive complex was difficult to
find and distinguish as being a command post, e.g., the forest of
antennas and mass of motor vehicles associated with the Western
divisions of the same day were simply absent even with the large
Red infantry divisions as constituted by the directives of
September 1939.^ The Germans interviewed made it clear that the
Red Army of June 1941 possessed relatively primitive C^ which was
in turn linked with an extremely backward transportation network
comprised of unpaved roads and thinly spread rail system. The
picture of Soviet C"^ which emerges is one of a system using
relatively few radios, dependent heavily on military and
civilian telephone equipment and lines and concentrated in
relatively small field command posts and modest headquarters,
which because of the Soviet xenophobia and the penchant for
secrecy remained largely undi scover able by the Germans in the
1. Based on their experiences in the Finnish War (1939-
1940), the Soviets had begun to reorganize the large (18,800 men)
model September 1939 divisions into more compact (14,400 men)
divisions under a directive of May 1941.
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planning for Barbarossa and elusive during the campaign itself.
3Yet the fact remains that Soviet C disintegrated almost
immediately under the impact of the German attack in the Western
Military District, and various Soviet sources of information on
the campaign imply or directly state that the Germans with
clearcut purpose demolished Soviet C • The two Soviet
participants in the opening stages of Barbarossa, who were
interviewed in the course of the study, stated that they
"believed" the Germans purposefully and methodically attacked
Soviet C*^.^ Tne emphasis must be on the word, "believe,"
because the interviewees could offer no proof of German intent
and based their belief on the disruption accomplished by the
Germans, which was so extensive that it supports a view of
specific intent. The evidence from the German Army participants
in Barbarossa, the German Army records, and the vast literature
on the subject, rejects the presence of German counter 3 doctrine
in the opening stages of Barbarossa or during the remainder of
the four-year campaign. The German statements on the opening
stages of Barbarossa, however, agree with the Soviet view of
chaos and carnage in the Western Military District (after 23
June 1941, designated by the Soviets as the Western Front) and
offer overwhelming evidence of the breakdown of Soviet C .
Whatever the Germans did in the opening stages of
Barbarossa, it resulted in the immediate disintegration of
Soviet C 3
, the encirclement and destruction of seven Soviet
1. Mr. Aleksandr Nekrich and Mr. Kamill Usfensky. The
former is a well known author and accomplished researcher on the
events of the Russo-German Campaign.
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armies opposite Army Group Center, and the defeat of the Red Army
forces opposite Army Groups North and South. Within the
political framework of a surprise attack against an ostensibly
friendly Soviet Union, with which National Socialist Germany had
a recent nonaggress ion pact of immense practical benefit to both
parties, the German Army planned from July 1940-June 194 1 a vast
offensive. The Army envisioned a secret, gradual, innocuous
Aufmarsch or concentration of forces for the offensive followed
by a set of operations calculated to defeat the Soviet Union in a
s ing le , swift campaign, i.e., in one campaigning season. The
operations foreseen in OKW Directive No. 21 (Case Barbarossa)
were transformed into reality through a set of plans extending
from army group through army, corps, and division. Those plans
exemplify the Army's dedication to a battle of decision and the
concomitant smashing of the Red Army.
The Germans made no reference in the documents examined to
a concept of stunning their opponent through special attacks on
his C either accompanied or followed by general attacks against
an assumed dis intearating enemy. The Germans made reference in
their documents to the destruction of the Red Army as far west
as possible and in the shortest period of time. Perhaps the
most important part of Fuehrer Directive No. 21 is the first two
sentences of the General Intention which state: "The bulk of the
Russian Army stationed in Western Russia will be destroyed by
1. Directive 21, was one of a slender category of 74
directives put out through OKW with additional special qualities
which caused them to be designated Fuehrer Directives. See H. R.
Trevor-Roper, ed. Blitzkrieg to Defeat, Hitler's War Direct ives,
1939-1945 (New York, 1964), pp. xxi, 48-52.
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daring operations led by deeply penetrating armored spearheads.
Russian forces still capable of giving battle will be prevented
from withdrawing into the depths of Russia." To carry out the
intention, the German Army and Luftwaffe planned three sets of
ground operations and a great air strike to secure the
destruction of the Soviet forces stationed near the frontier.
The emphasis in the ground operations and the air strike, to the
exclusion of virtually any other consideration, was the smashing
of the opposing combat forces.
Fuehrer Directive No. 21 designated the Schw erpunk
t
of the
offensive against the Soviet Union as lying north of the Pripyat
Marshes and in turn within the sector of Army Group Center.
Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's army group planned the most
daring and deeply oriented thrusts of the campaign. Taking
advantage of surprise by exploiting the associated factors of
initiative and concentration of effort, von Bock deployed his
mobile assets of Panzer and motorized infantry divisions in two
groups on the extreme northern and southern wings of the
advance. General Heinz Guderian, the creator of the German
armored force and possibly its most talented leader, was to
drive the 350 kilometers to Minsk swiftly enought to prevent the
three Red field armies in the Bialystok salient "from
withdrawing into the depths of Russia." Guderian would lead his
Panzer Group of eight mobile divisions from the area around
Brest-Litovsk northeast towards Minsk. General Hermann Hoth,
slender, wiry, nimble in thought and action, and ultraaggressive
was to drive a somewhat shorter distance of 320 kilometers to
Minsk, link up with Guderian, and prevent the Bialystok Soviets
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Xfrom withdrawing eastward. Hoth would lead his Panzer Group of
seven mobile divisions from the area of the Suwalki appendi
northeast toward Vilna then southeast toward Minsk. With luck,
from a German viewpoint, Guderian and Hoth would meet at
approximately the same time in Minsk and the Red Army troops of
the 3rd f 4th, and 10th Armies would be put as cats in a bag. If
all went well, i.e., the infantry armies of Field Marshal
Guenther von Kluge and General Adolf Strauss followed closely,
maintained the lines of encirclement, and quickly reduced the
pockets, the mobile groups would press on immediately in a
second great double envelopment anticipated to close at Smolensk
and culminate in the seizure of the land bridge to Moscow. The
next step would be the advance to Moscow, destruction of the
Soviet forces defending it, and the seizure of strategic terrain
around it resulting in the collapse of the Soviet war effort.!
Thus lay the German plans in the area of Army Group Center
— the area in which the Sch w erpunk
t
for Barbarossa had been
chosen and the Enstcheidungsschlacht would be fouqht. The
minute hands on hundreds of thousands of wrist watches moved
past 0300 and when they reached 0305 in the area of Army Group
North and Panzer Group 3 of Army Group Center, German artillery
there opened fire and special army assault detachments moved to
seize the bridges close to the border which were necessary for
the advance. Farther south in Army Group Center and Army Group
1. The higher army commanders contemporaneously recorded
their support for the singleminded drive to Moscow. Adolf
Hitler, alone and uniquely, had objections to the Moscow plan.
When the time for decision on the final drive to Moscow came on
schedule toward the end of July, Hitler vacillated for weeks and
finally imposed a great southern detour on the armies.
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South, the German artillery opened fire at 0315 and similar
special assault detachments moved to seize the former Polish
bridges near the frontier. Within a period of ten minutes the
Germans attacked across hundreds of miles of frontier. Shortly
before the artillery opened fire, approximately 900 Luftwaffe
combat aircraft moved down East Prussian, Polish, and Rumanian
runways shortly before first light, gathered themselves into
attack formations, and between 0305-0315 crossed the frontier.
The Luftwaffe formations, consisting largely of twin engined JU-
88 and He-III medium bombers and powerful fighter escorts, swept
on largely toward 34 Soviet airfields which had been
systematically and patiently uncovered by Air Fleet-level
intelligence during the preparations for Barbarossa. The Air
crews had every-reason to believe that when they arrived at the
fields, more than 1,000 Red Air Force machines would be lined up
on them. Meanwhile, on the ground, 45,000 infantry squads and
3,200 tanks supported by 8,000 pieces of artillery and infantry
guns had begun to move toward the east. The Germans advanced in
accordance with a plan, exerted a powerful initiative, and
concentrated their effort in point and time. Although it seems
inconceiveable today, the father of the present Soviet Army and
Air Forces was moved like a leaf in the wind by the German
onslaught.
As the Germans advanced early on Sunday morning,
1. Pieces of artillery and infantry guns comprised the fol-
lowing array of weapons none smaller than 75mm bore diameter:
75mm, 150mm infantry guns and 100mm, 105mm, 150mm, 170mm, and













































































Illustration 10. GERMAN OFFENSIVE MOVEMENT: German main battle tank,
PzKw III, on the largest and finest highway in the
Soviet Union, the read from Minsk to Moscow. The road
is unpaved and has only light telephone and other
electrical lines on one side.
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Illustration 11. GERMAN OFFENSIVE MOVEMENT: Shown above are Czech-built
TNHP-3S tanks used by the Germans in Army Group North
moving across a typical unpaveci road. German mobility
was severely reduced by such roads and engine cylinder
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particularly in Southern Lithuania and White Russia, they began
a process of disintegration of the Soviet field armies which can
be characterized in terms of the following trauma:
German Disintegration of the Red Army (June-July 1941)
(1) Disruption of Soviet Command, Control and Communications
(C ) over and among the field armies.
(2) Disruption of the Soviet Transportation System on
which the field army moved.
(3) Direct Physical Destruction of the divisions in the
field armies.
The Germans did not have enough accurate intelligence by 22
June 1941 to target for artillery fire or aerial bombardment more
than a handful of "suspected" Soviet military headquarters in the
opening hours of Barbarossa. Many Red Army headquarters and
field command posts, however, were located close to the Reich
frontier were they were subject to being brought under fire and
overrun physically by various combinations of German riflemen,
machine gun sections and tanks. The same targets were also
quickly brought under attack as targets of opportunity by the
agile and flexible German artillery but probably more often as
the command posts found themselves among Red Army formations
being buffeted about by the German assault. The Soviet 3rd Army
under Lt. Gen. V. I. Kuznetsov had its headquarters at Grodno, a
scant 27 kilometers from the Reich frontier in 1941. Elements
of the Germans 8th Infantry Division moved into the outskirts of
the city by 2000, 22 June 1941, having forced the physical
deplacement of the headquarters of the Soviet 3rd Army from
Grodno hours earlier. The German 8th Infantry Division and its
neighbors on each side in order to get to Grodno had smashed
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their way through three Soviet rifle divisions, the Soviet 54th
Armor Brigade, and overrun the headquarters of the Soviet 4th
Rifle Corps. The German 8th Infantry Division in moving against
the Soviet infantry and armor came under fierce tank
counterattack which lasted "from noon to dark," and came in
packs of 20-40 vehicles. The division estimated it destroyed 80
Soviet tanks in the heavy engagements. 1 within 17 hours of the
opening of the campaign Soviet C 3 within the 3rd Army was in the
following shambles:
Collapse of Soviet C 3 around Grodno/3rd Army
(1) Remnants of Headquarters, 3rd Army forced to flee
eastward under threat of being physicall overrun by German 8th
Infantry Division. Most of staff KIA or WIA in air attack
earlier in day.
(2) Headquarters of 4th Rifle Corps forced to flee
southeastward by the German 246th Infantry Division.
(3) Headquarters of Soviet 27th, 56th, and 143rd Rifle
Divisions forced to displace eastward along with every other
subordinate command element in the divisions not killed or
captured by the Germans.
Forced to move physically during the afternoon of 22 June
1941, the remnants of Headquarters, Soviet 3rd Army, lost
contact with both the higher command in the Western Military
District 265 kilometers to the rear at Minsk and the subordinate
elements within its own army. The Soviet commanders and their
instruments of control in the area of the 3rd Army existed, of
1. See VII.Armee Korps, Abt.IC, Gefangenenvernehmungen von
23.6.41-24.10.41. dated 23.6.41, 0700 hours. Bundesar chi v
,
Freiburg, RH 24-8/127.
2. See Heeres Gruppe Mitte, Tagesme ldunge n, 22.6.41-
23.6.41, Bundesarchiv, Freiburg, RH 19 11/128.
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course, not as an end in themselves, but to direct the movements
of the various combat formations of the army across the
transportation system in that part of White Russia. Within the
same 17 hours that Soviet C was directly threatened, overrun,
displaced, and disrupted, the Soviet commanders were faced with
at least two additional factors which tended to make C^
academic. First the casualties' and damage inflicted on three
Soviet rifle divisions and their scattering to the east, not
only destroyed the C J system within those formations, but also
plucked them out of consideration for use by higher level
commanders. Second, the Germans physically seized the roads
bridges, culverts, intersections, telephone and rail lines over
which they advanced denying them to the Soviets and making
orders passed to Red Army units through the Soviet C system
impossible to execute because of the occupation of the
transportation system by the German field armies and its
bombardment (after several days into the campaign) by the
Luftwaffe.
Farther south around Kobryn (Kobrin), where the Soviet 4th
Army under Maj. Gen. A. A. Korobkov had its headquarters, the
southern spearhead of the encirclement planned by Army Group
Center gained momentum. The German 18th Panzer Division of
Panzer Group 2 which jumped off just north of Brest, advanced 65
kilometers into Soviet-occupied Poland reaching the area
directly north of Korobkov's 4th Army headquarters just before
darkness on Sunday evening. In doing so, the German 18th Panzer
Division cut all of Korobkov's direct telephone communications
with the infantry and cavalry divisions lying south of Brest
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leaving him with limited control over one badly mauled rifle
division, one intact rifle division, and the remainder of the
Soviet 54th Armored Brigade. The Germans did not stop for
darkness and later in the evening at about midnight, drove into
Kobryn itself. Advanced elements of the 3rd Panzer Division
forced the headquarters of the Soviet 4th Army to displace
eastward and shattered most of what remained of Soviet C^ in the
area of that army. Marching hard on foot behind the Panzer
divisions, the German 34th Infantry Division more thoroughly
worked over the terrain along the road from Brest to Kobryn.
Farther south, the German 1st 'Cavalry Division and the
Vor au sab tei lung (VA) or advanced detachment of the German 255th
Infantry Division seized Malorita with its telephone exchange,
rail line, and main road, and broke up communications within the
southern wing of the 4th Army.
Literally in the eye of the German storm, the Soviet 10th
Army of Maj. Gen. K. D. Golubev with its headquarters at
Bialystok stood relatively unscathed on the first day of
Barbarossa. The German infantry armies advancing inside each of
the Panzer groups gradually built up heavy pressure aqainst the
northern and southern flanks of the Soviet 10th Army. As late
as two days later, in response to orders from Headquarters,
Western Front, Golubev launched his intact 6th and 11th
Mechanized Corps against the German infantry divisions of Lt.
Gen. Adolf Strauss' 9th Army south of Grodno. Strauss' army was
attempting by 24 June 1941, to hem in, pin down, and destroy
Soviet forces which would only 70 hours later be encircled by the
arrival of Panzer divisions of Hoth and Guderian at Minsk 280
121
kilometers farther east. The Soviet commander of the Western
Front, General G. D. Pavlov, and the commander of the 10th Army
had lost track of the movements of the deeply penetrating German
Panzer force. The two Russian generals should have been
withdrawing their divisions as rapidly as possible to the East
through Minsk to escape the encirclement which would be complete
three days later. The generals instead ordered far to the west a
major attack in a northerly direction which foundered on the 37mm
antitank guns of the antitank battalions and regimental antitank
companies of the German 162nd and 256th Infantry Divisions.
Farther to the north, opposite the Soviet Baltic Military
District, German Army Group North advanced in terrain which
favored the defender and was characterized by great forests,
unpaved sandy roads, swamps, and numerous rivers often winding
through narrow, precipitously sloped valleys. Army Group North,
nevertheless, scored an impressive breakthrough of the Soviet
frontier defenses on the first day of Barbrossa. The LVI Panzer
Corps under Lt. Gen. Erich von Manstein, through some special
combination of fortune and skill, found a relatively weak spot in
the Soviet defenses in Lithuania. Attacking just north of the
Nieman (Nemunas) River, the German 8th Panzer Division under
Brig. Gen. Br andenberger drove eastward 80 kilometers into
Lithuania seizing the bridge over the great Dubissa (Dubysa)
River gorge at Ariogala just as darkness was falling. The 8th
1. For the locations of these cities and geographical
features see especially Maps 1 and 2, which also give the
locations of every German division in the campaign at 2000 on the
day noted.
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Panzer Division stood roughly halfway between the headquarters of
the Soviet 11th Army under Lt. Gen. V. I. Morozov at Kovno
(Kaunas) and the headquarters of the Soviet 8th Army farther
west at Schaulen (Siauliai) under Maj.. Gen. P. P. Sobennikov.
The German division stood on the main (but unpaved) highway
connecting Kovno with the Baltic Sea at Memel (Klaipeda) but just
missed cutting the lesser road, telephone lines and exchanges,
and railroad which connected the Soviet 11th Army in Kovno with
the 8th Army in Schaulen. The German 8th Panzer Division
remained curiously "hidden" at Ariogala from the higher Soviet
command in the Baltic Military District. Although it had seized
the important bridge over the Dubissa River, it had not yet
advertised its startlingly deep objective hundreds of kilometers
further to the rear by cutting through the Soviet communication
system connecting the 8th and 11th Soviet Armies.
The Germans 16th Army, in the meantime, bore down on Kovno
and the Headquarters of the Soviet 11th Army and gripped its
attention to the south of Ariogala. On the same day, the German
4th Panzer Group thrust with its main weight at Rossenie adding
to the concern of Lt. Gen. Morosov and turning the attention of
the Headquarters of the Baltic Military District under Col. Gen.
F. I. Kuznetsov to the west of Ariogala. Faced with multiple
attacks, uncertain of the strenqth and potential danger of each,
an overloaded Soviet command simply reacted to the German
initiative. It is perhaps an important lesson in the overloading
of an enemy command defending against a Blitzkrieg, that the
Soviets missed the most important initiative of the Germans in
the north - the drive of the LVI Panzer Corps through Ariogala
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on its way to seize a bridgehead over the Western Dvina River 300
kilometers away at Dunaburg (Dvina) (See Maps 1, 2, and 3).
The German field armies advanced impressively on the first
day of Barbarossa. In the Soviet Western Military District,
German Army Group Center rapidly began to break up Soviet C^
especially through the physical dimension of its two major
breakthroughs at Kobryn in the south and Merkine in the north,
and the casualties and damage, e.g., tank losses, inflicted on
the defending Soviet divisions. In the Soviet Baltic Military
district, German Army Group North achieved a major breakthrough
at Ariogala, although the Soviets maintained their strategical
cohesion reasonably well and and the Soviet command gathered
forces somewhat precipitously for a major counterattack at
Rossenie. In the Kiev Military District, German Army Group
South, faced with proportionally the strongest resistance,
developed the potential for a major breakthrough in the area of
attack of the 11th Panzer Division. In a seldom made contrast of
results achieved on the first day of Barbarossa, the German field
armies inflicted far less damage and disruption on the opposing
Soviet ground forces than the Luftwaffe achieved against the Red
Air Force. The German field armies developed on the first day of
the war and during the next several days a potential for severe
defeat of the defending Soviet ground forces but the traps were
not closed nor the disruption irreversible until several days
into the campaign. In stunning contrast, within approximately one
hour and fifteen minutes of the time that artillery opened fire
at 0305 in the north, the Luftwaffe had achieved a shattering
blow which (1) caused the destruction of approximately 1,000
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Soviet aircraft and their associated support facilities, and (2)
gained an offensive strategic edge for the Luftwaffe, which kept
the Red Air Force of balance and resulted in the destruction of
5,000 Soviet aircraft by the end of the first week of the
campaign.
When midnight struck on 22 June 1941, the situation on the
Eastern Front could be compared with the preceding two
Blitzkriegs in Poland (1939) and France (1940) at the same early
stage of development. The defenders, in the present case the
Soviets, found themselves under attack in a war and rapidly
recovering from the local, tactical effects of surprise. With
the exception of the two Soviet army commanders physically
displaced out of their headquarters at Grodno and Kobryn, the
other army commanders had probably recovered their composure and
were feeling confident that with the immense, largely intact
forces at their disposal they could put up an effective defense,
and, in some reasonable period of time, regain the initiative.
Based largely on the noteworthy fact that the Germans succeeded
in losing the Second World War in Europe, authors, analysts, and
commentators have spilled much ink describing how the Germans
underestimated the Soviet armaments effort, the individual
Russian soldier, Russian space, and the cohesion of the communist
politial system. Few observers have commented on the gross
Soviet underestimation of German command flexibility, operational
mobility, and firepower, at the beginning of the Russo-German
Campaign. The Soviet strategy on the frontier turned out to be
to resist stubbornly as far west as possible, to give up a
minimum of Soviet and/or former Lithuanian, Polish, Rumanian
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territory, and to shift to the offensive as quickly as possible.
Such a strategy was hopelessly divorced from reality and
represented a monumental underestimation of the Germans.
On a bitterly cold afternoon in a small but comfortable home
in the outskirts of Celle on the North German Plain, Maj. Gen.
von der Groeben, former assistant operations officer of Army
Group Center, stated still increduously that "we were astonished
in the war that the Russians fought on the frontier." He went
on to elaborate that the commander and staff of Army Group
Center, did not believe that the Russians would accept battle on
the border and that the most difficult problem for the army
group to master would be to move fast enough to encircle the
Soviet armies in White Russia before they could retire east of
the Dnieper River. Groeben's comments tend to put the thematic
quotations at the beginning of this chapter in clearer
perspective. The Germans hammered into officers and soldiers
alike the need for tireless and swift forward movement fearful
that the Russians would slip out of the planned encirclement. It
is ironic that the Panzer spearheads of German Panzer Groups 1
and 2 would be pushing eastward "as far as possible without
regard to danger from the flanks," while the Soviet 3rd, 4th, and
10th Armies for several unreal days would be stubbornly defending
as far as possible to the west.
By Friday, 27 June 1941, the Soviets on the Western Front
faced a military disaster that even the most pessimistic critics
of the Red Army would have found difficult to believe a week
1. Intervie w, Von Der Groeben, Celle, W. Germany,
24 January 80.
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earlier. The situation on the Northwestern Front was potentially
more disastrous, and, even in the Ukraine, the Red Army was at
the beginning of a retreat that would continue for five months
and more than 1,300 kilometers. 1 Early in the evening of 27 June
1941, the German 7th Panzer Division, XXXIX Panzer Corps, 3rd
Panzer Group, cut the great Minsk-Moscow highway 39 kilometers
east of Minsk at the small communications center of Smolevici.^
The 7th Panzer Division, under Maj. Gen. Baron von Funck, had
made a spectacular dash of more than 320 kilometers to seize
that small city. In doing so, the division had contributed
decisively to the potential extinction of the Bialystok pocket by
making relief from the east virtually impossible and had also
closed the ring on a second pocket of Soviet divisions forming
just to the west of Minsk. Inside of Minsk, the situation was
chaotic and illustrates the complete breakdown of Soviet C^ on
the Western Front by Friday evening 27 June 1941. At the moment




trucks severed the direct highway, railroad, and telephone
communications from Minsk to Moscow, the headquarters of the
entire Soviet Western Front still lay in Minsk periously exposed
to being overrun. The German 12th and 20th Panzer Division stood
only six kilometers away to the northwest from Minsk cutting any
lingering telephone communications between Gen. G. D. Pavlov and
his three armies lying to the west. The German 17th Panzer
1. Distance from the 1939 Reich (Polish) border to Rostov.
2. See Map 3, which shows the overall strategic situation
in Barbarossa on 27 June 1941. The map also shows the tactical
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Division, XLVII Panzer corps, 2d Panzer Group was approaching
Minsk from the southwest and would enter the outskirts later in
the day following a drive which had originated 350 kilometers to
the west. Gen. Pavlov and his staff were forced to displace
eastward and lost any final communication with the High Command
in Moscow and the shattered armies of the Western Front which
were now being compressed into two pockets farther west.
In the opening stages of Barbarossa on the Central Front,
the events of 22-27 June 1941, represent actions, movements, and
situations similar to those which could be expected in the event
of a conventional Soviet offensive in Western Europe. History,
although it repeats itself in terms of generally similar
situations, never reproduces itself exactly. In the case of at
least three broad factors encompassing a potential Soviet
offensive in Western Europe, differences exist between
Barbarossa and a potential similar future operation. First, a
Soviet attack would represent the unusual case of a relatively
less developed state preemptively attacking a more advanced bloc
of states. Second, a Soviet attack would take place into less
space in Western Europe than was the case of Russian space in
Barbarossa. Third, the existing tense relations between the
Soviet Union and the North Atlantic Alliance reduce the chances
of surprise being achieved in an attack. On the other hand, the
Germans achieved an impressive degree of disruption in
Barbarossa. The disruption was based on identifiable factors and
principle of operation exploited by the Germans in 1941, but
capable of being employed by the Soviets today. Some of the
factors of disruption are quantifiable in terms of the offensive
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movement carried out by the Germans and the trauma inflicted in
the defending Soviets. Summarized briefly in terms of an
historical listing, the Germans had accomplished the following
by midnight of 27 June 1941:
German Disruption of the Soviet Western Front
1. Seizure of Minsk by German Panzer formations which had
moved 320 and 350 kilometers respectively from their initial
positions 5 days earlier on the frontier of the Reich.
2. Encirclement of large parts of the Soviet 3rd, 4th, and
10th Armies including: 13 divisions, four brigades, and the
headquarters staffs of the 4th and 10th Armies and three corps.
The pocket formed was 60 kilometers long averaged approximately
15 kilometers wide, and was centered on Mal-Berestovica well to
the east of Bialystok. The pocket was encircled almost entirely
by infantry divisions of the German 4th and 9th (Infantry)
Armies
.
3. Loose encirclement of a large number of Red Army
formations which had escaped the Bialystok cauldron. The
formations included 10 relatively intact Soviet divisions and the
remnants of two others. Most of these forces would soon be
hemmed in tightly around the small city of Bakszi (Baksty) 90
kilometers west of Minsk.
4. Total disruption of Soviet C^ on the Western Front as
characterized by the following factors:
a. "Annihilation" of the headquarters staff of the
Soviet 3rd Army in Grodno and displacement of the headquarters of
the 4th Army eastward out of Kobryn on 22 June 1941.
b. Loose encirclement east of Bialystok as early as 24
June 1941 of approximately half of the three Soviet armies on the
Western Front.
c. Cutting of all telephone communications on 24 June
1941 between the Bialystok area with its three army headquarters
and the commander and staff of the Western Front at Minsk.
d. German domination of the transportation system in
White Russia through physical seizure of the road and rail system
in the great offensive drives eastward 1 and through unopposed
aerial bombardment after 24 June 1941 of the Soviet occupied
parts of the system.
5. Inflicting of massive casualties and damage in the
ensuing reduction of the Bialystok (Mal-Berestovica) and
Novogrodek (Bakszi) pockets between 28 June-8 July 1941.
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Certain elements in the offensive movement carried out by
the Germans and the trauma inflicted on the defending Soviets can
be quantified in a useful way. Most of the same elements would
be significant in the event of a Soviet conventional offensive
against Western Europe in a moderately distant future time
frame. With appropriate restraint and caution, certain of the
elements common to Barbarossa I (22 June 1941) and potential
Barbarossa II (future time frame) can be systematically arranged,
quantified, and noted for consideration as historically based
projections of conventional combat in Western Europe. On the
other hand, in contrast, it can be shown that several important
factors for consideration at present in Europe were essentially
reversed in Barbarossa, e.g., the Germans with a higher command
style and technological superiority attacked The Soviets who
displayed a primitive C 3 style and system and uneven
technological achievement. The situation in Europe today can
perhaps be portrayed in the generalization that a major offensive
at the beginning of a conventional was would be launched by
Soviet forces with a less sophisticated command style and C 3
system and less advanced technology than those of the West. In a
!• Intervie w, Maj. Gen. Pape, Benr ath-Duesseldorf , 11 Jan.
80. Pape"^ for example, noted that many prisoners taken by 3rd
Panzer Division, were physically exhausted, ragged, and
dishelved. The reason: they had been forced consistently to move
cross country because (1) the Germans had seized the best roads,
and (2) the Luftwaffe had the Soviet part of the road system
under surveillance and attack.
2. See, Heeres Gruppe Mitte, la, Tages meld ungen , 22.6.41-
15.7.41, Bundesarchiv, Freiburg, RH 1911/128, for Soviet losses.
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more optomistic vein from the viewpoint of the historical
lessons, however, the following elements potentially common to
Barbarossa I (1941) and Barbarossa II (future) can be considered
and quantified:
Barbarossa Quantif iables (Army)
I. Measures of Offensive Movement.
1. Number of kilometers, direction, time.
2. Terrain seized.
a. Urban communications plexuses.
b. Rural avenues of movement.
II. Measures of Defensive Traumas .
1. Destruction.
a. Casualties: KIA, POW.
b. Damage: Tanks, Cannons, Destroyed/Damaged
2. Paralysis.
a. HQs and CPs attacked, overrun, displaced.
b. Ranks of POWs.
c. Physical seizure of transport net.
d. Air surveillance and attack vs transport net.
The Germans, in effect, accrued enormous advantages when
they achieved surprise, and, with it, the factor of initiative
and concentration of effort. The German historical style in war,
which placed a premium on independence and flexibility in
command, added the ingredients of the §^h we£p_unkj: and
Auf tragstak ti k. The results which the advantages of surprise
gave the Germans can be quantified for the first six days of war
in the Soviet Union, i.e., B-day +5, in terms of the distances
advanced. German offensive movement had been formidible, and it
had taken place within a frame of reference in 1941, which the
Soviets, for all their emphasis on the mobility of cavalry tanks
and armored cars, were scarcely able to comprehend. To arrive at
Minsk on 27 June 1941, Maj. Gen. von Arnim's 17th Panzer Division
traversed approximately 375 kilometers including several major
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engagements along the way and movement across a thinly developed
network of unpaved roads, through forests, swamps, and poorly
tilled farm land. The 17th Panzer Division moved toward Minsk in
the following increments: 1
1. 22 Jun 41, 80 km, NE, Seizure Pruzana, 5 Roads, Telex.
2. 23 Jun 41, 40 km, NE, Near Rozany.
3. 24 Jun 41, 40 km, NE, Seizure Slonim, 8 Roads, 2 Rails,
telex.
4. 25 Jun 41, km, Battle at Slonim.
5. 26 Jun 41, 110 km, NE, Seizure Stolpce, 5 Roads, 2
Rails, telex.
6. 27 Jun 41, 70 km, NE, Enter Minsk, 10 Roads, 4 Rails,
Tel-relay.
The 17th Panzer Division followed by several other German
formations including especially the 29th Motorized Infantry
Division and the 34th Infantry Divisions, had physically seized
375 kilometers of White Russian road, rail, and telephone
systems, thereby denying the Soviet High command in Moscow and
the battered Headquarters, Western Front, C 3 access by messenger,
officer courier, telephone, telegraph, and teleprinter, to the
armies around Bialystok and the divisions around Novogrodek. The
higher command lost touch with the several hundreds of thousands
of Red Army troops in combat around Bialystok and Novogrodek and
was left only the option of building up a new defense line along
the upper reaches of the Dnieper River. The Red Army command
within the two large pockets had lost control over events
entirely; by 29 June 1941, for example, evidence exists which
shows that the commanders and staffs in the still developing
1. Roads = number roads radiating out from urban area;
Rails = number rail lines radiating out; Telex = telephone
exchange; Tel-relay = telephone relay apparatus.
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eastern pocket were two or t hree day s be hind the actual German
movements. Soviet prisoners interrogated by German intelligence
personnel in Panzer Group 2 stated that they had received the
order on 29 June 1941 in Novogrodek to retreat to Baranovice. If
they found that city occupied, they were "told to go east to
Stolpce and Minsk. "1 The almost incredible fact is that the
Soviet headquarters issuing the orders did not know that the
Germans had passed through Baranovice three days earlier (at
about 1430 on 26 June 1941), seized Stolpce near midnight of the
same day, and entered Minsk on 27 June 1941.
The increments of distance in which the 17th Panzer Division
moved daily may partly explain the dislocation of the Soviet
command. After two days of movement totalling 120 kilometers on
22, 23 June 1941, the division moved only 40 kilometers on 24
June and remained stationary in heavy combat around Slonim on the
following day. Then, suddenly, two days later the Panzer
division appeared at Minsk 180 kilometers away to the northeast.
The pattern of movement as well as the long distances may well
have kept the Soviet command off balance and in the dark about
the locations of divisions like the 17th Panzer with long range,
strategic objectives. Such a pattern was characterized by an
initial substantial rate of movement, followed by an almost
static period, and finally an enormous acceleration to the
seizure of strategic terrain. The pattern might be formally
noted as the "accelerated breakthrough." The Germans did not
1. See Panzer A. O.K. 2, la, An la gen , Kriegestagebuch Nr . 1^
1 . Band , 1. 7.41. , 2 , Abschr i f t Fernsprechbuch , p. 4 , B u ncle s -
archiv, ~ Freiburg, RH21-2/V.113.
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plan such a pattern but rather rode with the circumstances in the
opening stages of Barbarossa which called forth the pattern. One
would suspect that the accelerated breakthrough could be found in
other Barbarossa-like offensives, and, indeed in France in May
1940, one can see a similar pattern: (1) initial substantial
rate of movement lightly opposed throught the Ardennes, (2) heavy
combat along the Meuse against French forces too strong either to
ignore or avoid, and (3) an enormous acceleration of movement to
the seizure of strategic terrain, e.g., in the French case, the
Channel coast.
The 17th Panzer Division was not alone in its pattern of
movement during the opening stages of Barbarossa. Farther south
the advanced elements of the 3rd Panzer Division along with the
division commander, Lt. Gen. Walter Model, moved the substantial
distance of 150 kilometers on 22, 23 June 1941, reaching the
Schara (Szara) River in a drive designed to get farther east to
the Dnieper as soon as possible in order to prevent the buildup
of a new Soviet front. During the next day, 24 June 1941, the
division established bridgeheads, gathered up its trailing
elements, and fought off heavy Soviet attacks all within a
distance of approximately 20 kilometers of the Schara River.
Halfway throught the next day, 25 June 1941, the 3rd Panzer
Division moved through the bridgehead and accelerated eastward
with intermediate target Sluzk (Sluck) and more distant,
strategic target Bobruisk (Bobriusk) where the Soviets would be
forced by geographic conditions to attempt to construct a new
front. At 0450 on 28 June 1941, two and one half days later and
245 kilometers distant, men of the light 20mm-gun tank platoons
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of the 1st Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment, 3rd Panzer Division,
raised the Reich battle flag over the tower of the 3obruisk
citadel. The 3rd Panzer division stood 440 kilometers by road
into the Soviet Union. It had achieved that distance in an
accelerated breakthrough similar to that of the 17th Panzer
Division but against a different objective farther south.
In the meantime, farther north, the German 8th Panzer
Division, LVI Panzer Corps in Army Group North had achieved a
deep breakthrough which offered the Germans a strategical
opportunity to collapse the Soviet Baltic front. The
breakthrough developed in the same accelerated pattern as farther
south but under different circumstances. Lt. Gen.
Branden berger * s division moved the substantial distance of 80
kilometers on 22 June 1941, to take the bridge over the Dubissa
River at Ariogala. The entire following day, 23 June 1941, the
8th Panzer Division remained essentially stationary while heavy
Soviet armored forces comprising approximately 350 tanks
including a substantial portion of T-3 4 and KV-II (152mm gun)
models moved across the front of the division heading north and
northwest to attack the two German Panzer divisions lying to the
west. On 24 June 1941, the 8th Panzer Division moved 80
kilometers through Kedainia to Wilkomerz (Ukmerge) rupturing
direct communications between the Headquarters, Soviet 11 Army in
Kovno (Kaunas) and Headquarters, Soviet 8th Army in Schaulen
1. Traditionsverband der Division, Gesch ich te der 3.
Panzer-D iv ision, Ber 1 in-B rand enbu rg 1 935 -1945 (Berlin, 1967),
p.118, and Interv iew , Maj. Gen. Pape, Benrath, W.Germany, Jan 80.
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(Siauliai), and the transportation system between the two armies.
On the following day, 25 June 1941, the division reached Utena,
and during the evening sent out two small combat groups to seize
the road and rail bridges at Dunaburg (Dvinsk) on the Dvina
River. The groups seized the road bridge intact just after 0630,
26 June 1941, having moved 200 kilometers in the previous two
days. An aggressive but overloaded Soviet command in the Baltic
missed the presence of major elements of a Panzer division at
Ariogala. The acceleration of the division out of its bridgehead
to seize the strategic terrain at Dunaburg, however, could
scarcely have been considered as a reasonable probability even by
a more alert defender.
The movement and fire of the German Panzer and motorized
infantry divisions and the great infantry armies marching behind
them inflicted massive trauma on the defending Red Army forces.
The Luftwaffe had also inflicted unparalleled losses on the Red
Air Force and was able by the third day of the campaign (24 June
1941) to shift emphasis to close air support of the German field
armies and interdiction of the Soviet lines of communication.
The Luftwaffe had achieved air supremacy, and its nimble medium
bombers and extraordinarily accurate dive bombers had virtually
free rein over the Soviet divisions for the year 1941. Although
the 1,300 medium and dive bombers represented small numbers for
an area as large as the eastern Front, the Luftwaffe was able to
keep an effective percentage in operation and concentrate them in
support of the known offensive Schwerpunkten . The German Army,
in addition placed an emphasis on aerial reconnaissance,
observation, and liaison unmatched by any other army in the world
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at that time. The Germans, in addition to the total of
approximately 1800 bomber, dive, attack, destroyer, and fighter,
aircraft in the East on 22 June 1941, had a total of
approximately 470 reconnaissance, observation, and liaison
aircraft. With air supremacy, the Germans were able to employ
their aircraft effectively to avoid tactical surprise and seize
special tactical opportunities. The buildup of Soviet
antiaircraft gun defense systems later in the campaign began to
reduce the effectiveness of such aircraft which had been
conceived by the Germans as necessary for great mobile compaigns
similar to those in Poland, France, the Balkans, and the opening
stages of Barbarossa.
The insertion of the Luftwaffe by the third day of the
ground war as a great mobile bombardment force in support of the
field armies deserves special emphasis. The collaspse of the
Luftwaffe by 1944 in the West, and the overwhelming of the
Luftwaffe in the East by about the same time, have had a tendency
to reduce some of the luster of its earlier performances. The
two-engined medium bomber and the dive bombers were designed
specifically for tactical support of the Army and comprise a
factor which significantly increased the mobility and firepower
of the field armies. The defensive trauma levied against the Red
Army by the Luftwaffe is difficult to ignore and included (1)
casualties and damage to the field armies inflicted by ground
attack, and (2) paralysis of movement caused by the destruction
of transportation facilities and the threat and execution of
ground attack through the presence of German aerial
reconnaissance aircraft and tactical bombers. Soviet Maj. Gen.
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Jegorov who commanded the Soviet 4th Rifle Corps was captured in
the Bialystok pocket just north of the small city of Dertschin
(Derecin) on 1 July 1941 and stated that "on the very first day
of the campaign, the units of the corps were bombarded by the
Luftwaffe (near Grodno) and began to disintegrate." As a reason
for the further "panic and disintegration" in his division,
Jegorov gave "1. the immense effectiveness of the German
Luftwaffe, 2. the lack of any communications, 3. the (physical)
encirclement and the flanking fires by German artillery and
machine guns."
The Luftwaffe intervened strongly in the ground combat in
Barbarossa and suprisingly early in the operation. The
historical lesson or warning would seem to be the following:
although some of the geographical circumstances are different and
certain technological factors have changed, e.g., a denser
transportation network in Western Europe and radar controlled air
defense systems, several general principles are still operating
which give an attacker generic advantages over a defender. I_f
the Soviets, for example, elect to seize the offensive and i_f
they achieve some degre e of_ surprise , the probability is great
that the NATO air forces will take heavy losses with initial
adverse exchange ratios based on having aircraft caught on the
ground and being forced to react to an enemy operating within a
plan and with his effort concentrated at crucial points in the
battle. One can expect also that the air defense system will
take initial, heavy losses. The end result for NATO is a
situation similar to that in the opening stages of the Russo-
German Campaign in which the Luftwaffe achieved the following:
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1 . Trauma Inflicted on Defending Air force and Air
Derence System : Luftwatte destroys 3,000 Soviet
aircraft in first 42 hours of combat. Exchange Ratio
approximately 90 Soviet aircraft for 1 German aircraft
lost through combat.
2. Trauma Inflicted on Defending Ground Armies ;
a. Destruction : Luftwaffe inflicts casualties and
damage to troops, tanks, trucks, artillery positions
b. Paralysis : Luftwaffe attacks bridges, other
transportation facilities, telephone exchanges,
radio stations, truck and march columns, trains,
headquarters and command posts. Luftwaffe estab-
lishes restrictive aerial surveillance over Soviet
ground armies.
The Luftwaffe in close cooperation with Army Group Center
supported the great encirclements planned by it for at Minsk and
later at Smolensk by selectively destroying bridges in White
Russa. The Luftwaffe, with extreme care, avoided damaging
bridges necessary for the advance of Panzer Groups 2 and 3
through Brest and Vilna. In contrast, the Luftwaffe
systematically and decisively destroyed bridges within the great
encircling arms of the Panzer groups, across which the Soviet
3rd, 4th, and 10th Armies would attempt to withdraw or ultimately
flee eastward. •* The historical lesson and warning for NATO, in
terms of the general factors which operated during Barbarossa, is
the reasonable probability that an attacking Soviet Air Force
with the initial advantages of surprise, initiative, and
1. Interview , Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Chicago, Illinois,
December 1979. Col. Rudel, the premier combat aviator in the
history of military aviation, emphasized the importance that the
Germans placed on knocking out Soviet bridges in the early stages
of Barbarossa. He noted that the Knights Cross which he received
in September 1941, was issued for his decisive attacks against
bridges earlier in the campaign with Army Group Center as well as
his well known destruction/sinking of the Soviet battleship,
Marat.
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concentration of effort could achieve a significant disruption of
NATO ground movement and C 3 through both ordnance attacks and
counter electronics "strikes" against transport and command
facilities. The unusual twist, which emerges from Barbarossa, is
that the Soviet Air Force might attack a large number of bridges
to block NATO forces from moving across the Rhine and other
rivers
.
In Barbarossa, the fire and movement of the German Panzer,
motorized infantry, and infantry division inflicted severe
casualties and material losses on the defending Soviet armies.
The severity of the Soviet losses is worth examining in detail,
because it was associated with general principles and factors
which operated in Barbarossa and could be assumed to be present
in similar, grand offensives in the future. The Germans
inflicted casualties', whose absolute values were great by any
standards, and exchange ratios, which were even more extreme.
The reasons for such casualty exchanges in Barbarossa also can be
found to some degree in the unique historical relationship
between the German and Red Armies in 1941. This unique
relatinship, which existed at a single, brief interval of time,
can be characterized as that of a well trained, combat
experienced, high technology, confident German Army in combat
against a less effectively trained, Soviet peacetime army, with
lower technological standards, and a slight but pervasive sense
of inferiority. The unique German advantages of 1941 were
accentuated by the general factors or principles of military
operation which the Germans determined to seize by launching a
surprise attack against the Soviets. The results of the initial
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weeks of combat illustrate an extraordinary inbalance in
casualties in Barbarossa which i_f even remotely approached in a
Soviet offensive against the West would be disruptive and




Soviet Casualties Ger man Casualties
22 June - 8 July 41 (Bialystock-Minsk) 22 June - 8 July 41
1. KIA - 100,000 1. KIA - 4,842
2. POW - 310,000 2. POW - Virtually none
9 July - 27 July 41 (Smolensk) 9 July - 27 July 41
1. KIA - 90,000 1. KIA - 5,400
2. POW - 310,000 2. POW - Virtually none
The casualty figures show that the Germans, who were on the
offensive and experienced the tactical hazards associated with
being a relatively exposed attacker, suffered relatively light
casualties, i.e., approximately 4,842 KIA in Army Group Center,
while inflicting approximately 100,000 KIA on the defending
Soviets. The exchange ratio is a staggering 21:1 in favor of the
Germans and of record proportion for modern combat on a large
scale. Perhaps of even more significance is the total of 323,898
POWs, most of whom were taken in the period of the setting of the
first encirclement around Bialystock on 25 June 1941 through the
collapse of the second cauldron west of Minsk on about 3 July
1941. The historical case is of particular significance because
the use of statistical models of combat as, for example, the well
known Lanchester Equations, which give expected values of
1. See, HeeresGruppe Mitte, la, Tagesmeld ungen, 2 2.6.4 1-
15.7.41
, Bundesarchiv, Freiburg. RH 19Il7l28, p. 210 of file for
Soviet casualties for the "double battle of Bialystok and Minsk."
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Illustration 19 . GERMAN FIREPOWER: The German infantry squad was built
around the fire developed by the MG-34 (later MG-42) shown
above in the midst of an infantry squad at Kalefnik, East
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Illustration 22- General (German Generaloberst ) Hermann Hoth at right
in a rare photo with Heinz Guderian. These two
German leaders headed the Panzer forces of Army Group
Center and pulled along the conservative infantry army
commanders in the center and the imaginative, but
erratic and nervous military dilettante, Adolf Hitler,
to Smolensk and a hairsbreadth away from final victory
within 24 days of the opening of Barbarossa.
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Illustration 23. Shown here as Lieutenant General (German
General der Infanterie ) and Commander,
56th Panzer Corps, in Lithuania in 1941,
Erich von Manstein has the historical
reputation of possessing the finest opera-
tional mind in the Second World War.
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casualties based largely on the number of attackers and
defenders, are ineffective for the opening stages of Barbarossa
and similar surprise attacks. The German field armies in Army
Group Center had only a modest initial advantage in numbers for
an attacking force, and equations based on principles similar to
those of the Lanchester Equations could not be expected to give
21:1 values especially 21 defenders versus 1 attacker. Although
prisoners are lost as completely as KlAs to a combat force, the
Lanchester Equations do not take account of such casualties. Yet
the historically verifiable figure of approximately 324,000 Red
Army personnel fell into the hands of the Germans in the double
battle of Bialystok and Minsk, and one must suspect that
significant numbers of NATO troops would be captured by the
Soviets in a similar major surprise attack.
The Germans certainly disrupted the Soviet armies opposite
Army Group Center with approximately 424,000 casualties in killed
and captured during the first two and one half weeks of the
campaign. The Soviets were battered almost as severely during
the next three weeks, and by 27 July 1941, they had suffered
approximately 400,000 additional casuatlties in combat with Army
Group Center for a grand total of well over 800,000 killed and
captured in five weeks of combat. The Soviets stubbornly
contested the German advance from the outset of the campaign and
it is inaccurate to say that they traded space for time. The
stubborn defense as far west as possible resulted in the immense
casualties noted above and it is more accurate to say that the
Soviets with characteristic pragmatism acknowledged the
superior mobility of the German armies and were willing to take
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the casualties to slow them down and keep them from penetrating
to the strategic terrain around Moscow. In an alternate analysis
it could be reasoned that the Soviets sensed there was not enough
space in the Soviet Union to prevent Army Group Center from
seizing Moscow without fighting against it along every inch of
the way, i.e., they were forced to trade casualties and space for
time. In an analogous situation today, the West finds itself as
a voluntary defender with little space and little apparent
willingness to accept casualties on the scale of the Soviet model
for survival in Barbarossa. It is doubtful, of course, that the
Western political or military leaders expect to experience
exchange ratios of 21 defenders to 1 attacker killed in action
and equal ly doubtful that they consider, as realistic exchange
ratios of 88 defenders to 1 attacker in killed and captured.
^
The following factors tend to explain the disparity in
casualties: (1) strategically the Germans achieved surprise and
concentrated their effort in various Schwerpunkten of their own
choosing, and (2) tactically the Germans with their
Auftragstakti k, superior training, greater combat experience,
unique machine gun tactics, flexible artillery techniques, and
proven combined arms Panzer divisions, dominated the Soviets in
combat. Soviet Major General Jegorov noted the contribution of
the flanking fires of German artillery and machine guns to the
panic and disintegration in the corps which he commanded, and one
can sense in his words, the tactical expertise, economy of
1. Based on 424,000 Soviet KIA and POW from 22 June-8 July
41, and 4,842 Germans KIA and POW during the same period.
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effort, and flexibility with which the Germans operated at
Bialystok, Minsk, and Smolensk. Retired Major General Pape, who
commanded the 1st Battalion, Schuetzen (Mechanized Infantry)
Regiment 394, 3rd Panzer Division, from 27 June 1941, at
Bobruisk, commented that his men had been trained and drilled to
respond immediately to heavy resistance and noted that
significant fire from a village against a column of troops could
result in an attack begun simply with the leader's command:
"combat in village".
The factors noted, however, do not fully explain the German
domination of opponents as tough and numerous as the Russian
riflemen and as dangerous as the vast Soviet tank formations.
The Germans after all had only a moderate numerical superiority
in troops 1 at the beginning of the campaign, which in spite of
the immense casualties which they inflicted on the Soviets, was
compensated for by ruthless, brutal, methodical, and efficient
Soviet recruiting and willingness to accept casualties among the
untrained levies. As attackers, however, the Germans were able
to concentrate their effort at critical points of their own
choosing, and in some cases were able to achieve loc al heavy
numerical superiorities. On the other hand, even under such
circumstances, the Germans as attackers were forced to expose
themselves more in combat with a logical necessity to take
comparatively heavy casualties in the movement toward the
1. The Germans were heavily outnumbered by the Soviet tanks
and even the numerous Soviet T-26 and BT-5 type vehicles were
equivalent in gun amour piercing capabilities with their 45mm
antitank canon.
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defender. It is particularly significant to note in the great
encirclements near Minsk, Bialystok, and Smolensk that the
Germans found themselves for days on end as d efender s againsti
powerful Red Army forces massed to break out of the cauldrons.)
i
Under those circumstances, the Germans, although stra tegically or
i
the offensive, were tactically on the defensive over large areas,
for long periods of time. On 27 June 1941, the day that Panzer]
Group 2 completed the Minsk encirclement, 15 German infantry andj
one motorized infantry division stood in a tight encirclement of
13 Soviet divisions and four tank brigades to the north and east
of Bialystok. The German 29th Motorized Infantry Division under
Maj. Gen. von Boltenstern, held the line of encirclement to the
east, i.e., in the area in which the Soviets were trying to break
out, and stood largely on the defensive between 26-30 -June 1941
During that time, the Division, intact, confident, and in secure
blocking position inflicted fearful damage on the disintegrating
Soviet attackers with its artillery and machine guns. The 71st
Motorized Infantry Regiment of the division took the
extraordinary total of 30,000 Soviet prisoners in that five days
of combat in return for moderate losses of its own.
Army Group Center continued its advance beyond Minsk in e
pattern similar to the one which had led to the formation of the
two great pockets of Soviet troops now lying to the west of the
advanced elements of Panzer Groups 2 and 3. The leaders of the
two Panzer Groups, Generals Guderian and Hoth, agreed that th<
mobile division should immediately press on to prevent the
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Illustration 30. DEFENSIVE TRAUMA: The Germans captured huge numbers of
Red Army prisoners in the period June - October 1941.
Shown above is a Soviet prisoner, possibly an officer,
emerging from a formal concrete fortification. Unlike the
general situation in Barbarossa which approached numerical
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Illustration 33. DEFENSIVE TRAUMA: The Germans in Army Group Center
destroyed or captured approximately 6,5000 Soviet tanks
in the period 22 June - 27 July 1941. Shown above is a
BT-7 fast cavalry tank, a 15-ton vehicle with 45mm cannon,
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Soviets from building up a new front along the
line of the
Dnieper and the terrain just to the north of Orsa around
Vitebsk
(see Maps 1-6, especially 3). The leader of Army
Group Center,
the redoubtable Field Marshal Fedor von Bock,
was convinced that
a swift move past the Dnieper was crucial for
seizing the terrain
around Smolensk on schedule but was also bound by
directions from
OKH to secure the Bialystok pocket. The officers,
who commanded
the German 4th and 9th Armies on 27 June 1941,
were also
concerned about the violence of Soviet attempts to
break out of
Bialystok pocket and the problems of setting the
additional lines
of encirclement around the new pocket north of
Novogrodek. Field
Marshal von Kluge and General Strauss felt that
the Dnieper
crossing should be delayed until their foot marching
infantry
division could catch up and assist in the drive to
Smolensk.
in the time period 28 June - 2 July 1941,
Guderian and Hoth
worked hard to assist the infantry armies in maintaining
the
lines of encirclement of the Novogrodek cauldron
while
simultaneously pushing forward all of the mobile
divisions
possible into bridgeheads across the Beresina River
in the south
and up against the Western Dvina in the north. On 3
July 1941,
the remnants of the Soviet armies trapped in the
Bialystok
cauldron surrendered and thus freed approximately 16
German
infantry divisions, which had been pressing in on the
lines of
encirclement, to move eastward. At this juncture in the
campaign, Guderian estimated that it would take the
infantry
divisions two weeks to arrive at the Dnieper and more
time to
participate in an attack. Panzer Group 2 went on to
expand
aggressively the German bridgeheads over the Beresina
and reach
167
the Dnieper in the time period 3-7 July 1941, and noted an
ominous buildup of Soviet forces which had developed out of the
Soviet mobilization and was characterized by ultra aggressive
attacks by poorly led Soviet forces. On 7 July 1941, Guderian
made the highly independent decision to cross the Dnieper using
only Panzer and motorized infantry divisions of the Panzer Group
and press on to seize the strategic terrain around Smolensk and
Yelnia. The decision was bold and correct, and showed the
Auf tragstaktik operating efficiently within the general framework
of the mission to seize the strategic land bridge around
Smolensk. Over the objections of his immediate superior, Field
Marshal Guenther von Kluge, commander of the recently formed (3
July 1941) 4th Panzer Army, he ordered the attack for 10-11 July
1941. In his memoirs, Guderian notes he was convinced that the
attack would succeed and the operation would decide the Russian
campaign in the year 1941.
Such an interpretation of circumstances was largely correct.
Hoth and Guderian working in concert had attacked soon enough
after the rapid drive to Minsk to keep the Soviets off balance
and maintain the tactical situation fluid in the sector of Army
Group Center. Although 13 days had passed since the German
mobile divisions had swirled around and into Minsk, the Soviets
had not been able to put together a coherent defensive front. On
10-11 July 1941, Guderian's Panzer forces successfully crossed
the Dnieper against the fierce but poorly coordinated Soviet
counterattacks and the threat of a counterof f ens ive by strong
1. General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York, 1956),
p. 169.
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forces moving in from the south and east. In the meantime,
Panzer Group 3 under Hoth, had taken Vitebsk and began its drive
toward Smolensk approaching that communications center from the
northwest. Both commanders hoped to breakthrough and accelerate
forward to Smolensk while simultaneously encircling major Soviet
forces and disintegrating the Soviet front on the upper reaches
of the Dnieper.
Similarly to the pattern of movement through Soviet
resistance earlier in the campaign around Slonim, the German
divisions made enormous gains across and along the Dneiper. The
German 29th Motorized Infantry Division successfully crossed the
Dnieper at Kopys early Friday morning and advanced against the
Soviet 18th and 54th Rifle Divisions. After heavy fighting in
the bridgehead area on Friday and Saturday, 11-12 July 1941, the
29th Motorized Infantry Division drove 100 kilometers on 13 July
through the Soviet defenses to reach a point 18 kilometers
southwest of Smolensk. The dramatic advance of the division
fractured the Soviet front cutting off the powerful Soviet forces
at Orscha (Orsa) from the strong forces being pushed back from
the Dnieper farther south. As the 7th Panzer Division under
Brig. Gen. von Funck and the 20th Panzer Division under Brig.
Gen. Stumpf had broken through north of Smolensk at the same
time, the Soviets saw themselves face-to-face with yet another
cauldron forming this time between Orscha and Smolensk.
The same German troops in Panzer Groups 2 and 3, who had
successfully encircled the Soviets at Bialystok and Novogrodek
were accomplishing a similar task 380-500 kilometers further to
the east at Smolensk. 1 The effects of the original German
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strategic and tactical surprise of 22 June 1941 lingered on in
the form of Luftwaffe air supremacy, heavy Soviet casualties, and
the inability of the Soviet command to slow the German advance to
a manageable pace. In spite of the difficulties of advancing
against an enemy with approximate numerical parity behind a major
river barrier, the qualitatively superior Germans continued to
hold on to the initiative and concentrate their efforts into
advances which surprised, fragmented, and overwhelmed the
Soviets
.
By 16 July 1941, the 29th Motorized Infantry Division had
seized control of Smolensk and the 7th and 20th Panzer Divisions
lay astride the Minsk-Moscow completing a loose encirclement of
major Soviet forces lying west and northwest of Smolensk. The
German mobile divisions by their physical presence forced the
Soviet Headquarters, Western Front, to displace more than 180
kilometers to the east to Juchnov, which lay in turn only 180
kilometers from Moscow. Soviet telephone communications and
ground transportation to the Red Army forces encircled east of
Mogilev and hemmed in further north at Lubavici Demidov were cut
by the Germans. The Soviet 13th, 19th, and 20th Army
Headquarters managed to slip away to the east but lost control
over the approximately 17 Soviet divisions encircled or hemmed in
by the Germans, The deep penetration of the 7th and 20th Panzer
Divisions north of Smolensk, the movement of the 29th Motorized
Infantry Division into Smolensk, and the drive of the 10th Panzer
1. The distances are from the centers of the pockets when
they were first formed on 25 and 27 June 1941, i.e., 500km from
the area northwest of Volkovysk, and 380 km from Juratiski north
of Novogrodek (see Map 4).
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Division of Maj. Gen. Schaal through Potschinok (Pocinok) to
Jelnja (Yelnya) on 20 July 1941, had completely shattered Soviet
communications and road and rail transportation across the front
of German Army Group Center.
The Germans intended to trap and destroy as much as possible
of the defending Red Army formations and the results by the end
of July had been catastrophic for the Soviets. The 7th and 12th
Panzer Divisions of Panzer Group 3, attacking near Vitebsk on 11
July 1941 at the beginning of battle for Smolensk, destroyed 101
Soviet tanks in tank versus tank combat, approximately half of
which were T-34 or KV models.-'- In contrast, but with the same
impressive results, the anti-tank gunners of the 529th Antitank
Battalion destroyed 51 Soviet tanks on the same day. 2 Farther
south, in Panzer Group 2, the 17th Panzer Division "annihilated
in heavy fighting over 250 enemy tanks" and inflicted heavy
casualties on the accompanying Soviet motorized infantry forces
in engagements in the same area near Sjenno (Senno) between 7-10
July 1941.3 The 18th Panzer Division, advancing immediately to
the south, knocked out 40 Soviet tanks on 7 July 1941. In the
brief period 7-11 July 1941, those four Panzer divisions,
destroyed more than 391 Soviet tanks while moving across the
Vitebsk land bridge and concentrating for the drive to Smolensk.
The heavy fighting by the German armor, which had the
1. Heeres Gruppe Mitte, la. Tagesmeldungen , 2 2.6.4 1-
1 5.7.4 1, A .0 .K . 4 Tagesmeldung , Bundesarchiv, Freiburg, RK
1911/128, p. 218 of file.
2. Ibid
. , p. 223 of file, paragraph 8.
3. Panzer A. O.K. 2, An lagen , Kr iegs tage buch, 1 3.7.4 1,
Bundesarchiv, Freiburg, RH 21-2/v. 122, p. 107 of file.
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initiative and was concentrating for the planned attack into the
Smolensk area, confused the Soviet command probably at the Front
and army levels. German reconnaissance aircraft supportinq
Panzer Group 3 reported a heavy column of Soviet troops "on the
march south" toward Gorodek on 10 July 1941 possibly moving to
support the Soviets in the great tank battles around Senno.
German aerial observation reported in the afternoon, however,
that same column "is on its way back via Newel (Nevel) in the
direction of northeast." The first general staff officer for
intelligence (Ic) of the German LVI Panzer Corps, commented on
the Soviet activity with the words: "the aimlessness of the
movement leads to the conclusion that the Russian leadership is
already confused." The followinq day, 11 July 1941, the German
29th Motorized Infantry crossed the Dnieper at Kopyss (Kopys)
with specific objectives to capture a bridgehead and as swiftly
as possible drive to Smolensk. The 15th Motorized Infantry
Regiment of the division seized a Soviet airfield just north of
Sobowa and captured 20 operational fighters in the process of
enlarging the bridgehead. While standing on the newly captured
field, German troops observed a Soviet aircraft approach the
field and land. The Germans grounded the taxiing aircraft with
gunfire and proceeded to capture two staff officers from the
Headquarters of the Soviet 20th Army. The staff officers were
out of touch with the actual progress of events on the ground tc
the extent that they had flown complete with "valuable maps" into
the arms of the German riflemen.
In the fighting, which led to the capture of Smolensk and
the formation of several cauldrons to the west of the city, the
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Germans took prisoners in a well defined pattern. In the mobile
stages of the drive, especially from 10-17 July 1941, the German
Panzer and motorized infantry divisions took moderate numbers of
Soviet prisoners while effecting the hemming in of the less
mobile Soviet forces. As the lines of encirclement were set and
the German infantry divisions arrived to assist the mobile
divisions, the Soviets took severe casualties in their attempts
(1) to break out of the pockets, and (2) to stabilize a new front
with fresh but poorly armed and led draftees and battered
veterans. The pattern is illustrated by the following data for
the German 12th Panzer Division which took approximately 50
prisoners each day on 11, 12 July 1941 as it attacked toward
Smolensk and 5,000 on 20 July 1941, while holding the lines of
encirclement around several Soviet divisions directly to the west
of Smolensk.
The German officers interviewed noted attacks in the
Bialystok, Minsk, and Smolensk pockets which indicated a severe
degradation of Soviet C 3
. Such attacks were not coordinated with
the other movements and were unsupported by artillery. Witnesses
interviewed and those reporting in documents noted as many as ten
waves of infantry attacking at ineffectively chosen sectors and
with no variation in the point of attack. Witnesses observed the
Russians attacking actually with arms linked together, without
prior reconnaissance, the troops often inebriated, and shouting
the cry, "urrah," incidentally, to the detriment of tactical
surprise in the night attacks. The Germans also observed that
many troops in the following waves in multiwave attacks were
unarmed. One German officer noted on moving through an area near
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Smolensk in which his unit had been receiving substantial
resistance, Soviet troops on hands and knees drinking vodka out
of the ditches on either side of a road near which a large
storage container had burst and poured out the colorless liquid.
The reasons for the Soviet casualties were many and varied,
but whatever they were, the Soviets suffered extreme losses
especially in attempting to break out of the German
encirclements. The situation in Central Europe today, however,
is substantially different in some respects. The West will not
be surprised in the grand sense of being attacked by a
diplomatic partner in a nonaggress ion pact. The West also has
well developed plans for defense including withdrawals for
considerable distance. In contrast, however, the defending NATO
forces will probably not have a copy of the potential Soviet
plan of attack and must accept all the deficiencies associated
with being surprised at the time and the main points of effort
of a Soviet offensive within the theater of operations. The
tactical situation is different in Central Europe also. In a
potential future Barbarossa II, unlike the case in June 1941, in
which a superior German Army attacked a less adept enemy, the
Soviets will be attempting to move against coalition divisions
with moderate technological superiority, probably moderate
superiority in historical command style, and a superiority in C^
hardware. The historical lesson and warning of Barbarossa is
that the enormous advantages associated with surprise,
initiative, and concentration of effort may allow a determined
attacker to overload the opposing enemy commands and accelerate
through defenses to a degree that no recovery of the defense may
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be possible in the limited space of West Germany. A unique
twist which stands out from Barbarossa also is the significant
probability that some NATO forces will be encircled and be
forced to attack equivalent size Soviet formations under
disadvantageous conditions of engagement associated with the
breakout situation, e.g., obvious points and times of attack and
assault against large, prepared enemy formations.
The Germans, in addition to inflicting severe casualties on
the Soviets, destroyed or captured large quantities of materiel.
The most important Soviet war materiel would probably include
tanks, rifles, machine guns, artillery, and antitank and
antiaircraft cannons. Of these weapons, the Germans felt that
tanks and cannons were particularly important weapons and
demanded that subordinate formations report the numbers of such
equipment destroyed or captured. The Germans were critical in
their acceptance of claims and sensitive about the possibilities
of double counts by different units. The following listing shows
the damage inflicted by Army Group Center on the defending
Russians in terms of materiel losses:
Barbarossa Materiel Losses
(Soviet Western Front)
9 3Soviet Losses German Losses
2_2 June - 8 July 41 (Bialystok-M insk) 22_ June - 8 July 41
1. Tanks — 3,332 1. Tanks — 195
2. Cannons — 1,809 2. Cannons —- 90
2. July " 2_7 Julv 41 (Smolensk) 9 July - 27 July 41
1. Tanks — *~ 3,20 5 1. Tanks — 218
2. Cannons -- 3,120 2. Cannons — 115
1. See H.G.M., la. T. M. , 2 2.6 - 1 5.7.4 1 , Freiburg, RH
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Army Group Center inflicted astounding tank losses on the
Soviets who had massed a huge quantity of armor in the Western
Military District prior to the German attack. Unlike the
situation relative to casualties, in which the army group
attacked with a slight numerical superiority, the German tank
force in the center moved forward with approximately 1,650 tanks
against approximately 8,000 Soviet tanks deployed with the forces
in the Western Military District on 22 June 1941, or immediately
available for use by newly mobilized formations. Based on the
numbers of Soviet tanks destroyed or captured by 8 July 1941, one
can estimate that approximately 4,000 Soviet tanks were deployed
with the Soviet 3rd, 4th, and 10th Armies, and arrive at a
conclusion that the tank force with Army Group Center was heavily
outnumbered by Soviet tanks. The Germans were able to compen-
sate for the striking inferiority in numbers by taking advantage
of the initial surprise and exploiting the factors of initiative
and concentration of effort into reasonable force ratios in tank-
versus-tank engagements.
(continued from previous page) 1911/128, p. 119, for Soviet
losses at Bialystock-Minsk. See, Panzer A.O.K.2, Kreig stagebuch
Nr. 1, 22.6.41 - 31.2.42
,
Anlagenband Nr. 40, p. 2, for the
losses of the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions, and, by
extrapolation, the losses to the other Panzer divisions in Panzer
Group 2. The figures are thus approximations. The figures for
artillery cannon losses are r ough app rox i m ation s based on the
1941 tactical sitution.
2. Soviet cannons include 76mm guns and 122mm and 152mm
howitzers and larger cannons.
3. German cannons include 10 5mm and 150mm howitzers,
100mm guns and larger cannons. Notes that antitank and anti-







i—i m -h C TD
t-H > H
c o T3
p> 05 C/0 >> 03
5<£ .c P. Fjp y-i O 2
•p o -p -p
0) 0) o a,
•H ti -P 03 03
> S-. 4h O
o g o
w a, > <1)
•a a. O t,
O 03 3 k a)
3 .c w •H 5
•P M i£
•H c >i
bO 03 -h <u a)
c 3 j= x:
•H <D -p -p
3 w h
O .X «H c a;£ CHh •H c*
03 0J a>
-p -p T3 X
.c o 03 3
a. a; <d O
03 W h 3 03
fc 03 -H T3 -H
bO .C *^ O C
o t- Ph 03
4-« ^ a, a H
O -C rr
x: • m-^i 03 -P cn
Ck 03 C, "H H
k k 03 J
(D 3 HI 3 03
k P N c; c
o3 a -p GO -H p
fc -H -H ^ !"3
Cu 3 C 03
< o 0! > Lf3
<13 ,C -P o CN
.H £1
• • bO £ 03 03 *-
< c e X3 Ij"2'H W E- C CMD oi ^ 3
2 03 O CU
E-< 03 >i w H
C M VW -H T3 p 03 p
> 0) c u 03H fi-H 03 03 J
CO (1) U 4-t
"z. x: $-, C T3 DW P 05 •H C •Hb 11 U 03 CU bO T3 D
a o -a 03 T3 00
-p c M 03 M
E-o 03 •H UU on U bC OSHii M o c
> C G +J -H 03O 03 O O 0) ,~

















nj • CJ I >-.
03 d) o> 0) E- 4->
Cu 4- fc. H





•H V M-i o 4-1
0> 03 &4 £ T3 U-4
u 43 CD -l-l C •r-i
u 3 o- 03 -a
3 c
+J >> o «H .* T3
,4 4-» c 03
0) c 03 JZ
x: to TJ 3 •p
•H 0) o o
E H J2 i-» J^
•4-1 •H H a 0) 3
O H 03 •H
<4-l 01 > CO
U « 03 13
to > A CO a
a) •H CJ "O E
£< 4h •H 0) CO S-.A +J •H 0)
0) +J 3 03 — u
r~* 0) b r-i
+J
rfl CO O a>
T3 U-i -G
#* iH C M • 4JJ
<u 3 a> JL,
J-. 4-> (X CD O
CU 03 h > 4->
J3 -r h •
>d M c 0) 0) •H
C 0) B 3 CO CO -
3 +j •H O — •H CT>
o o O w o u H
J3 03 P 9*
CO D. a> £ c M c
E H — 03 3 •H
•H O. X = CO
• • •H M 4-»
< A* fc CO CD rH -
s C O o 03 X>
Z3 o E 03 CJ -
as
p m 0) •H
03 +J
~ B2 o
H > n 4->
> £ j .H ~U 03 E -j CM •^
> <D o o c
i—
i
43 in 0) — —
CO — 4-> V :
s: M C Xi .c a JZ
w (—
(
n •H M *j XJ
u- 1 £ to •H
u > E CO CO 03 SflQ i^ a> o C
C9 a. <4-) 0] •H
E- +J •H 03 MW <D 0) CO
i-i —
<
xi •H cy cu 4-»
> > c £ J)O O o 4-1 •H 03 ~



















































































































































































































BAEBARObSA STUDY SITUATION HA? 4 ',
5 July 1941
Map Scale, M* I
SO /jo /So 2ep
r.H.103
.•**"









Lit. lbk/>y ^™ .rCn«.i#<ffAvci "^ " *^ \ " •••
I 90






























































BARBAROSUA oTUDY SITUATION UAPi"
15 July 1Q41
Map Scale, /V*r
SO /0<3 /SO 2Q \
ii.
O ^^ 3 "' 7"? -v-i • "
^^ JS l!ft ?» iNdrdwest













THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK
18 3
In the actual battles which developed, the Soviets had so
many tanks that the German horse-drawn and foot-marching infantry
divisions experienced scores of tank attacks. The German infan-
try divisions survived based on a complex but favorable balance
among the number and qualities of the German antitank guns,
the armor protection of the Soviet tanks, the defects in the
Soviet turret design, and the unskilled coordination of the
Soviet tanks among themselves and with potential supporting arms.
Each German infantry division had 72 organic 37mm motor -veh icle-
drawn antitank guns, which proved capable of mastering the armor
of the Soviet T-26 inf antr y-suppor t tank and BT-7 cavalry tank
while surviving the fire of the unusually heavy main armament of
those tanks and Soviet artillery. The Soviet T-26B and BT-7
tanks had exceptionally powerful 4 5mm cannons for tanks in their
large but relatively light weight class of about 10-15 tons, but
the two-man turrets severely restricted the rates of fire and
interfered with target acquisition. The bulk of the German
tanks (approximately 80%) in Army Group Center were 50mm cannon
Panzer III G tan ks and 75 mm s h or t cannon Pan zer IV E veh i cl es and
both vehicles weighed about 20 tons. The German tanks were
clearly superior to the Soviet in C^ apparatuses, three-man
turrets with more effective target acquisition performance and
more advanced fire control apparatuses, and cannons which
dominated the relatively thin armor of the Soviet T-26B and BT-7
tanks. The technological superiority of the bulk of the German
tanks over the bulk of the Soviet tanks is a strong reason for
the effective performance of the Panzer division of Army Group
Center in the opening stages of Barbarossa. It should be noted,
184
however, that the Soviet 45mm, M-1935, tank cannon with its
relatively large, kinetic energy, armor piercing ammunition and
moderately high muzzle velocity of 760-820m/s, was able to
perforate the armor of every German tank on the Eastern Front at
realistic ranges of engagement.
1
The Soviets lost approximately 6,837 tanks destroyed or
captured from 22 June - 8 July 1941, and the factors discussed
above — especially the effectiveness of the 37mm antitank guns
against the most numerous Soviet tanks and the superiority of the
German tanks against the same vehicles — explain the reasons for
the German success. The Germans lost through irreparable damage
from Soviet gunfire, Russian terrain hazards and evacuation back
to major rebuilding facilities, the comparatively moderate number
of approximately 415 tanks. The Germans in Army Group Center
with those moderate losses had achieved an extremely effective
exchange ratio of 16 Soviet tanks permanently lost to one German
tank.
Such extreme exchange ratios would not seem to be
attainable by an attacker in a Barbarossa II type offensive in
Central Europe. The strategical advantages associated with
surprise, important as they have been, do not seem weighty
enough to result in exhange ratios of 16 defending tanks versus
1 attacking tank. The tactical situation in a Soviet advance
into West Germany would show the Soviets with a heavy numerical
advantage partly cancelled by known Soviet deficiencies in fire
1. See, for example, F.M. von Senger und Etterlin, E^ie
Kampfpanzer von 1916-1966 (Muenchen, 1971), pp. 513, 516.
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control in tank versus tank combat, large numbers of NATO
antitank weapons, and anticipated Soviet inflexibility in
tactical command. One must suspect that the exchange ratios
could be reversed with some moderate advantage for the defending
NATO forces. On the other hand, the lesson or warning from
Barbarossa is that an attacker through concentration of effort
can swamp a defender with numbers at the Doints of main effort
and effect deep penetrations through the defending forces and
into their rear areas, even though the tank loss exchange ratios
favor the defending (potentially NATO) forces. If the attacking
Soviet force could carry out encirclements of some NATO forces,
the latter would be forced to attack the Soviet formations
blocking their ground transportation system and accept the
relatively high losses and less effective casualty and damage
ratios associated with an attacker.
In the artillery howitzer and gun category of weapons, the
Soviets suffered equally catastrophic losses in the great battles
of encirclement on the Western frontier. The most numerous
artillery weapons with the Soviet field armies were the 76mm,
122mm, and 152mm howitzers organic to the Soviet divisions and
brigades. Larqer caliber howitzers and guns were held under the
control of corps and army headquarters and comprised the
remaining artillery assets. In the opening stages of Barbarossa,
Army Group Center destroyed or captured the crippling total of
4,929 Soviet artillery cannons. The extreme losses denuded the
Soviet Western Front of artillery support for def en se agai nst
the anticipated German advance toward Moscow after the short
rest, rehabilitation, and resupply which the Germans planned for
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after the seizure of the Smolensk land bridge. The Soviet
losses in artillery cannons taken together with the destruction
of the Red Air Force, by 27 July 1941, reveal the Soviet ground
forces defending to the east of Smolensk largely with rifles,
machine guns, and mortars. German artillery was largely intact
during the same period of time and dominated the battlefield
through its large numbers, flexible employment, advantages in
aerial observation, and the extensive use of the Luftwaffe to
attack Soviet artillery positions. German combat losses in
artillery cannons during the first few weeks of the campaign (22
June-27 July 1941) are more difficult to discover but can be
estimated to be much lower because of the general success of the
German advance, the primitive nature of Soviet indirect fire
techniques, and German air supremacy. A figure of approximately
205 German artillery cannons lost to Soviet fire during this
period of time can be estimated only roughly on the basis of the
tactical situations.
The ratio of combat losses between the defending Soviets and
the attacking Germans was extremely unfavorable for the defender.
Given the relatively more similar qualities of the opposing
forces in a potential Soviet attack in Central Europe, one can
expect less of an advantage for the potential Soviet attacker.
Yet, the opening stages of the Russo-German Campaign in 1941,
seem to contain the lesson and warning at the attacking Soviets
with (1) possible air superiority, and (2) probable large gains
on the ground and associated heavy losses inflicted against NATO
in artillery weapons captured due to mechanical breakdown and
light mobility damage, would achieve effective loss ratios from
187
the viewpoint of a numerically superior attacker
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At 0340 Hours on 22 June 1941 the combined air assets of
four Luftwaffe Air Fleets struck a .formidable blow at the Red Air
Force -- a blow from which, in some respects, the Red Air Force
has not recovered to this day. The Luftwaffe used 1280
operationally ready combat aircraft for the initial waves of air
strikes in the war against the Soviet Union. With these air
assets the Luftwaffe destroyed more than 2000 2 Soviet aircraft
on the first day of the campaign in approximately 18 hours of
combat, as compared with a loss of 35 German machines. 3 in terms
of numbers of enemy aircraft destroyed versus numbers of
friendly aircraft lost, the initial Luftwaffe attack against
Russia is the most successful air force operation in the history
of airpower. Of the 35 German aircraft lost approximately 15
suffered damage not directly related with combat. The problem
was malfunctioning of the SD-2 fragmentation bomblettes which
occasionally detonated while still in aircraft bomb bays or upon
landing (see page224). If one takes only the losses of German
aircraft to Soviet defenses the exchange ratio of German aircraft
lost to Russian aircraft lost was approximately 1 : 100 on the
1. Bundesarch iv - M_i l_i t ae r a r c h i v , Freiburg, Federal
Republic of Germany, "Der Luftwaffenaufmarsch 1941 gegen
Russland", from Gen. Qu. 6 Abteilung.
2. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 317, (also
see note accompanying chart 5 ).
3. Bundessar chi v , "Auszug aus den Lageber ich ten" ODb.L.
dc) .
190
first day of the campaign.
The first Luftwaffe strikes were conducted at 0315 in
concert with the German Army's ground attack. Twenty to thirty
air crews had been previously handpicked to deliver special
fragmentation bombs (SD-2 2kg bomblettes and SD-10, 10kg
bomblettes) against key Soviet airfields, a flight of three
aircraft being assigned to each field. The purpose of these
early attacks was to cause disruption and confusion as well as
delay in the take off of Soviet planes until the main blow was
struck approximately 25 minutes later.
*
There was considerable controversy between the Army and the
Luftwaffe over the timing of the first air attacks. The Army was
firm in its position; it wanted to attack at first light to
achieve the maximum amount of tactical surprise and avoid the
problems of control in a night attack. The Luftwaffe, on the
other hand, was tasked with destroying the Red air forces so
that the Army could operate without fear of Russian air attacks
and the Luftwaffe could provide air support for the attacking
German ground forces. If the Army attacked first then the
Soviet Air Force units would probably be alerted and retire to
airfields beyond the reach of the Luftwaffe. 2 The resultant
compromise was the decision to select a few special crews^ f or
1. Bekker, Luft w affe War Diaries
,
p. 311.
2. Ibid., p. 312.
3. Selected for abilities at blind flying and navigation as
they would have to proceed to their targets at high altitude and
before first light to avoid detection by the Russians. See
Bekker, Luft w affe War Diaries .
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missions with times on target of 0315 --the same time as the
beginning of the Army Attack in the area of Army Group Center.
The first mission of the Luftwaffe for the opening stage of
Barbarossa was straightforward and specific: destroy the Red Air
Force and its ground organi zat ion.l After the completion of
this task the Luftwaffe was to concentrate on support of the
advancing German ground forces. *• These two missions could
probably best be defined respectively as the first and the main
missions of the Luftwaffe. 3 The Luftwaffe had to fulfill the
first mission (elimination of the Red Air Force) prior to
concentrating on the main mission—support of the German Army.
After attaining air superiority, the specific missions
planned for each of the four Air Fleets supporting Barbarossa
4were:
Air Fleet 4 - Supporting Army Group South
IV Air Corps
Prevent the rearward movement of the enemy
Minethe harbors of: Nikolajew, Odessa, Sebastopol
V Air Corps
Prevent re-enforcement of enemy
Support forwardmost Panzer groups
Air Fleet 2 - Supporting Army Group Center (main
concentration of the Panzer thrust)
1. Interview , Brigadier General Rudolf Loy tved-Hardegg
,
Luftwaffe Retired, Nuernberg, Federal Republic of Germany, 18
Jan. 1980.
2. Major General Herbert J. Rieckhoff, "Geheimnisse urn die
Luftwaffe der Sow je tunion," F lug Wehr und T echni k , Nr.8, Aug.
1948, p. 182.
3. Bunde sarchiv (Lw 118/4 4a) "Der Feldzug gegen




hi v, "Auszugsweise Abschrift aus dem KTB der
SeekreigsleTtung", (1. Abt., Teil A: Heft 22 von 1-30 Juni 1941).
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II Air Corps
Support the right flank of the Army in the direction
of Smolensk
. VIII Air Corps
Air Fleet 1 - Supporting Army Group North (destruction of
enemy forces in the Baltic provinces)
Support of the Army for the breakthrough to the Duna
River
.
Air Fleet 5 - Supporting the advance of the Army in the
North Norwegian area-- (minimal forces).
Mining of Polarnoje
Air Commander East Sea
Cooperation with Navy Group North
Armed Recce against enemy fleet movements
Mining of Kronstadt, Leningrad, the Newa River between
Schuesselberg and Leningrad
Attack locks of the White Sea canal at Powenietz
Regarding the first mission of the Luftwaffe in Barbarossa,
which was the destruction of the Red Air Force and its ground
organization, the following priorities were planned:
1. Destruction of modern aircraft and associated Red Air
Force ground organization
2. Destruction of production facilities for aircraft and
aircraft engines
3. Destruction of aircraft with "M" (modern) engines
4. Destruction of other aircraft
5. Destruction of the Red Air Force ground organization
The bombing of the Russian aircraft industry was not
possible at the start of Barbarossa because the Luftwaffe had no
bombers with sufficient range and payload to reach the Russian
factories. 2 For the balance of the targets the overall objective
was support of the Army. Even the highly successful attacks of
the first few days against the Red Air Force were not an end in
themselves. The Red Air Force was to be eliminated so that the
1. This is a translation of the original German document
which did not specify the tasks of VIII Air Corps. Other
accounts are more specific, for example see: "General Kommand
VIII Flieger korps", Oberst v. Heinemann.
2. I bid. , also see Paul-Werner Hozzel Recollect ions and




German Army could move without fear of Russian air interference
and so that the Luftwaffe could concentrate on supporting German
Army operations. Why did the German military leadership opt for
such a utilization of the Luftwaffe, especially when the theories
of strategic bombing of the then popular Italian air power
advocate General Giulio Douhet, 1 were still in vogue?
To start with, one must appreciate the strategical-
geographical circumstances of Germany. Germany was even in 1941 a
relatively small country. Except for coal, Germany was resource
poor with no natural defensive borders. The three factors: size,
no natural borders, and uneven resources dictated the
traditional Prussian-German military strategy. Wars had to be
short as there were not enough natural resources to support wars
of attrition. The armed forces had to concentrate on quality
and efficiency because the population base contained limited
expendable human resources. Finally, because German space was at
a premium, German military strategy had to concentrate on
destroying the enemy forces, rather than trading space for time.
These factors drove the Germans to embrace the theory of the
Entsc he idung s schlacht , or battle of decision, The classic
strategy which would quickly seek a decisive battle with the
enemy. Under such circumstances, the concept of Auftragstaktik
,
or mission tactic, was a natural guiding principle of German
1. In his book Airpower
,
published in 1921, Douhet (1869-
1930) advocated subjugating a foe mainly by attack from the air.
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military operations at all levels of command. 1 Essentially
Auf tragstaktik meant allowing decisions to be made at the lowest
possible level in the chain of command. Germany, furthermore,
had to make optimum use of its leaders because Germany could
usually count on being outnumbered by its opponents. In
Auf tragstaktik , then, the higher echelon assigned the objective,
to the lower echelon and the lower echelon determined how the
objective was to be taken. Orders were short, simple, and easily
understood. A commander at all levels, from squad leader to
field marshal, was a real commander, not merely a telephone
exchange passing on higher directives to subordinate units.
The Luftwaffe's military style was thus similar to that of
the German Army. Auftragstaktik was a principle used as much in
the Luftwaffe as it was in the German Army. The Schwerpunkt
concept also manifested itself, for example, even in the strong
emphasis that the German air force placed on dive bombing as
opposed to level carpet, or area, bombing. The Luftwaffe was
flexible, aggressive, and tactically oriented. The failure of
the German strategic bombing campaign against Great Britain and
the associated lessons were clear to the German military
leadership which emphasized tactical support of the Army during
1. Germany's historical position was seen by many as that
of the bulwark of Western Europe, behind which Western culture
was able to flourish and expand. Germany was Europe's forward
defense against alien invasion. This role was dutifully
fulfilled, in turn by the Teutonic knights, Electors of
Brandenburg-Prussia, Kings of Prussia, and German Emperors. This
tradition was also very much alive in the Third Reich and it is
no wonder, then, that Germany's "Best and Brightest" flocked to
the officer corps. In a country with easily accessible borders,
small size, and limited resources, national survival depended on
having an efficient and effective armed force.
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Barbarossa.
German air operations in Barbarossa provide an excellent
example of the Luftwaffe's military style. Lower echelons --
the squadron level and even flight level — decided the tactics,
weapons, and size of formations to use in destroying the targets
designated by higher echelons. Interference from higher
headquarters, in general, was kept to a minimum, and aircrew
opinions were highly regarded. When aircrews reported a severe
safety problem with the SD-10 fragmentation bombs, for example,
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commanding Air Fleet Two,
instantly banned their use except on external bomb racks. The
Germans placed great emphasis on minimizing aircraft losses and
battle damage and safeguarding the lives of aircrews. Erich
Hartmann, Germany's and the. world's top scoring fighter ace with
352 aerial victories, said in a" letter to Reichmarschall Hermann
Goer ing : 2
"Today from this airfield on your orders fighter
units took off in vile weather in an effort to find
and shoot down American bombers. The weather was so
bad that I would have been unwilling to take off
myself. The fighters you sent into the air never found
the bombers and ten very young pilots and planes were
lost without firing a shot at the enemy."
"Some of the young pilots I talked to in this
squadron who are now dead had less than 80 hours flying
time.... to send youngsters up to die in bad weather
is nothing short of a criminal act."
Although written when he was a junior captain, Hartmann's words
are very much in the classic German tradition which emphasized
minimizing losses.
1. Kenneth Macksey, K_££££.l r
_i:I!..2-i. the Making of the
Luftwaffe, (N.Y., 1978), p. 90.
2. R. F. Toliver and T. J. Constable, The B lond Knight of
Germ any
,
(N.Y., 1970), p. 8.
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The Luftwaffe was told to plan for a short war, and in
Barbarossa, as originally planned, strategic targets for aircraft
were essentially irrelevant. The general concept of the opera-
tion was the destruction of the mass of the Red Army in the
Western part of the USSR. Strategic Targets — factories, power
plants, population centers -- had no bearing on the outcome of a
Blitz, or lightning campaign of short duration. The Luftwaffe
in Barbarossa was totally committed to tactical support of the
German Army. In the words of Field Marshal Kesselring:^-
"I instructed my air force and flak generals to
consider the wishes of the Army as my orders"
The Luftwaffe's collection of intelligence data on the Red
Air Force in preparation for Barbarossa was a well organized,
albeit straightforward operation. The sources of information
which the Germans used included the following: the Russian
press, agents of various nationalities, Russian emigrants,
ethnic German emigrants, the German attache service, air
reconnaissance, and radio intercepts. All of these inputs were
analyzed by Luftwaffe Major Rudolf Loytved-Hardegg. Hardegg was
at that time a general staff officer and chief of intelligence
for Air Fleet One. A recently experienced reconnaissance group
commander in the West, Hardegg was specifically selected by his
superiors to collect data for the entire Eastern Front and set
up the target folders for the Luftwaffe missions opposite Army
Groups Center and North for the opening stages of Barbarossa.
1. Macksey, Kesselr ing
, p. 83,
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He was an excellent choice. He was a peacetime-trained general
staff officer, a pilot, a combat group commander, and intimately
familiar with air reconnaissance.
Loytved-Hardegg 1 wa s officially assigned to Air Fleet One as
chief of intelligence in March 1941, and was charged with
determining the order of battle of the Red Air Force and later
the targeting of its aircraft and ground installations. He set
up a small, secure headquarters in Berlin and started to work.
The units which came under his control for intelligence gathering
consisted of two radio intercept sites, a long range recon-
naissance squadron (Lufthansa) ^ and a long range reconnaissance
squadron (regular Luftwaffe), and finally, access to Reic hs-
f ue hrer Heinrich Himmler's security service organization for
screening emigres from the Soviet Union (see Chart 1 ).
The Luftwaffe High Command directed Hardegg to investigate
and answer the questions:
1. Is it true that 9000 Soviet aircraft are still
in the Western part of the USSR? (figure from Foreign
Armies East)
2. Are these 9000 aircraft supplemented with modern
aircraft?
3. Where are the industrial plants which are pro-
ducing modern aircraft and modern engines?
Intelligence data gathering for the Luftwaffe attacks during
the first critical days of Barbarossa was handled by a major with
1. Inter view , Hardegg. (all of this information is based
on the Hardegg interview, unless otherwise stated).
2. Photo intelligence was gathered from Lufthansa civil
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a staff of three officers. The same staff also designated all
Luftwaffe targets opposite German Army Groups North and Center.
The success of the Luftwaffe strikes makes a convincing argument
for small but well trained planning staffs.
Two incidents which occurred during the Luftwaffe
intelligence gathering phase of Barbarossa are particularly
significant. The first involved a Luftwaffe long range
reconnaissance mission in a newly developed special
reconnaissance aircraft. The aircraft was capable of reaching
an altitude of 34,000 feet, but on one of its missions deep into
Russian territory, the Luftwaffe aircraft was forced down by a
Russian fighter interceptor. This disturbed Major Hardegg,
because the general impression in early 1941 had been that the
Russians had no modern aircraft capable of intercepting German
aircraft above 30,000 feet.
Another incident involved a recently emigrated engineer of
German ancestry who had been allowed to leave the Soviet Union
under the terms of the recently negotiated Russo-German Non-
Aggression Pact (1939). The engineer was screened by Himmler's
security organization and because of his former employment in an
aircraft factory was then interviewed by Hardegg. The emigre was
quickly identified as an expert in alloy technology. He had
worked specifically in a Russian aircraft engine factory and had
produced such excellent results that the Russians had paid him
in gold. Hardegg was astounded that a man of such talent had
been released by the Russians and that Russia had such highly
skilled engineers working in the aircraft industry. The two
incidents led Hardegg to be more concerned about the technical
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capability of the Russians. Hardegg was of the opinion that the
Russians were not as backward and unsophisticated in certain
technical fields vital to war production as many people in
Germany and the West had been led to believe at that time.
Hardegg estimated the number of aircraft in the Red Air
Force as approximately 15,000 of which 350 were considered by
the Germans to be modern aircraft. The Hardegg organization also
determined that there were about 2000 airfields in the western
USSR. This information, when presented to Reichmarschall
Hermann Goering, was not well received. According to Hardegg,
Goering did not pass this information on to the Armed Forces High
Command— it was not conceivable to Goering that a "primitive"
people such as the Russians could have this many aircraft. In
this regard, Loytved-Hardegg had a private conversation with Lt.
Col. "Beppo" Schmidt who was on the Luftwaffe High Command
Operations Staff. Schmidt was aware of a truer picture of
Russian strength and also apprehensive about it. He asked
Hardegg to keep his reservations about the large number of
Soviet aircraft to himself because he felt the only hope for the
campaign was the self confidence of the German troops and the
chance that the Soviets would collapse from internal stresses
with the start of the German attack.
Hardegg's reservations never had a chance of altering the
decision of Hitler to attack the Soviet Union. Although he was
personally apprehensive about the chances of success, Hardegg
worked thoroughly, and, as subsequent events proved, effectively,
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established by Hardegg for the first day of Barbarossa were:
1. New aircraft with associated ground organization.
2. Production facilities for modern aircraft and air-
craft engines.
3. Aircraft with modern engines.
4. Other aircraft.
5. Red Air Force ground organization.
6. Support of the Army.
The second of the priorities proved impossible to fulfill as the
factories were beyond the range of the German bombers available
at that time.
There were approximately 2000 Soviet airfields within a 250
kilometer belt from the Western border of the USSR, which were
known to the Germans at the start of Barbarossa. * Of these
fields, four in the North and seven opposite German Army Group
Center had modern aircraft. Each occupied airfield had an
average of 30 aircraft, and virtually every such airfield in the
250-kilometer belt was attacked. Major Hardegg's organization
prepared sealed target folders for each Luftwaffe group
commander who passed the appropriate target information on to
the individual squadron commanders. The latter, in turn,
passed the data to their aircrews. Security was therefore
compartmentalized. Most aircrews had only eight hours^ notice
before they took off on their missions. It was felt that more
effect could be achieved by surprise rather than by detailed
planning which would entail security leaks. Extensive aircrew
mission planning was also considered less critical since most of
the crews were experienced and their training had emphasized
flexibility. The Auf trag s taktik concept made the Luftwaffe
1. Intervie w, Hardegg.
2. Interview, Hardegg.
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flexible and its aircrews self confident and capable of
independent decisions, and, thus, the Luftwaffe leadership did
not consider the very short notification times as a liability.
At a higher level, the thrust of Luftwaffe operations had
already been established in 1939, by the Luftwaffe Chief of
Staff, General Hans Jeschonnek. Basically the eternal problem
of resources was a prime mover in dictating the Luftwaffe
operational style. In the Spring of 1939 Jeschonnek stated:
"In the Luftwaffe it is not just a question of
technology. In the technical field every state is
always trying to get ahead of every other. But we must
realize that all states are really on the same
technical level and that there is no such thing as a
permanent lead. But the development of air tactics is
so recent that in the field conclusions can be reached
which, translated into action could mean actual
superiority over the enemy. The duty of the General
Staff is to indicate to the technicians the
requirements they must meet, but its most important
task is to make the best possible use of what the
technicians give them, to extract the maximum out of
men and machines at the lowest possible cost."
Even before the start of Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe was falling
into the mode of being subordinated to the Army. Considering the
necessity for Germany to wage short wars if they were to
terminate victoriously for Germany, one can see that the use of
the limited Luftwaffe assets as they were employed in Barbarossa
was probably optimal. The assets and resources for an effective
tactical and strategic air force were simply not available. At
the beginning of Barbarossa, the de facto situation, in spite of
Goering's desire for a fully independent air force, was that
Germany had a highly developed tactical air force which was
1. Werner Baumbach, Th e Life and Death of the Luftwaffe
(N.Y., 1949), p. 23.
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largely subordinated to the German Army.
After the intelligence analysis was completed, targeting for
the Luftwaffe was finalized. It is noteworthy that specific
targets for missions after the disruptive and first wave
Luftwaffe attacks were not assigned. 2 The Luftwaffe waited for
reports of bombing effects from returning aircrews and
reconnaissance pilots before assigning subsequent air strikes
because some targets would need to be struck again, while others
would have been completely destroyed. The final target list for









The port facilities at Sevastopol
The success of the Luftwaffe attacks was to astound the Germans
and the Russians.
1. Re ichmar schall Goering had a tremendous effect on the
buildup of the Luftwaffe and was often instrumental in securing
priorities (raw materials and personnel) for the Luftwaffe solely
as a function of his position within the National Socialist
hierarchy. Conversely Goering tended to use his position as head
of the Luftwaffe to influence political decisions, or more often
to secure the favor of Hitler. Periodically this had disasterous
consequences, as evidenced in Goering's boast that the Luftwaffe
alone could eliminate the BEF at Dunkirk in 1940. One of the
most painful consequences of having a major political figure head
the Luftwaffe was the ill-fated attempt to supply by air
transport the surrounded German Sixth Army at Stalingrad.
2. Intervie w , Hardegg.
3. Bunde sar
c
h i v , "Auszug aus den Lageber ich ten OBd.L. Ic",
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In the execution of the Luftwaffe attack in the East, a
special preliminary wave of approximately one group of bombers
hit the Russian airfields opposite Army Group Center on which
the modern Soviet fighters were based. The special preliminary
Luftwaffe air strike was designed to disrupt the modern Red Air
Force fighter units, cause confusion, and preclude their
dispersal and employment before the first wave of the attack.
Based on the results of the first wave of Luftwaffe attacks, the
disruption wave fulfilled its mission. As far as known with the
limited Luftwaffe records still existing, the disruption attacks
only took place opposite the area of Army Group Center—the most
critical of the three Army Groups.
In the first wave, 637 strike aircraft (Stukas, bombers,
destroyers) and 231 fighters (Me-109s) --868 aircraft totals-
took part in the attacks against the previously mentioned
targets. Results of air strikes against targets other than
aircraft are not available because an exact accounting was not
made at the time of the attack. Aircraft losses, friendly and
enemy, however, are known. The initially estimated Soviet losses
from the first Luftwaffe strikes were 222 aircraft destroyed in
the air and 890 on on the ground, 2 but this figure turned out to
be conservative. German aircraft losses for the first wave were
1. It must be pointed out that the entire strength of the
Luftwaffe was not employed against the USSR at the start of
Barbarossa. In fact only 61 percent of the Luftwaffe's strength
was on the Eastern Front at the start of the campaign. See
previously cited Lageber ichten examined in the Bundesarch iv
(Freiburg)
.









This figure of 18 German aircraft is somewhat misleading because
a substantial portion of these losses was due to weapon
malfunctions with the SD-2 and SD-10 fragmentation bombs. The
SD weapons were essentially bomblettes carried inside of a
canister, similar to numerous cluster type munitions used by air
forces today. The SD bomblettes frequently, however, would not
all release from the canister after having been armed.
Occasionally, as a result, a bomblette would detonate inside of
the canister, or would fall out and detonate upon landing or
while taxiing after landing. These inadvertent detonations could
destroy or severly damage the aircraft carrying the bomblettes.
This problem was an especially acute one for aircraft like the
JU-88 and He-Ill which carried the SD canisters in an internal
bomb bay. Shortly after the start of Barbarossa, the SD type
munitions were banned for all aircraft which had to carry it
internally as opposed to aircraft like the Stukas which had
external bomb racks.
A sampling of typical German impressions from the first
days flights is noted below:
German commanders are unanimous in their views on
the effects of the concentrated German air attacks
during the first few days, which were well organized and
soundly conducted. Thus, Captain (Luftwaffe retired)
Otto Kath, who at the time was a pilot in the 54th
Fighter Wing in the northern area, writes that on their
first mission the units of his wing dealt annihilating
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blows to Soviet air units still on the ground on the
Kovno airfield. The German bombs hailed into the SB-3
and DB-3 bomber aircraft closely packed along the runway
and in front of the sheds. The German Me-109 escort
fighters dived with the dive bombers or, after
accomplishing their escort mission, searched out Soviet
fighters in other areas of the airfield and destroyed
most of them on the ground. Those that did manage to
take-off were destroyed in their take off, or
immediately thereaf ter.l
"We hardly believed our eyes" reported Captain Hans
von Hahn, commander of V Air Corps' I/JG 3, operating in
the Lvov area. "Row after row of reconnaissance planes,
bombers, and fighters stood lined up as if on parade.
We were astonished at the number of airfields and
aircraft the Russians had ranged against us".
Russian planes went up in flames by the hundred. In
II Air Corps* sector, at Bug near Brest-Li tovsk , a
single Soviet fighter squadron attempting to "Scramble"
was bombed while still in motion on the ground. Later
The airfield boundary was found littered with burnt-out
wrecks .
*
The first attack caught complete air units upon the
ground, unprotected. Within a few days the greater part
of the Soviet air forces was destroyed. In the weeks
that followed, the Russian Air Force appeared to be
paralyzed; only small units, appearing at very
infrequent intervals, participated in combat actions,
and most of these were uncoordinated and unsystematic.
The possibility of Soviet flying units halting or even
delaying the swift advance of German Army groups, or of
threatening the German homeland was eliminated. Within
a few days it became clear that the technical
superiority of Luftwaffe aircraft, the relatively higher
level of technical and tactical training of German
airmen, and the high morale and aggressiveness of
individual German aircrews were more decisive factors in
combat than the actual numerical strength of these units
might have suggested. By accomplishing its primary
mission, the Luftwaffe contributed materially to the
great victories of the German Army in the East
1. Major General Walter Schwabedissen, Luftwaffe Retired,
The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of the German Commanders
,
(New
York, 1968), p. 54.
2. Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diar ies
, p. 552.
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during the opening weeks of the campaign.
1
In an interview on 23 January 1980 2 / Colonel Robert Poetter
gave a personal account of the first mission flown by his unit
in support of Army Group North. At that time Poetter was a
major commanding the I. Group of Bomber Wing 76, equipped with
Ju-88As. His unit was stationed at Jesau south of Koenigsberg.
Poetter's target was the Russian airfield at Kedania, in
Lithuania. Poetter had learned about Barbarossa and his group's
mission the day before from his air corps commander Lt. Gen.
Foerster at a meeting of all wing and group commanders within I.
Air Corps.
Upon returning to his group at Jesau, Col. Poetter briefed
his squadron commanders and then started preparing for the next
days mission. Poetter was left complete freedom of action
relative to the tactics to use in destroying the Red Air Force
aircraft and ground organization at the Kedania airfield. Using
the target folders prepared by Major Loy tved-Hardegg , Colonel
Poetter's group planned a high level ingress (4000 meters
altitude), with a low level attack and low level egress. The
munitions used by the group's attacking Ju-88As were the SD-2
fragmentation bomblettes Each Ju-88 was loaded with a total of
360 individual SD-2s. The airfield target area had been divided
1. Major General Hermann Plocher, Luftwaffe Retired, The
Ger man Air F orc e versus Russia, 1941, (N.Y., 1968), p. 39.
2« Interview, Colonel Robert Poetter, Luftwaffe Retired,
Kronburg, Federal Republic of Germany, 23 January 1980. In his
interview, Col. Poetter made extensive use of his personal
pilot's log book which he kept throughout the war.
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up into three sections, each one being allocated to one of the
three squadrons within the I. Group of Bomber Wing 76.
The group's mission started with a 0210 hours take off and
ended with a landing at 0403 hours. After approaching the
Kadania airfield at high altitude and sighting the targets, the
Ju-88s dove to low (tree top) altitude and made one pass with
the SD-2s. Col. Poetter recalls seeing about 30 Russian aircraft
at the field. Poetter's group lost only one aircraft, but not
due to enemy fire. One Ju-88 in a combat misadventure flew into
an SD-2 which had been released from another Ju-88 in front of
it.
Poetter related that a bomber unit to which he had
previously been assigned, working at that time (22 Jun 41) with
Army Group South, was severely restricted, by the air corps
commander, as to the type of tactics to use in the first day's
attacks with the SD-2s. Not only the target, but the exact
ingress, egress, and tactics were specified. In contrast to the
relatively low loss rate for Poetter's group in the North, the
other group's losses were "extremely" high using the rigidly
specified tactics. 1 The losses suffered by the unit in the
South were due mainly to light flak as ingress, attack, and
egress were all conducted at low level. Target identification
was very difficult and exposure time to small caliber AAA was
longer. Poetter feels one of the major reasons for the success
of the group working under General Foerster was that Foerster




















































































































































































































































































































































































SOVIET AIRCRAFT LOSSES (BY DAY)*
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•These figures are from daily reports
which were reported each evening to
the High Command of the Armed Forces.
The actual losses based on subsequent






































































































Figure 9 . The SD-2 Bomblette
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were best and did not dictate the manner in which operations,
were to be carried out. In Poetter's words: "We were told what
we had to do, but not how to do it".
The Luftwaffe attacks achieved its assigned mission in
Barbarossa of immediately overwhelming the Red Air Force in what
was planned to be a short campaign. The Luftwaffe did achieve
air superiority but did not completely destroy the Red Air Force.
As General Adolf Galland stated:
"One of the guiding principles of fighting with an
air force is the assembling of weight, by numbers,
of a numerical concentration at decisive spots. It
was impossible to adhere to this principle because
of the urgent demands made by the Army. In spite
of superiority and relatively small losses it was
possible in the east to visualize a point in the
future where the offensive strength of the Luftwaffe
would diminish through a continuous exertion. The
campaign had to be brought to a victorious end before
this moment arose. The initial successes seemed to
justify such a hope."l
Notwithstanding later developments in the Russo-German War,
the Luftwaffe fulfilled its mission relative to the concept of
Barbarossa and, in fact, "destroyed" the Red Air Force for the
planned duration of Barbarossa. The Chart on page222a shows the
extent of the Luftwaffe's success for the first few days of the
campaign and especially the success achieved initially. On the
first day of the war, the Germans traded 35 aircraft for
approximately 2000 Russian aircraft, and, then, the Russian
aircraft losses tapered off. These facts illustrate the
tremendous effect of surprise on the losses early in the
campaign. It is noteworthy that the operational ready rate of
1" General de£ Fl ieger Adolf Galland, Luffwaffe Retired,
The First and the Last (N.Y., 1978), p. 65.
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the Luftwaffe at the start of Barbarossa was only 70 per cent.
Had the Luftwaffe concentrated its air assets earlier in the
concentration and preparation for the campaign in the East, it
could have pushed the operationally ready rate much closer to
100 per cent. A determination was obviously made, however, that
surprise was a more valuable factor than mere numbers of
attacking aircraft. The fact that only 868 combat strike
aircraft, out of 1280 available for operations, were used in the
first wave of attacks supports this position. Commenting on the
success of the Luftwaffe in his diary, General von Waldau states
that 80 per cent of the success of the attack was due to
surpr ise.
The Red Air Force was the largest in the world in 1941 and
the Soviet Union had an equally large aircraft industry to
support the Air Force. 3 Soviet soldiers and airmen had also
been constantly bombarded with propaganda about the
"invincibility of the Red Army". 4 One can imagine the shock that
swept through the Red Air Force when the magnitude of the initial
Luftwaffe successes against the Soviet Union became known. In a
single day, the Red Air Force fell from the world's largest air




2. Bundes a rchi
v
, General von Waldau, Luftwaffe Retired,
"Tagebuch Marz '39 - 10.4.42" Chief des Luftwaf fenfuehrungstabes.
3. Richard C. Lukas, Eagles East (Tallahassee, 1970), p. 6.
4. Alexander werth, Russia at War , 1941-45 (N.Y., 1964),
p. 142.
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w i thin its own country. Throughout the war, the Red Air Force
improved, but man for man and machine for machine it was not a
match for the Luftwaffe even at the end of the war. German close
air support aircraft would often work without the benefit of air
cover for protection from Soviet fighters^- even when they became
engaged by those fighters.
There are 107 Luftwaffe pilots with over 100 air to air
victories from World War Two, the vast majority of whom came from
combat on the Eastern Front. 2 m contrast, the highest scoring
Soviet ace from World War Two had 62 victories. 3 The Russians
never caught up with the Germans qualitatively in the air but
outmatched them quantitatively. Russian production of 163,6874
aircraft surpassed German production of 113, 514. ^ Additionally
the USSR was given 14,798^ aircraft on Lend-Lease from the United
States, of which 14,062 7 arrived in the USSR. The quantitative
imbalance is all the more impressive because the Germans never
concentrated more than 64% of their air assets in the East.
The rigidity of Russian air tactics was almost
unbelievable. Field Marshal von Manstein described an incident
1. Hozzel, Recollections .
2. R. Toliver and T. Constable, Horrido (N.Y., 1977),
p. 368.
3. Ray Wagner, ed. , The Soviet Air Force in World War II
(N.Y., 1973), footnote, p. 175.
4. Ibid , p. 400.






at a bridge at Dvinsk on the Dvina River which had been captured
intact by the Germans. On that occasion, wave after wave of
Russian bombers attacked the bridge with no variation in
direction or altitude of attack. At the end of the day, 64
attacking Russian aircraft had been destroyed by German fighters
and flak. In the Red Air Force, blind obedience to the flight
leader was the norm. In an interview, retired Luffwaffe General
Loy tved-Hardegg stated that often only the flight leader in
Russian bomber formations actually knew what the target was and
he was also the only pilot with an aeronautical chart.
^
The Luftwaffe was able to provide extensive support for
German Army operations as early as the second day of the
campaign. This support grew daily as the Luftwaffe mission
shifted from destruction of the Red Air Force to interdiction and
close air support, the latter being most prominent during all of
1941. The German Army was able to operate without fear of
effective Red Air Force interference and with the impressive
benefits of Luftwaffe fire support for German ground operations.
The Luftwaffe, however, insidiously became a captive service to
the German Army:
"In a study prepared during the war, the Military
History division of the Luftwaffe General Staff dis-
cussed this subject in some detail. Even in 1941, as
the study pointed out, the outstanding feature of air
warfare in the East was the preponderance of Luftwaffe
operations in support of the Army. Indeed, it soon
became patent that the ground forces, confronted with
forces superior in numbers, could make good progress
only when attacks were supported by the Luftwaffe
This general condition, coupled with the mobile warfare
1. Interview, Hardegg.
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mobile warfare which prevailed up to November 1941,
required the commitment of almost all air units for
close support, leaving only weak elements for "missions
of a strictly strategical nature". The study concluded
that if the number of aircraft and missions flown a-
gainst Moscow be compared with the magnitude of the
Anglo-American bombing effort against Germany, it must
be concluded "that our strategic attacks cannot have
been expected to produce decisive results".
l
The same problem of limited numbers of aircraft became true
in the interdiction role German since air assets were simply not
numerous enough to provide the quantity of sorties required to
produce lasting results in interdiction. Rail interdiction was
important in 1941 but produced only local results, and these were
short lived due to the effectiveness of Russian repair crews.
2
It must be emphasized, however, that in the first few critical
weeks of Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe fulfilled its mission, which
was to allow the German Army to operate unhindered by Soviet air
attacks and powerfully supported by Luftwaffe ground attacks.
Prior to World War Two, air forces around the globe were
infatuated with the theories of the Italian General Guilio
Douhet, and the Luftwaffe was no exception. After the carnage
of the First World war, military and political leaders were
receptive to Douhet's theory, which implied that the strategic
use of airpower could be decisive in winning a modern war.
Unfortunately Douhet's theories were just tha t-- 1 heor ie s .
Strategic bombing was not as effective as had been hoped in the
Second World War, and Germany's war production was highest in
1. "Die wichtigsten allegmeinen Einsatzerfahrungen des
Jahres 1941", Karlsruhe Document Collection, quoted in
Deichmann's German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army .
2. Bundesarchiv , LW 118/4 4a.
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1944, for example, at the height of the Allied bombing
campaign. Both Allied and Luftwaffe tactical air operations,
however, were enormously successful.
The Luftwaffe air attack plan for the start of Barbarossa
was probably the most efficient possible considering the air
assets available to the Germans in 1941. Had the Germans opted
for a strategic bombing effort against Russian industry, as
opposed to concentrating on tactical air support, the highly
successful first phase of Barbarossa might have miscarried. In
1941, the Germans had no effective strategic air force and they
concentrated their tactical aircraft on two tasks: (1)
destruction of the Soviet air forces, and (2) support of the
attacking German Army. The main mission of the Luftwaffe was
continuous air attacks against enemy defenses and the hindering
of the forward movement of Russian reserves by air attacks on
highways and railroads in continuous tactical air support of the
spearheads of the attacking German Army.l As the following
quotation illustrates, the Luftwaffe found itself providing
direct fire support and interdiction for the Army:
The Air Corps consequently found themselves acting
mainly as mere auxiliaries to the Army's ground
operations, and virtually no strategic air offensive
was mounted.
^
Another aspect of Luftwaffe operations which must be empha-
sized is that of air reconnaissance. Once can get a better feel
1. Lieutenant General Paul Deichmann, Luftwaffe Retired,
German Air F orc e Operations in Support of_ the A_rmy_. (N.Y.,
1968)
, p. 160.
2. Bekker, War Diaries
, p. 334.
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for the importance that the Germans placed on reconnaissance
merely by the fact that over 25 per cent of all Luftwaffe
aircraft were committed to reconnaissance.-'- The operational
reconnaissance mission was to "furnish information on which the
Army commanders could base their operational decisions. "2 "The
mission of tactical air reconnaissance was to provide information
for the command and operation of army troops on the field of
battle". After contact with the enemy was established German
tactical reconnaissance transitioned to battle reconnaissance and
artillery reconnaissance.
Luftwaffe operational reconnaissance was normally flown
single ship at higher altitudes (16,500 to 24,400 feet) to avoid
enemy fighters. 3 j n the target area the reconnaissance aircraft
would frequently descend to lower altitudes in order to get a
better view of details on the ground. Parachute flares were used
on night reconnaissance missions for visual observations and
f lashl ight ing for taking photos. Radio reports in the air by
returning Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft were avoided to
prevent enemy radio intercept and subsequent enemy fighter
attack.
Tactical, battle, and artillery reconnaissance were also
flown single ship. Friendly fighter cover was normally
1. Alfred Price, Luft w affe , Ballantine, NY, 1969, p.78.
2. Deichmann, Operations
, p. 58. The balance of information
on air reconnaissance comes from Deichmann unless otherwise
stated.
3. The Germans divided military operations into three
areas: Strategic, operational and tactical. This study will
consider strategic and operational to be synonymus.
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requested in the area where air reconnaissance was to be
conducted. Tactical reconnaissance was restricted to a range of
120 miles beyond the front lines and the aircraft would fly at
high altitude until beyond the main lines and then descend to
lower altitude for more accurate observation. Air
reconnaissance sorties which were specifically for purposes of
aerial photography were flown at altitudes of 16,500 feet and
higher
.
Battle reconnaissance missions were normally flown at
altitudes below 6,600 feet. At night the aircraft would
frequently operate at near ground level to obtain the detail
required by the Army. Artillery reconnaissance had to be very
flexible due to different types of friendly fire. For defense
against enemy fighters, both battle and artillery reconnaissance
would rely on friendly fighter and flak protection.
The Luftwaffe had an extensive system of liaison officers
to see that the results from reconnaissance missions were
disseminated" to the Army. Fielseler Storch (Fi-156) aircraft were
used by liaison personnel and for air drop messages. A
consolidated digest of reconnaissance information was also
broadcast three times daily by the tactical air command support
staffs located with armies and army groups.
Both the Army and the Luftwaffe conducted separate air
reconnaissance to serve their own purposes. Luftwaffe
1. The Germans divided military operations into three
areas: Strategic, operational and tactical. This study will
consider strategic and operational to be synonymous.
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reconnaissance operations had been criticized before the war by
the Army as often being conducted in accordance with viewpoints
differing from those of the Army. 1 The Army, accordingly, had
requested and received Luftwaffe reconnaissance squadrons which
were specifically attached to Army units. These reconnaissance
squadrons had missions which were determined by the Army unit to
which they were attached.
Regarding the specific targeting of C 3 it can be stated
that such targeting was not a policy of the Luftwaffe in the
early stages of Barbarossa and the three suspected higher staff
headquarters targeted for the initial first wave attacks on 22
June 1941 seem to have been selected based on Army information
and desires. Several factors may have contributed to the
Luftwaffe decision regarding C 3
. Firstly, the Russian
communications system, transportation net, and command structure
were primitive by the German standards of 1941. Lack of
sophisticated communications manifested itself also in the air
with the Red Air Force where only the flight leader in a
Russian bomber formation had navigation aids and the target
information. 2 j n conjunction with this study, four former
Luftwaffe officers 3 were interviewed, all of whom were involved
in operations for the first four weeks of Barbarossa, and not
1. Deichmann, Op_er a t ions
, p. 86. In 1942 all air
reconnaissance was transferred to the direct control of the
Luftwaffe
.
2. Inter view , Colonel Hans-Henning Freiherr von Beust,
Luftwaffe Retired, Muenchen, 22 Jan. 1980.
3. Three were flying operational missions, one was on Air
Fleet One's staff.
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one knew of a Luftwaffe air attack against a higher headquarters
or communications center. 1 All of them personally recall being
heavily engaged in attacks against airfields, railroads,
2
railroad stations and transportation choke points.
There were many Soviet C 3 targets that were destroyed, but
they were destroyed largely as by-products of larger operations
whose goal was the physical destruction of enemy forces.
Regarding communications, Col. Poetter said the Germans would
avoid destroying an enemy (lower echelon) command post in order
that they could use transmission from that command post for
timely intelligence. 3 There was, conversely, heavy emphasis on
preventing the withdrawal of Red Army forces deep into the
interior of the Soviet Union, as well as hindering the
reenforcement of front line Soviet forces.
In all of the documents researched for this study, there was
only one mention of C 3 targeting. The targets of the VIII Air
Corps with Army Group Center included known battlefield command
posts. ^ These targets were, listed, however, after the listings
ordering the destruction of enemy air forces and the support of
forward armored units. General Loy tved-Hardegg said that the
Germans would have attacked C 3 targets had they known where they
1. Interviews , Hardegg, Beust, Poetter and Rudel. Interview
with Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Luftwaffe Retired, Kufstein,
Austria 20-21, Jan. 1980.
2. Ibid.
3. Intervie w , Poetter.
4. Bundesarchiv, "General Kommando VIII Fl ieger korps"
"Angriffe gegen Russland" (erste Einsatze), Colonel Lothar von
Heinemann, Luftwaffe Retired.
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were. The primitive nature of the Soviet C^ system in 1941,
however, largely precluded attacks against it as a viable option
for the Luftwaffe.
From the German viewpoint of lessons learned, "there were
three main reasons for the success of Barbarossa:
surprise, Schwerpunkten , and Auftragstaktik ." 2 To these factors
stated by General Graf von Kielmansegg, Beust added the factor of
flexibility. 3 Considering the limited number of aircraft of
aircraft allocated to the Luftwaffe, its contribution to
Barbarossa can be considered as nearly optimal. There were of
course mistakes made by the Luftwaffe, for example, the holding
back of resources in late 1941 for the expected offensive against
Great Britain after the Russian campaign had been successfully
concluded. 4 The decision to hold back aircraft was made at the
highest political level in Germany, but, in spite of the
decision, the Luftwaffe success in the opening stages of
Barbarossa was about as complete as it could have been even with
substantially more attacking aircraft.
The overall lessons learned from Luftwaffe support of the
opening stages of Barbarossa can be summarized as follows:
1. Interview , Hardegg.
2. Interview, General Johann-Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg,
Bundeswehr Retired, Bad Krozingen, Federal Republic of Germany,
19 Jan. 1980.
3. Interview , Beust.
4. Interview, Poetter.
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1. The Luftwaffe was a tactical air force in effect
subordinated to the Army.
2. In the Luftwaffe, responsibility for the success of
missions was assigned to the lowest possible level.
3. Luftwaffe unit commanders were trained in the tradi-
tional German manner and their actions reflected that
training.
4. The Luftwaffe effectively eliminated the Red Air
Force for the planned duration of Barbarossa.
5. After the elimination of the Red Air Force, the
Luftwaffe concentrated its efforts on close air
support and interdiction in support of Army
operations.
6. Effective strategic air operations were non-existent
during Barbarossa.
7. Air reconnaissance was highly valued by the German
Army and approximately 25 per cent of the German
combat aircraft were dedicated to reconnaissance.
Barbarossa can be graphically depicted as shown on Chart 6
,
where the exchange ratios are very high in favor of the attacker
and then fall rapidly with time as the effect of surprise
decreases. If the attacker maintains the initiative and
momentum, the campaign is concluded before the favorable exchange
ratio starts to drop off. The campaign against the Red Air Force
is a case in point. The air battle was essentially won by the
Luftwaffe in the first two days, after which the Luftwaffe had
air superiority and operated essentially unhindered in its
support of the Army for the duration of the time planned for the
Barbarossa campaign.
The key questions at present are how will the Soviets
conduct a Blitz of their own aimed at the West European states
and how has the Soviet experience with the Luftwaffe in
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lessons learned from the Luftwaffe, then, in a general attack
against Western Europe, they can be expected to consider the
following possible actions:
1. Sacrifice total numbers available for an attack in
favor of the achievement of surprise.
2. Attempt to eliminate the opposition air forces at
the start of combat operations.
3. Concentrate on destruction as opposed to disruption,
i.e., disruption would only be a means to an end which
would be the destruction of enemy forces.
4. Heavily commit air forces to aid in the support of
Red Army operations.
5. Improve the efficiency of their own communications
net.
If the Soviets attack NATO, will the Soviet air forces have
the same effect as did the Luftwaffe against the Russians in
1941? The answer is clearly no. To assume that the Russians
could expect the same aircraft combat exchange ratio of 100 : 1
demonstrated by the Germans in 1941, is unreasonable. Large
numbers of NATO combat aircraft are parked in blast hardened
shelters. A significant portion of NATO air forces are in a
constant alert status. NATO's early warning radar net is highly
efficient and could be expected to preclude a complete surprise
air attack against NATO airfields. In spite of these conditions
which have enhanced the defense of Europe, a massive Soviet
surprise attack could seriously, or even critically, hamper
NATO's ability to defend Western Europe.
The Soviets do not need a 100 : 1 exchange ratio in aircraft
losses, because the Warsaw Pact air forces already outnumber the
NATO air forces. At an exchange ratio of 1 : l,the attacking
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Warsaw Pact would have aircraft left over to suport army
operations. It can be further assumed that, if the Soviets
follow the lessons learned from the Luftwaffe in Barbarossa, they
will attempt to destroy as many NATO aircraft as possible early
in the campaign.
Introspectively one might place oneself in the position of
the Warsaw Pact Air Force commander and ask the question: "How
can I best support the ground forces in the attack on NATO?" Two
factors immediately come to mind. The Warsaw Pact ground forces
want protection from NATO air attacks and protection for their
logistics system from NATO aircraft conducting interdiction
missions. These factors require air superiority and the least
expensive method for attaining air superiority is to destroy the
enemy's air force on the ground. It must be remembered, however,
that the Germans in Barbarossa targeted three suspected higher
staff headquarters for attack in the first wave of attacking
Luftwaffe aircraft. The Germans apparently felt at that time
that the staff headquarters were of such importance that a few
sorties could be spared from the first mission of obtaining air
super ior ity
.
One significant difference between the Luftwaffe in 1941 and
the Soviet Air Force today, is that the Germans in 1941 did not
know where all of the Russian airfields were. Although the
Germans did their best to pinpoint all of the Russian airfields
they did not know for sure that they had located all of them.
Conversely it can be assumed that the Soviets today know the
exact location and it is a tempting option for the Warsaw Pact
Air Commander to allocate all of his combat aircraft assets for a
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great first wave attack against all of the NATO airfields at the
start of combat operations. Another option would be to allocate
a small portion of the attacking Warsaw Pact aircraft to C^
targets, while the majority of combat aircraft would be dedicated
to destroying NATO's air forces. This second option would be
parallel to th» Luftwaffe attack in June of 1941.
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Chapter 6.
3German Spec ial Counter C Cperations in Barbarossa
On 22 June 1941, even before the first artillery rounds were
fired into the Soviet Union at 030 5 in the north and 0315 farther
south, agents of various nationalist organizations and German
members of the Brandenburg Regiment had unobtrusively infiltrated
across the Soviet border. The Germans had difficulty in
introducing agents into the Soviet Union because of the strict
Soviet border controls, 2 and eight Ukrainians of the Organi-
zation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) were intercepted, in fact,
by NKVD guards in the ten davs preceding the attack. 3 Those who
successfully crossed into Russia proceeded to execute their as-
signments and disrupt Soviet C 3 by preventing the collection and
dissemination of information about attack, interfering with
command and control, and gen erally disrupting the Soviet response
to the German invasion. Near Brest, for example, in the Western
Special Military District opposite Army Group Center, the Soviet
4th Army interrogated a German deserter who had crossed the
1. During the six months preceding Barbarossa 17,000
trains rolled eastward with war materials. For their attack on
the Soviet Union the Germans had deployed over 3,000,000 men, 141
divisions of which 19 were Panzer, 3,350 tanks, 7,184 Artillery
pieces, 600,000 lorries and a like number of horses, and over
2,000 aircraft. See The Haider Diaries
, p.964 and Erickson, The
Road to S talingrad
, p . 98 .
2. G eneralleu tnant a.D. Andreas Nielsen, The Collec t ion and
Evaluation of Intelligence for the German Air Force High Command ,
unpublished, U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History,
p. 139.
3. See J. Ericksen "The Soviet Response to Surprise Attack:






border near Volchin during the night of 21 June 1941. At 0220
the next morning, 4th Army officials attempted to disseminate the
results of their interrogation, which included evidence of
pending German attack, and discovered that their telephone lines
had been cut. The destruction of the lines had been carried out
by infiltrators from across the Reich border. Even before this
time, 4th Army had been cognizant of the interruption in Brest of
electric power, the water supply, and the telephone system.
These interruptions were apparently inflicted by Brand en burgers
who were dressed as Red Army soldiers and who were also at work
spreading alarm and confusion and assisting Army assault
detachments in seizing bridges.
The damaging of communications partly isolated the Soviet
4th Army and had graver consequences than slowing down the
distribution of the information on the German deserter at
Volchin. At 003 on 22 June, the Soviet High Command had
transmitted a warning about the German attack and directed units
to prepare for combat and disperse aircraft on all airfields.
The Soviet 4th Army did not receive this directive until too late
to be of value at 0530, and the activities of the Brandenbur gers
contributed to the delay. The Luftwaffe had already attacked the
neatly aligned rows of Soviet aircraft and Army Group Center had
captured intact the six Bug River Bridges guarded by the Soviet
4th Army. Other units did not receive official warning of the
German attack until 0800, almost five hours after the onslaught
began. The disruption of the communications of the Headquarters,
1. Ibid.
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4th Army, before the attack was not an isolated incident. As far
south as Sevastopol on the Black Sea, communications had also
been disrupted as a prelude to the initial German assault. At
0320 the commander of the Sevastopol garrison, Maj or-Gene r al
Morgunov, while attempting to black out the city as German
aircraft approached, realized that his communications had been
tampered with. Communications between Moscow and the Sevastopol
Naval Headquarters, however, continued to function as before.
As German regular army units crossed the border,
divers ionists and saboteurs accompanied them to spread the
disruption begun by their comrades earlier in support of the
German advance. The goal of the divers ionists and saboteurs was
to interfere with the Soviet Command and hinder Soviet response
to the attack of the German Army and Luftwaffe. German commandos
accomplished this goal by severing communications links to
prevent the exchange of intelligence and the issuance of orders.
The Soviet History of the Great Patriotic War recounts that,
"After the first shot., .the di versionists cut communication lines
2linking headquarte rs army-to-corps and corps-to-divisions." The
communication lines noted were apparently telephone and telegraph
lines. German commandos also helped to seize key transportation
facilities, particularly bridges, to facilitate the rapid advance
of the mobile German formations and interrupt Soviet attempts to
establish a cohesive defense. In Army Group North's area alone,
1. Ibid.
2. History of the Great Patriotic War of the S ov i e t Union,
1941-1945
, Volume II, Military Publishing House of the Ministry
of Defense of the USSR, 1961, p. 12.
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Lithuanian activities seized twenty-four bridges during
Barbarossa. °n the first day of the campaign, Brandenbur ger
s
assisted Army Group Center units in capturing intact all bridges
across the Bug River as part of the Army Group's first move into
Soviet territory. 2 still further south, elements of the
Brandenburg Regiment established a bridgehead over the San River
for Army Group South.
*
The three German Army Groups achieved almost total surprise
along the entire front when German artillery opened fire against
Soviet fortifications, troop concentration and art ill ery posi-
tions.^ Behind the border itself, German air and artillery fires
caught Soviet frontier guards and Army troops in their barracks
or racing half-dressed to occupy their positions. Many of these
positions remained empty as German forces advanced swiftly
through the Soviet border defenses. 5 Elsewhere, the Soviet Air
Force, its fighters and bombers sometimes aligned wing to wing,
stood exposed to the surprise appearance of the Luftwaffe. Only
Major-General M.V. Zakharov, commander of the still forming 9th
Army in the Odessa Military District, ordered his aircraft
dispersed before dawn, a precaution he instituted on his own
initiative without authorization from higher headquarters.
1. H. Hohne, Canaris
,
(N.Y., 1979), p. 46 7.
2. J. Erickson, The Road to Stali ng r
a
d, (N.Y. 1975), p. 109.
3. H. Hohne, C anaris
, p. 46 0.
4. See material cited previously in the H is t ory of the
Grea t Pa tr iot
i
c War of th e S ov i e t Un io n 1 941-1945, and Plocher,
German h±L E.2L9.1' Vo1 • *» P-15, and Erickson, The Road to
Staling rad
, pp.115 and 116.
5. Erickson, The S ov i e t H igh Command
, p. 58 7.
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Enjoying surprise and the associated initiative and
concentration of effort, the Germans generated attacks which
displaced the opposinq Soviet units, and, by physical movement
and fire, jolted Soviet C3 into ineffectiveness. The Soviet 11th
Army covered the Baltic Military District at its boundary with
the 3d Army of the Western Special Military District. Army Group
Center enjoyed particular success at this point, attacking with
such strength that the Soviet 11th Army units were scattered or
destroyed. The unexpected displacement of units within the 11th
Army in response to the German attack destroyed communications
between the army staff and subordinate commands, precluded
2intelligence reporting, and prevented a coordinated response.
Meanwhile Lieutenant-General Kuznetsov's 3d Army, opposing the
9th German Army, had lost all telephone and radio communications
within the first hour of battle, and, except for runners, was
isolated from the 11th Army to the north, the 10th Army to the
south, and the Western Front to the rear.3 The 10th Army was in
a similar predicament since its telephone lines had been severed
and its radio communications jammed. ^ obviously such a bleak
situation prevented an accurate assessment of the German advance
by Soviet commands at all levels and precluded a coordinated,
strategic response.
1. Erickson, Staling rad
, p. 111.
2 . History of the Great Patr iotic War of the Sov iet Union
1941-1945
, p. 18.
3. Erickson, Staling rad
, p. 129.
4. A. Werth, Ru ssi a at War, (Barrie and Rockliff, 1964W
p. 153.
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The disruption prevalent in the Western Military District
affected Moscow as well, which failed to get an accurate picture
of events in the West. After almost seventeen hours of battle,
the "center" in Moscow issued Directive Number 3 ordering the
Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern Fronts to take offensive
action using coordinated operations and carry the war to enemy
territory. Marshal Timoshenko reflected the general confusion of
22 June in Directive Number 3 by ordering attacks at unrealistic
times by partly destroyed mechanized forces which were to be
supported by a disintegrating Red Air Force. The Fronts experi-
enced extreme difficulty in complying with Directive Number 3 but
nevertheless counterattacked westward and contributed to the
German encircling operations at Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk.
In the days after 22 June 1941, nationalist agents and
Brandenburg units continued to support the operations of those
armies to which they were assigned by cutting rail lines,
severing teleDhonic communications and spreading general disorder
but with decreasing effect. Commandos remained relatively active
in front of Army Group North where members of the Brandenburg
Regiment posed as Soviet casualties in two captured lorries and
helped regular army units to seize the Dvinsk roadbridge over the
Dvina River for Manstein's advancing 5 6th Panzer Corps. Else-
where Lithuanian activists seized twenty-four key bridges in
advance of General busch's 16th Army, and anti-communists in a
Lithuanian Division at Vilna shot their political commissars and
turned their unit over to the Germans. In Lemberg, in the
1. H. Hohne, Canar is, p. 46 0.
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south, Ukrainian members of the Brandenburg Regiment seized the
local radio transmitter on the night of 29-30 June and spread
disorder among the local populace and military by proclaiming an
independent West Ukrainian State.
The Germans directed an enormous psychological warfare
effort against the Red Army and achieved the surrender of
individuals and small groups as well as entire battalions. *
Consider that 14 million leaflets were air-dropped by 16 August
1941, the earliest date for which statistics are available, and
that other means of psychological war such as loudspeakers and
radio broadcasts were also used. Lieutenant General Wolfram von
Richthofen, VIII Air Corps Commander, has related that , by 11
July, the leaflet program had indeed produced tangible results
and that Soviet deserters said many more Red soldiers were ready
to desert but were afraid to do so without their own individual
leaflets, or "special life insurance certificate" as they called
them. Thereupon the Luftwaffe produced and distributed briefer
leaflets valid for several persons. As a result the number of
deserters clearly increased. 3 The overall German psychological
warfare effort reduced the number of Soviet soldiers in the field
opposing the German forces and disrupted C 3 in the cases of those
regiments and divisions from which entire battalions deserted.
1. P. Lever kuehn, German Military I ntelligence (Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1954), p. 165.
2. See Captain Bucks baum, German Psycholog ical Warfare on
the Russian Front 1941-1945
,
(Department of the Army, 1953), for
a detailed analysis of the German Psychological Warfare effort
and its effects.
3. See Plocher, German Air Force , Vol. I, p. 99.
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The tempo and surprise of the German attack simplified the
German tactical signals intelligence task because many normally
encoded Soviet radio transmission were sent in the clear for
battle expediency. Throughout the war against the Soviet Union,
the Germans considered the information produced by their signals
intelligence service as extremely credible. General Franz
Haider, Chief of the German General Staff, for example, noted in
his diary entry for 31 July 1941, information produced by signals
intelligence which delineated the new Soviet Army command
structure instituted on 10 July, complete with the names of the
new theater commanders. 2 Earlier, on 6 July, as Panzer Group 2
advanced towards Smolensk, signals intelligence informed General
Guderian of a new army headquarters directly to his front in the
Orsha area. Aware of this information, Guderian realized he
would have to hasten his attack across the Dnieper to prevent the
new army from establishing a coherent front and preventing the
seizure of Smolensk.-3 German divisions responded quickly to
signals intercepts and when the 9 7th Light Division at Lubaczow
on 22 June intercepted a message at noon indicating the enemy
could no longer endure its artillery regiment's punishing fires,
it pressed on and seized its objective by 1400."^ The Germans
also routinely intercepted Soviet facsimile transmissions which
1. Generalleutnant a. D. Nielsen, p. 152.
2. See Haider Diaries
, p. 1089.
3. H. Guderian, Panzer Leader , (Zenger, 1979), p. 166.
4. Adv_an<2_ed Combat Ope rations o_f the 8_l_s_t A_r_tJ._l_le£Y_
Reg iment W ith the 9 7 th Ligh t Div ision, 22 June- 1 Ju ly 194*1 ,
(unpublished, 1947). ' In files of U.S. Army, Office of Chief of
Military History.
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were sent by Soviet civilian agencies early in the war.
The Germans rarely entered Soviet radio nets for the purpose
of deceptive disruption but, during Barbarossa, there was at
least one incident of the Germans employing captured Russian
radios to enter Soviet nets for deceptive purposes. During July,
the Germans deceived the Soviets into redeploying Red Army units
in response to a phony threat developing along a wooded, swampy
area of the Luga River. This threat was conveyed via Soviet
radio nets and successfully relieved the pressure on German units
establishing a bridgehead across another section of the Luga
R i ve r .
1. Praun , Radio Intellig ence , p.227.
2. E. F. Raus, Dec ep t ion s and Cov er P lans f (unpublished,




Barbarossa Lessons and Conclusions
The research team reconstructed the German disruption of
Soviet command, control, and communication during the opening
stages of Barbarossa. The reconstruction was based on interviews
with German and Russian participants in Barbarossa, examination
of original unpublished documents at the West German Military
archives in Freiburg, examination of photographs at the Federal
Archives in Koblenz, and the use of various reference-type pub-
lished sources. The study takes the position that Soviet C3 was
part of a continuum which extends from command, control, and
associated communications hardware across a transportation net-
work to the combat forces assigned to field commanders. Soviet
C3, accordingly, could be disrupted not only by direct attack
against headquarters staffs and associated communications hard-
ware but also by the seizure or destruction of the transportation
system and the destruction of the assigned combat forces. In
considering C3 as part of a continuum which includes the
transportation system and assigned combat forces, the research
team cast the net of analysis widely enough to include factors
which had an impact on C3 and were necessary for the estab-
lishment of a satisfactorily complete picture of disruption.
In the study it was necessary to consider whether or not
there was a reasonable historical analogy between the existing
historical event, Barbarossa (1941), and a postulated Soviet
offensive. The Germans had synthesized various factors into a
successful military offensive at the beginning of a war in the
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planning and execution of Barbarossa (1941). Those factors are
listed below and displayed side by side with identical considera-
tions for a potential Soviet offensive in Central Europe:
Barbarossa Historical Analogy
Soviet Offensive
Barbarossa (1941) in Central Europe
1. Political state, medium size, 1. Political state, large
highly developed military style size, highly developed mili-
& technology: decision to attack tary style & technology:
large, inferior style & technol- decision to attack medium
ogy opponent (USSR). size, slightly superior style
& technology opponent (NATO)
.
2. (Fact) Attacker maintains 2. (Forecast) Attacker main-
secrecy, tains substantial secrecy.
3. (Fact) Attacker achieves stra- 3. (Forecast) Attacker achieves
tegic & tactical surprise. substantial surprise.
4. (Fact) Attacker seizes initi- 4. (Forecast) Attacker seizes
ative and effects concentration initiative and effects concen-
of effort. tration of effort.
5. (Fact) Attacker Superior in 5. (Assumption) Attacker
Technology, Tactics, Mobility, Slightly Inferior in Technol-
Flexibility. ogy, Tactics, Flexibility.
6. (Fact) Attacker Holds Initia- 6. (Forecast) Attacker Main-
tive for Six Months. tains Initiative in First
Engagements
.
Working within the framework of the factors noted above, the
German Army had to overcome 15,000 Soviet military aircraft,
20,000 tanks, and hundreds of thousands of riflemen controlled by
a primitive C3 system. In the first 18 hours of the campaign,
however, the Army achieved territorial gains which shattered
Soviet C3 in the Soviet Western Military District (Central Front)
through the seizure of crucial parts of the transportation system
and the concomitant displacement or destruction of numerous com-
mand centers of the Soviet ground armies. German Army Group
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Center continued to advance in the following two phases and
register the disruption noted below:
Barbarossa Results
( Success of the German Army
1. Bialystok-Minsk (22 June - 8 July 41) (Army Group Center )
a. Destruction HQ, 3rd Army, Traumatized Displacement HQ,
4th Army.
b. Penetration 500 km into USSR to Dnieper
c. Prisoners & KIA: 424,000 (loss ratio 88:1)
d. Tanks Destroyed or Captured: 3,332 (loss ratio 16:1)
2. Smolensk (9 - 27 July 41) (Army Group Center )
a. Traumatised Displacement HQ, Western Front
b. Penetration 750 km into USSR to East of Smolensk
(15 July 41)
c. Prisoners & KIA: 400,000 (loss ratio 72:1)
d. Tanks Destroyed or Captured: 3,106 (loss ratio 16:1)
3. General : Germans seize Smolensk "Land Bridge", stand
ready to attack toward Moscow opposed by decimated, unco-
ordinated Soviet field armies (27 July 41)
Soviet C3 collapsed in the face of the deep penetrations,
immense territorial gains, and casualties and damage achieved by
Army Group Center. The Soviet command, from the S tavka, or
general headquarters of the armed forces in Moscow, through the
Western Front, armies, corps, and divisions frequently lost track
of its own forces during this time and consistently failed to
coordinate counterattacks. Well over half way to Moscow by 15
July 1941, the German field armies stood close to victory in the
war by the middle of the summe_r of 1941.
Several lessons and warnings stand out from the achievements
of the German Army in Barbarossa (1941) and the establishment of
an historical analogy between Barbarossa (1941) and a future Soviet
offensive. The German Army completely disrupted and largely des-
troyed seven Soviet field armies on the Western Front by the last
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half of July 1941. If the historical analogy between the past
and postulated future offensive were strong, one would have to be
extremely pessimistic about the chances of the military survival
of NATO. In a more realistic and optimistic vein, however, it
can be considered that NATO is in a more alert posture with
relatively higher quality forces than was the case with the
defender in Barbarossa (1941). Such optimism is counterbalanced
to some degree by the forecast numerical superiority of the
attacking Soviets, the more closely matched technical and tacti-
cal qualities of the Soviet and NATO forces, and the assumption
that a significant degree of secrecy and surprise with accompany-
ing initiative and concentration of effort can be effected by the
attacker. The balance between Soviet weakness and strengths in a
postulated Soviet offensive in Central Europe can be summarized
as follows:
Postulated Soviet Offensive in Central Europe
(Barbarossa II)
Soviet Advantages
1. Limited NATO space.
2. Superior USSR Numbers.
3. Soviets As Attackers 3
Can Achieve Significant
Degree of Surprise.
4. Soviets As Attackers 4
Will Seize Initiative and
Concentrate Effort at
Crucial Points in Battle.




ical Style, i.e., Poten-
tially Inept Conduct of
Grand Offensive Opns.
Moderately Inferior Soviet








Limit Scope and Time of
Soviet Initiate and Con-
centration of Effort.
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The lessons and warnings of Barbarossa-style offensives
would be the following. The attacker accrues enormous advantages
by seizing the initiative and concentrating his effort at prede-
termined areas in the battle. The limited space for defense, the
well developed transportation network, sophisticated and readily
targeted C3, and the forward defensive strategy of NATO offer
great opportunities for the attacker. In Barbarossa (1941), the
Germans overloaded the defending Soviet command by advancing
across a broad front while concealing the points of main effort
in the background noise. It was only after approximately 72
hours of combat that the Germans accelerated out of the predeter-
mined areas of main effort to encircle major Soviet forces. In
an instructive twist in Barbarossa (1941), the defending Soviets
also took enormous casualties as attackers while attempting to
break through the German lines of encirclement. In a postulated
offensive in Central Europe, the Soviets may not be able to hold
on to the initiative so effectively as the Germans did in the
earlier Blitzkreig. The relatively greater mobility and flexi-
bility of the NATO forces may come into play rapidly enough to
block and cut off the Soviets along their main avenues of ad-
vance. Superior NATO C3 and historical command style could
contribute decisively to a successful NATO recovery from the
first rush of the Soviets. Yet the counterbalancing Soviet
advantages of a significant degree of surprise could result in
crippling attacks against the hardware sensitive NATO C3 and
overloading of the remains of the system with superior numbers
and concentration of effort at crucial areas in the battle.
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The Luftwaffe contributed heavily to the success of the
German Army in Barbarossa (1941) by immediately gaining air
superiority, giving the Army the resulting advantages of aerial
observation over the battlefield, and shifting from the destruc-
tion of Red Air Force aircraft and installations to intervention
in the ground combat by the beginning of the third day of the
war. The deeply penetrating German Panzer columns were largely
free from air attack, had excellent information about the enemy
from short and medium range reconaissance aircraft, and received
powerful, flexible fire support from tactically effective dive
and medium bombers. The defending Soviets were blinded in the
air, and harassed, damaged, and slowed in their movements on the
ground by the Luftwaffe. I_f the Soviet Air Force in Europe in a
Barbarossa-s tyle offensive can achieve a significant degree of
secrecy in its concentration and surprise in its attack, its
superior numbers and moderately high quality may allow it to gain
air superiority for a long enough period to give additional
impetus to the Soviet ground armies through interdiction and
paralysis of NATO movement and mobile fire support at the heads
of the advancing Soviet armored columns in fluid conditions of
combat tending to fragment air defense systems.
In reconstructing the German disruption of Soviet C3 during
the opening stages of Barbarossa, the research team accomplished
several specifically delineated research tasks. The tasks in-
volved the identification, assessment, determination, or gauging
of the effects of the German attacks in several areas of C^
interest. The research tasks, associated areas of interest, and
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the conclusions of the study are the following ones:
Research Task
1. Identify Soviet C3 which
Germans Planned to Attack.
2. Identify Soviet C3 which
German Actually Attacked.
3. Assess Germans' Success In
Disrupting Soviet C3.
4. Determine Shifts in C3
Hardware Being Targeted
5. Gauge Weight of German
Attacks vs. C3 in
Comparison With Attacks
Conclusions
1. German Army & Air Force
Planned to Attack Ex-









4. Germans Placed Little
Emphasis on Targeting of
Soviet C3.
5. Germans Directed Few
Air or Ground Attacks
vs. Soviet C^
In the immediate opening of Barbarossa, the German Army
targeted practically no Soviet C3 facilities with either
artillery fires or raids by special infantry or tank forces. The
Army concentrated its movement toward strategic terrain seizure
of which would assure the destruction of opposing major groupings
of the Red Army. The Luftwaffe targeted three facilities which
had been identified as building complexes possibly housing higher
staffs on the morning of 22 June 1941. The Luftwaffe launched
the remainder of the aircraft of the first wave in Barbarossa
entirely against the installations of the Red Air Force except
for a few missions in support of ground forces faced with unique-
ly difficult assaults demanding dive bomber attack. As the war
progressed through the first hours and following days, the Luft-
waffe shifted from attacks on Soviet air installations to raids
in support of the Army including (1) close air support against
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artillery positions, troops, fortifications, and armor, and (2)
interdiction of the Soviet transportation network. A small num-
ber of missions within the category of interdiction were carried
out against suspected Soviet headquarters and C3 telephone
exchanges in several larger cities. For both the German Army and
the Luftwaffe, the relatively primitive Soviet C3 system com-
prised targets which were difficult to locate. The Germans
considered such targets as having extremely high priority for
either attack or monitoring, as the tactical situation dictated,
but Soviet C3 installations and hardware remained predominately a
small number of targets of opportunity.
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APPENDIX A





























(1) This rank was reserved for Hermann Goering
(2) Ausser Dienst , signified by the initials a.D., refers to a




Luftwaffe combat aircraft strength on the East Front after one







BOMBERS 940 450/47 73 He-lll/Ju-88
DIVE BOMBERS 330 220/66 86 Ju-8 7
FIGHTERS 590 340/57 51 Me-109
DESTROYERS 85 35/41 83 Me- 110
1945 1045/53 64
*A total of 65 groups of aircraft - liaison, recce, and
transport
+This can be compared with 61 groups on the East Front at the
start of Barbarossa with a total strength of 1830 aircraft, of
which 1280 were operationally ready C?0 ?O . Two fighter and two
bomber groups had been transferred to the East during this period
SOURCE
Per Luftwaffenaufmarsch 1941 gegen Russland , Gen. Qu.
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